SEC Can't Force Help For Stanford Victims, DC Circ. Told

April 12, 2013
By Counsel for Appellee SIPC

The Securities Investor Protection Corp. asked the D.C. Circuit on Monday to affirm a landmark district court ruling declaring it doesn't owe compensation to victims of Robert Allen Stanford's $7 billion Ponzi scheme, suggesting the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission succumbed to political pressure in bringing the suit.

The SIPC asked the appeals court to affirm U.S. District Judge Robert L. Wilkins' decision dismissing the agency's application to compel the SIPC to pay the fraud victims' claims through a liquidation proceeding.

A top agency official had originally agreed that the SIPC did not owe funds under the Securities Investor Protection Act, SIPC claims, but that changed after U.S. Senator David Vitter, R-La., threatened to block the nominations of two SEC officials in June 2011, the SIPC said.

"The record shows that the SEC's general counsel agreed that SIPA did not apply to the Stanford case," the SIPC said. "It was only two years later that the SEC sought to force SIPC's hand, apparently bowing to pressure from a U.S. senator," referencing a June 14, 2011, press release from Vitter.

The corporation, funded by the brokerage industry to cover investors who lose money in failing firms, also claims the SEC didn't seek a liquidation until two years after its 2009 case against Stanford.

"If the SEC had thought the Stanford fraud was within the scope of what SIPA protects, it was under a legal obligation to notify SIPC immediately," the SIPC said. "The SEC did not do so, even though it filed an enforcement action against Stanford and secured the appointment of a receiver over U.S. Stanford assets in February 2009."

On July 3, Judge Wilkins ruled that Stanford's U.S.-based Stanford Group Co. was a member of the SIPC, but that the Antigua-based Stanford International Bank was not. Stanford International Bank Ltd. was an offshore bank, not a registered broker-dealer, which is what the SIPC oversees, Judge Wilkins said.

Judge Wilkins' decision was a major blow to victims of the Ponzi scheme, who together lost upwards of $7 billion in certificates of deposit administered by Stanford International Bank. It also carried broader legal significance, marking the first time since the enactment of SIPA 42 years ago that a federal court had ruled on how much power the SEC has to command a SIPC liquidation.

The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that brokerage customers cannot force such proceedings, but that the SEC has the authority to do so.

Because of its precedential nature, a key issue in the Stanford dispute was the standard of proof required of the SEC. The agency argued for a more lenient standard than the SIPC did, describing its burden as merely probable cause supported by hearsay. Judge Wilkins ultimately chose the higher standard requested by the SIPC: a preponderance of the evidence. In an SIPC liquidation, an investor must meet a preponderance standard to prove the validity of his or her claim.

In its appellate brief filed in January, the SEC said Judge Wilkins had taken a too-narrow view of the term "customer." The agency argued that transactions with both Stanford entities should be treated the same way under SIPA because the company operated "as a single fraudulent enterprise that ignored corporate boundaries."

"This interpretation of the statute to allow for flexibility in certain circumstances is the correct one, and it is at least a reasonable one that was entitled to deference by the district court," the SEC said.

The SEC added that it was not seeking customer status for all Stanford investors, but only for those who held accounts with Stanford Group Co., purchased fraudulent certificates of deposit through SGC and deposited funds with Stanford International Bank Ltd.

But SIPC said Monday that the terms of its mission were clear: to protect investors when a member brokerage fails, adding that Judge Wilkins' purportedly narrow view of the term 'customer' was appropriate.

"By its terms, the statute does not insure against fraud or investment losses, instead protecting only the 'customer' property that an SIPC-'member' brokerage firm holds in custody when the brokerage fails," the corporation added.

The corporation also said the SEC's case was unprecedented because it has not made similar requests in proceedings related to the downfall of a major financial institution.

"In 40 years and over 300 liquidation proceedings — including the recent liquidations ofLehman Brothers Inc., Madoff Investment Securities LLC, and MF Global Inc. — this is the first the the SEC had ever tried to compel a liquidation."

Stanford was sentenced in June to 110 years in prison for his role in the fraud.

SIPC is represented by Edwin John U, Eugene F. Assaf Jr., John C. O'Quinn, Michael W. McConnell and Elizabeth M. Locke of Kirkland & Ellis LLP.

The case is U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., case number 12-5286, in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

SIPC Response to SEC Appeal Brief.

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SEC MOTION TO INTERVENE AND TO SUSPEND THE MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF JULY 3, 2012

August 22, 2012
By Matthew T. Martens

Applicant U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission") respectfully submits this memorandum of law in response to Robert Cheatham's Motion To Intervene and To Suspend the Memorandum Opinion and Order of July 3, 2012 ("Motion To Intervene").

Mr. Cheatham contends that he may intervene as of right in this proceeding pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2). That provision states that intervention must be granted as of right, "[o]n timely motion," to anyone who "claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest." In other words, the right of a party to intervene depends on the following four factors:

(1) the timeliness of the motion; (2) whether the applicant "claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action"; (3) whether "the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest"; and (4) whether "the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.".

SEC Motion To Intervene and To Suspend the Memorandum Opinion and Order.

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Stanford Officer to Plead Guilty

	June 18, 2012 By VANESSA O'CONNELL Stanford Financial Group's top investment executive, Laura Pendergest-Holt, is expected to plead guilty to obstruction of justice Thursday for her alleged role in a $7 billion Ponzi scheme that was among the largest frauds in U.S. history, a person familiar with the case said. A spokeswoman for the Justice Department declined comment. The expected plea by Ms. Pendergest-Holt, Stanford's chief investment officer, follows the sentencing last week of convicted Ponzi schemer R. Allen Stanford to 110 years in prison. That punishment amounts to a life sentence for Mr. Stanford, 62 years old, who for years enjoyed the life of a billionaire aboard jets, yachts and in homes around the globe. He remains in federal custody until the U.S. Bureau of Prisons decides where he will serve the time.
Laura Pendergest-Holt
A Federal Bureau of Investigation affidavit filed in U.S. District Court in Dallas had alleged that Ms. Pendergest-Holt misled Securities and Exchange Commission investigators who took her testimony in the probe of alleged fraud at Stanford International Bank, Mr. Stanford's Antigua-based offshore bank. Ms. Pendergest-Holt was scheduled to go on trial in September. An obstruction charge can carry a three-year sentence.

Source.

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Stanford sentenced to 110 years over Ponzi scheme

June 14, 2012
By The Wall Street Journal

R. Allen Stanford, the once-highflying financier convicted of masterminding a $7 billion Ponzi scheme, was sentenced Thursday to 110 years in federal prison.

The punishment amounts to an effective life sentence for Stanford, who is 62 years old and used to live extravagantly aboard yachts, jets and homes around the world.

"I didn't run a Ponzi scheme, I didn't defraud anybody and there was never any intent to defraud anybody," Stanford, wearing a green prison jumpsuit, told US District Court Judge David Hittner before he was sentenced.

In a rambling statement, marked with long pauses as he choked up and wiped away tears, Stanford accused the government of using "Gestapo tactics" and blamed it for the billions of dollars in losses to his investors.

Stanford's sentence was 40 years less than the prison term given to Bernard Madoff, but 100 years more than his lawyers had asked for.

The sentence ends the three-year criminal prosecution of Stanford, who in March was convicted by a federal jury on 13 of 14 counts including fraud, obstructing investigators and conspiracy to commit money laundering.

Though investors continue to seek hundreds of millions of dollars from Stanford in a civil proceeding, the end of the criminal case closes a chapter on one of the most flamboyant figures in the annals of white-collar crime.

Source.

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Vitter Testifies at House Hearing, Continues to call for SIPC to Compensate Stanford Victims

March 7, 2012
For Immediate Release

(Washington, D.C.) - U.S. Sen. David Vitter today was invited to testify at the U.S. House Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Capital Markets about some of the ongoing problems at the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC). Vitter testified about SIPC's refusal thus far to compensate the victims of the Allen Stanford Ponzi scheme.

Since early 2009, Vitter has been the leading Congressional advocate for Stanford victims, many of whom live in Louisiana.

The text of Vitter's testimony as prepared for delivery is below.

Thank you, Chairman Garrett and Ranking Member Waters and members of the Capital Markets and Government Sponsored Enterprises Subcommittee, for inviting me to testify here today. Congress has given the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) incredible responsibility for protecting investors, and for that reason, it's vitally important and appropriate that we point the spotlight at SIPC to understand the ways that it is and is not working.

If there is one common cause between Stanford and Madoff investors, it's the way SIPC fought investors every step of the way and has absolutely refused to protect the victims of fraud. For three years the Stanford victims have been fighting just to have their day in court - and unfortunately, it's SIPC that they have to fight.

I fear we are in a situation where, if SIPC were a true financial regulator, we would call it regulatory capture. The actions of SIPC are dictated by the member companies rather than by the law. SIPC is functioning more like a trade association and advocate than a quasi-regulator.

I first became involved in the Stanford case because it has affected thousands of victims in the United States, and many of them live in Louisiana. Allen Stanford was adept at preying upon the savings of retired oil and gas workers in Louisiana in particular. Many of the victims have told me their entire savings has been lost because of the Stanford fraud, and that they have been forced to sell their home and re-enter the work force.

I want to be absolutely clear. I don't believe there is any need to change to the Securities Investor Protection Act in order to provide coverage for the Stanford victims. These victims are entitled to coverage under the law as it is currently written.

In the actual criminal case against Allen Stanford, he is accused of stealing customer funds. Instead of purchasing Stanford International Bank (SIB) "certificates of deposit" (CDs), the Stanford Group Company (SGC) which was a SIPC member, acquired control of its customers' funds and the funds were stolen by Allen Stanford. The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) and courts have taken the position in litigation related to the receivership of Stanford's estate, that the Stanford companies operated as a Ponzi scheme and, "a Ponzi scheme is, as a matter of law insolvent from its inception." And, just yesterday, a jury convicted Allen Stanford on 13 of 14 counts related to this case.

In Old Naples Securities, Inc. the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit held that customers of an introducing broker-dealer who thought they were purchasing bonds through the broker- dealer were "customers" of an introducing broker-dealer within the meaning of SIPA and entitled to coverage under the statute. The court held whether a claimant deposited cash with the debtor "does not... depend simply on to whom the claimant handed her cash or made her check payable, or even where the funds were initially deposited." Rather, the issue was one of "actual receipt, acquisition or possession of the property of a claimant by the brokerage firm under liquidation."

Previously, the SEC has argued that "a customer's legitimate expectations" ought to be protected "regardless of the fact that the securities were fictitious." It is impossible for an insolvent entity issue legitimate securities. In re New Times Securities Services, Inc., the owner sold fictitious mutual funds, as well as bona fide mutual funds to investors via a register broker dealer that was a SIPC member and a non-broker-dealer entity.

Forensic accounting, which was done by the court appointed receiver, shows that the SIB CDs were not purchased by SGC for its customers, and therefore they are not worthless securities with zero value as argued by SIPC. Instead, these CDs are fictitious. The SGC customer funds were never transferred to the Antiguan bank and there was never any money standing behind the CDs.

On June 5, 2011, the SEC Commission voted on a determination that SIPC should provide coverage for the Stanford victims. In the analysis of the case provided by the SEC to SIPC, the SEC explains that on the specific facts of this case, investors with brokerage accounts at SGC who purchased the CDs through the broker-dealer qualified for protected "customer" status under SIPA.

In reaching its determination, the SEC cited the conclusions in the report of the court appointed-receiver for SGC, who noted that the many companies controlled and directly or indirectly owned by Stanford "were operated in a highly interconnected fashion, with a core objective of selling" the CDs. Among other things, the receiver also noted that "[c]orporate separateness was not respected within the Stanford empire... Money was transferred from entity to entity as needed, irrespective of legitimate business need. Ultimately, all of the fund transfers supported the Ponzi scheme in one way or another, or benefited Allen Stanford personally."

A SIPA liquidation proceeding would allow investors with accounts at the SGC to file claims with a trustee selected by SIPC. The trustee would decide whether the investors have "customer" claims that are protected by the statute, and an investor who disagreed with the trustee's determination could seek court review.

However, the ultimate roadblock to the victim's day in court is SIPC.

During the eight months since the SEC made its determination instructing to provide protection to the Stanford victims, SIPC has tried every conceivable idea to drag out making a final determination.

After the SEC's determination, SIPC ran up $200,000 of charges in June and July of last summer in reviewing the court appointed receiver's documents - a cost that will be ultimately be paid for with the money set aside for the victims. When asked about these charges, SIPC claimed that it was in order to do research into a settlement offer to the victims. However, an official settlement offer never materialized.

During the time between the SEC's determination and the SEC ultimately filing an application with the DC Circuit Court to compel a SIPA liquidation, I had many calls and meetings with Orlan Johnson, then Chairman of SIPC and his staff, including Stephen Harbeck. Concerns were raised by both Mr. Johnson and his staff on a reoccurring basis, as far back as our first meeting on this issue, about the cost to the SIPC fund of covering Stanford victims and how SIPC member companies would react to the need for SIPC to increase its assessments. I stressed in our discussions that I believe the only focus should be on providing the victims with swift resolution under the law in a manner that takes into account the complex nature of the fraud and uses the forensic accounting that had already been undertaken.

In these meetings and on these calls, it seemed to me, that SIPC was more interested in the cost of the resolution and protecting its Wall Street member companies than it was in doing their duty, doing the right thing, and immediately initiating a formal liquidation proceeding in the Stanford matter as ordered by the SEC. In fact, I was told that SIPC felt they would be sued no matter what they ultimately decided to do. SIPC was certain they would either be sued by the SEC or sued by their member companies.

During the course of these meetings and phone calls it also became obvious that SIPC hired lawyers to defend itself from the SEC while still negotiating a settlement offer, and SIPC has shown every indication it will continue to litigate this matter in court.

Currently, SIPC is fighting the SEC in court trying to avoid being compelled to file a protective order which would ultimately allow individual victims to get a judicial review of the merits of their claims against SIPC. While this judicial review is certainly part of the SIPA process, it was intended to be more of a summary proceeding, and I think everyone would be surprised at some of SIPC's tactics they are willing to use in order to avoid compensating the victims.

In a filing on February 16th, despite the fact that SIPC has run up a charge of $200,000 dollars with the court-appointed receiver, SIPC asked the judge to allow a discovery of documents related to who the customers were, the certificates of deposit and the corporate structure of the Stanford Companies. In addition, on Monday of this week, SIPC asked the judge for approval to review all of emails and documents of the SEC's legislative affairs team in a fishing expedition in an attempt to find a past instance where a staffer at the SEC might have said something that disagreed with what the SEC ultimately voted on months or years later.

The SIPA statute is 41 years old, and SIPC has never challenged the authority of the SEC in court the way it is now. SIPC has decided to test the SEC's authority to compel SIPC to protect investors. If SIPC persists on this pat, SIPC will undermine the faith investors have in markets and in SIPC coverage itself. Although I hope SIPC will see the error of their logic, I realize that ship has already sailed. I will continue to work on behalf of Stanford victims and all of Louisiana victims of securities fraud.

Chairman Garrett, I want to close by once again commending you on this timely hearing. I hope that my testimony shows that though no additional legislative action is needed to provide SIPC coverage for the Stanford victims, they are facing what amounts to regulatory capture and are in a desperate search for ways to hold SIPC accountable. Hearings like this one are a very important step in that process. I encourage you to bring them back before this committee on a regular basis to answer for their actions.

I hope at some point to hear Mr. Harbeck and Ms. Bowen tell the victims why they feel comfortable running up a $200,000 tab at the expense who have lost everything.

Thank you again Chairman Garrett, Ranking Member Waters and Members of the Subcommittee for the opportunity to speak on behalf of the victims.

Congressman Bill Cassidy questions CEO of SIPC Stephen Harbeck

Related article:

STIPULATED FACTS for SGC Customers

The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and the Securities Investor Protection Corp. ("SIPC") have reached the stipulated facts that are attached hereto. In addition, the SEC is still attempting to confirm and the parties are attempting to reach a stipulation to the following effect: "SIBL did not provide its investors with U.S. tax Form 1099 for the income purportedly earned on the SIBL CD investments. SGC did not include SIBL CD ‘interest income' on the Forms 1099 it provided to investors."

The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and the Securities Investor Protection Corp. ("SIPC") hereby stipulate and agree to the following facts only for purposes of the abovereferenced matter:
At the specified times or at all relevant times:

1. Stanford Group Company ("SGC") was a Houston-based broker-dealer that was registered with the Commission and a member of SIPC.

2. Stanford International Bank, Ltd. ("SIBL") was a bank organized under the laws of Antigua.

3. SIBL offered certificates of deposit ("CDs") to investors. In order to purchase a SIBL CD, an investor had to open an account with SIBL. CD investors wrote checks that were deposited into SIBL accounts and/or filled out or authorized wire transfer requests asking that money be wired to SIBL for the purpose of opening their accounts at SIBL and purchasing CDs.

4. Most SGC investors either received the physical CD certificates or had them held by an authorized designee, including Stanford Trust Company. To the extent that some SIBL CD investors did not receive the physical certificates, the SEC is not relying on that fact to support its claims in this proceeding.

5. SIBL CD investors received periodic statements from SIBL reflecting the balances in their SIBL accounts, including their CD balances. (An example of such a periodic statement is attached as Exhibit A.)

6. In the United States, disclosure statements for SIBL's CDs stated that "SIBL's products are not subject to the reporting requirements of any jurisdiction, nor are they covered by the investor protection or securities insurance laws of any jurisdiction such as the U.S. Securities Investor Protection Insurance Corporation." (An example of such a disclosure document is attached as Exhibit B.) A version of the marketing brochures for SIBL's CDs stated that SIBL CDs "are not subject to the reporting requirements of any jurisdiction outside of Antigua and Barbuda, nor are they covered by the investor protection or securities insurance laws of any jurisdiction such as the U.S. Securities Investor Protection Insurance Corporation or the bonding requirements thereunder.
There is no guarantee investors will receive interest distributions or the return of their principal." (An example of such a marketing document is attached as Exhibit C.)

7. SIBL and Stanford Trust Company are not and never have been members of SIPC.

8. For purposes of its Application in this proceeding, the SEC is relying on investors' deposit of funds for the purchase of SIBL CDs; it is not relying on transactions involving any other securities (or funds for other securities).

Source and Exhibits.

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Stanford Told Investors "Lie After Lie" and now he is trying to "game the system"

January 28, 2012

Stanford's lawyer told the panel that the CDs sold by the Stanford bank weren't securities and that Stanford's clients had no say over how their money was invested.

Robert Scardino, one of Stanford's court-appointed lawyers called those CD purchasers "sophisticated investors" whom he said "know what a CD was and what it wasn't."

They also received promotional materials from Stanford's business disclosing that past performance was no guarantee of future success and that an investor could lose the entirety of an investment.

Well, it seems Scardino and defense lawyer Ali Fazel should look at these promotional materials from Stanford's business!

Gregg Costa, the lead federal prosecutor, has said that Mr. Stanford is trying to "game the system."

"You're still pushing that?" Judge Hittner responded incredulously when he heard from the defense lawyers that Mr. Stanford was unable to participate fully in his defense.

Trial Set for Financier Accused in Decades-Long Ponzi Scheme

Stanford Told Investors "Lie After Lie"

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KLS complaint against the U.S. Government/SEC

December 21, 2011
By Dr. Gaytri D. Kachroo

Ft. Lauderdale, FLA - A class action lawsuit was filed against the United States on December 13, 2011, for the billions in losses suffered by investors in the Allen Stanford international Ponzi scheme.

The case, filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida seeks to hold the SEC responsible for its failure to stop Stanford and his registered investment advisor and broker/dealer company Stanford Group Company ("SGC"), who the SEC investigated several times between 1997 and 2004. The suit claims that the SEC was grossly negligent in its actions following each investigation in failing to take any action to stop Stanford, whom SEC official had determined was operating a Ponzi scheme. The class action against the SEC was filed the day after the SEC filed suit against the Securities Investor Protection Corporation ("SIPC") for its refusal to reimburse investors for their losses.

"This case is unique because the SEC knew all along that this was a fraud and did nothing," said lead attorney Dr. Gaytri Kachroo of Kachroo Legal Services, P.C. (KLS), who is representing investors in the class action. "If the SEC had simply refused to register SGC for any of its various securities laws violations or reported to SIPC that SBC was a Ponzi scheme and insolvent, the SEC could have stopped this scheme over a decade ago."

In government investigations in 1997, 1998, 2002, and 2004, the SEC determined that Stanford was operating a Ponzi Scheme, but failed to take action to prevent his fraud. After increasing pressure from the Madoff collapse, the SEC finally acted in 2009, filing a case in federal court against Stanford and his companies, but only after investors had been defrauded of over $7 billion. The suit also alleges that the court-appointed SEC receiver has only been able to recover $100 million, net of expenses, out of the $7 billion investors lost because of the SEC's negligence.

The case is Zelaya et al. v. United States of America, Case No. 11-CV-62644-RNS (S. D. Fla. 2011).

CLASS ACTION AND INDIVIDUAL COMPLAINT.

Related article:
Stanford Investors Sue SEC for Losses in Alleged Swindle (Edward Gonzales)

Source: http://sivg.org/article/KLS_complaint_against_SEC.html

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SEC sues insurance fund in Stanford case

December 12, 2011
By Loren Steffy

The Securities and Exchange Commission, in an unprecedented move, sued a national brokerage insurance fund to force it to cover potential investor losses from R. Allen Stanford's alleged $7.2 billion Ponzi scheme.

The lawsuit, filed in federal court in Washington, would require the Securities Investor Protection Corp., or SIPC, to begin a liquidation proceeding for Stanford's U.S. brokerage, which was based in Houston. The liquidation would let customers file claims under federal investor protection laws.

The court action comes after months of negotiations between the SEC and SIPC failed to produce an agreement. SIPC, which is funded by the brokerage industry, has resisted covering losses in the 2009 collapse of Stanford Financial Group, saying the investments were certificates of deposit with an offshore bank rather than securities.

"It's time to get even tougher in our fight for the victims," said Sen. David Vitter, R-La., who led the fight in Congress on behalf of Stanford investors. "I've been urging SIPC Chairman Johnson to act quickly for months, but the victims still haven't received an up-or-down answer. This move by the SEC is encouraging and should significantly help the process."

Last week, Vitter pressed SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro to sue.

The SEC, which has oversight authority for SIPC, argued that the CDs constituted securities and were sold to investors through Stanford's SIPC-insured brokerage.

In June, the commission ordered SIPC to cover investor losses, much as it has for those who lost money in Bernard Madoff's Ponzi scheme, but SIPC's board didn't respond to the order.

"Because SIPC has declined to take steps to initiate the proceeding for the protection of Stanford customers, the commission filed suit today asking a court to compel it to do so," the SEC said in a statement.

Why it's fighting back

SIPC officials said they intend to fight the suit.

"After careful and exacting analysis, we believe the SEC's theory in this case conflicts with the Securities Investor Protection Act, the law that created SIPC and has guided it for the last 40 years," fund chairman Orlan Johnson said in a prepared statement.

Stanford's membership in SIPC reassured investors like Carl Rabenaldt, who works for a Houston engineering firm. He invested his retirement in the CDs in part because he thought his money was covered by SIPC. "Then, when there's a claim against it, they're finding reasons not to pay it," he said.

R. Allen Stanford is accused of defrauding thousands of investors by selling them certificates of deposit from his bank in Antigua, assuring them that the investments were safe.

He then allegedly used the money for other purposes, including funding a lavish lifestyle for himself and investing it in highly speculative private businesses.

Settlement offered?

SIPC last week offered to cover a portion of the Stanford investors' losses, but the SEC found the offer unacceptable, according to a person familiar with the discussions.

At a closed-door meeting Wednesday, the commission decided to proceed with the suit, the person said, adding that SIPC may still make another settlement offer.

SIPC, created in 1970, is designed to insure investors if a brokerage fails and cash or securities are missing from customer accounts. It isn't designed to cover losses from declines in investments' value.

SIPC officials had argued that the Stanford case is different than Madoff's. Stanford investors sent money to buy CDs directly to Stanford's Antiguan bank and therefore they weren't "customers" of the brokerage under the definition of the law, they said. In addition, they argued that Stanford's CDs, while worthless, did exist, and therefore insurance coverage isn't warranted.

The SEC contends the money investors thought was being used to buy the CDs was diverted for other purposes and the CDs were never actually purchased. Because the CDs were sold through the SIPC-insured brokerage, the insurance pool should cover the losses, it argued.

The coverage would apply to about 7,800 of Stanford's 20,000 investors worldwide.

Source.

Application of the Securities and Exchange Commission.

ANALYSIS OF SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION ACT COVERAGE FOR STANFORD GROUP COMPANY

The SEC has authorized its Division of Enforcement to bring an action in district court against SIPC to compel the institution of a proceeding to liquidate SGC under SIPA.

The Commission has determined that the statutory requirements for instituting a SIPA liquidation are met here. SGC is insolvent and the subject of a receivership. And for the reasons discussed below, the Commission has concluded that SGC has failed to meet its obligations to customers. Based on the totality of the facts and circumstances of this case, the Commission has determined (in an exercise of its discretion) that SIPC should initiate a proceeding under SIPA to liquidate SGC.

In concluding that investors who purchased the SIBL CDs through SGC qualify for protected "customer" status, the Commission finds two lines of cases applying SIPA particularly relevant. First, courts have held that, under certain circumstances, an investor may be deemed to have deposited cash with a brokerdealer for the purpose of purchasing securities-and thus be a "customer" under Section 16(2) of SIPA - even if the investor initially deposited those funds with an entity other than the broker-dealer. Second, courts have held that when securities purportedly acquired for customers by a broker-dealer are actually fraudulent vehicles for carrying out a Ponzi scheme, customers' "net equity" claims under SIPA can be measured by the net amount of cash customers invested and not by the purported but unreal value of the fraudulent securities (including fictitious "profits").

In In re Old Naples, the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether claimants who had deposited cash with an affiliate of a broker-dealer in order to purchase securities could nonetheless qualify as customers of the failed broker-dealer. The court held that the investors should be deemed to have deposited cash with the broker-dealer based on evidence supporting the bankruptcy court's findings that (1) the investors "had no reason to know that they were not dealing with" the broker-dealer; and (2) the funds investors deposited with the affiliate "were used by, or at least for," the broker-dealer, who "diverted some of the investors' money from [the affiliate] for personal use, and... used much of the money to pay [the broker-dealer's] expenses."

The totality of facts and circumstances in this case supports a similar conclusion about the status of the investors with accounts at SGC who purchased SIBL CDs, i.e., that by depositing money with SIBL, investors were effectively depositing money with SGC. Based on the findings of the Receiver and his expert investigators, the separate existence of SIBL, SGC, STC, and their ultimate, sole owner, Stanford should be disregarded.

In so doing, the court focused on the substance of the transactions rather than their form.

Credible evidence shows that Stanford structured the various entities in his financial empire, including SGC and SIBL, for the principal, if not sole, purpose of carrying out a single fraudulent Ponzi scheme. These many entities (controlled and directly or indirectly owned by Stanford) were operated in a highly interconnected fashion, with a core objective of selling fraudulent SIBL CDs.

Additionally, as in Old Naples, there are facts that could have led SGC account holders who purchased SIBL CDs through SGC to believe they were depositing cash with SGC for the purpose of purchasing the CDs. Defrauded CD investors have submitted affidavits stating that they were told by their SGC financial advisors that SGC and SIBL were both members of the "Stanford Financial Group," and that Stanford financial advisers frequently referred simply to "Stanford" without clearly distinguishing between SGC and SIBL. Affidavit of Sally Matthews

Both SGC and SIBL had the word "Stanford" in their names and used the same logo, and SGC provided at least some customers with "advisory statements" bearing that logo that listed their SIBL CD positions.

There is also credible evidence that, as in Old Naples, the funds deposited with SIBL were diverted for Stanford's personal use and used to pay the expenses of SGC.

In an August 14, 2009 letter to the Receiver, SIPC President Stephen P. Harbeck stated that "if SGC and SIBL are consolidated ... the CDs are, in effect, debts of SGC, and are part of the capital of SGC. Such a relationship negates 'customer' status under 15 U.S.C. § 78lll(2)(B) [as amended, § 78lll(2)(C)(ii)]." The Commission disagrees for the reasons the courts in C.J. Wright, Old Naples, and Primeline rejected similar arguments advanced by the SIPA Trustee as grounds for denying customer status. In C.J. Wright, the court found that claimants "believed they were depositing funds for the purchase of securities and were not told and were not aware that their investment was to become part of debtor's capital."

Read the complete analysis here.

Read the complete analysis with the attachment.

Related article: SEC Concludes Stanford Investors Are Entitled to Protections of SIPA

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION.

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Stanford's donations still stain lawmakers' hands

December 8, 2011
By Loren Steffy

In the battle over insurance coverage for investors who lost money in the collapse of Stanford Financial's U.S. brokerage, it's difficult to know who's on investors' side.

Recently, 27 lawmakers sent a letter to the Securities Investor Protection Corp., which is funded by the brokerage industry and overseen by the government, demanding that SIPC cover investors for their losses. SIPC granted similar coverage to clients of Bernard Madoff and the recently bankrupted commodities trader MF Global.

The 23 Republicans and four Democrats threatened to convene hearings in Washington next week if SIPC didn't act. That, apparently, is easier than living up to their own shortcomings.

Seven of the lawmakers who signed the letter received campaign contributions from Stanford. Only two - Rep. Michael McCaul, R-Austin, and Rep. Rep. Charles Boustany, R-La. - returned the money. Five others - Republicans Pete Sessions of Dallas, Lamar Smith of San Antonio and Vern Buchanan and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida, as well as Democrat Steve Cohen of Tennessee - owe Stanford's estate money, according to the court-appointed receiver in the company's bankruptcy.

The firm's namesake, R. Allen Stanford, liked to spread cash around Washington. The receiver has been trying to recover political donations for almost two years. About $1.8 million remains outstanding, and only about $142,000, has been returned.

Even more disturbing, five committees of the two political parties - the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, the National Republican Congressional Committee, the Republican National Committee and the National Republican Senatorial Committee - have refused to return a combined $1.6 million. Check please the complete list of Political contributions here.

In other words, while lawmakers are quick to call on the brokerage industry to insure the losses of Stanford's investors, they are far less willing to demand the same of themselves or their political parties.

Many of the elected officials who received campaign contributions from Stanford - including both Texas senators and Sessions - donated them to charity. That, however, doesn't let the politicians off the hook.

If Stanford was a fraud as the government contends, then the money is stolen. Donating stolen money doesn't eliminate the potential theft. Even if no theft is proved, the receiver is operating under a court order to recover money on behalf of investors, and donating it doesn't absolve lawmakers of the court's order.

Meanwhile, the Securities and Exchange Commission, which is charged with overseeing SIPC, ordered the fund to pay investors in June. So far, it hasn't. As recently as last week, SIPC's chairman sent a letter to one member of Congress saying SIPC disagrees with the SEC's decision.

Sen. David Vitter, R-La., had been trying to arrange some sort of settlement between the SEC and SIPC. Those efforts apparently fell through.

"The SEC needs to take definite action before the end of the year, and I'm afraid that's going to mean suing SIPC," he told SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro.

The SEC, of course, is making up for past mistakes. Having bungled earlier investigations into Stanford, it then took more than two years to reach a decision on SIPC coverage.

It may be getting tough now, but suing SIPC means investors, who have been strung along for almost three years, must wait even longer to find out if their losses are covered. Sadly, in this case, that's progress.

Source.

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International Victims Charge America to play Fair

October 22, 2011
PRESS RELEASED By Kate Freeman

In 2009 on the heels of the Madoff fraud, the Ponzi scheme operated by R. Allen Stanford was uncovered which has received widespread media coverage in the United States. What has not been widely reported is that only 4,000 of the 21,000 victims worldwide are US citizens. The remaining 17,000, the vast majority, are innocent victims from around the globe, who all have one common cause; to recover their life savings, stolen by the US citizen R. Allen Stanford, under the guise of his Stanford Financial Group, based in Houston, Texas, and regulated by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.

It is now almost three years since R. Allen Stanford was charged with fraud and his various enterprises wound-up and sold by the US court appointed receiver Ralph Janvey. Yet to date there has been no distribution of any funds recovered by the receiver, nor even a mechanism created whereby those funds can be fairly distributed equally among all the innocent victims, some of whom have lost their homes and become ill, while others have died waiting. Meanwhile the receiver, his general counsel, Kevin Sadler of Baker Botts, and the other advisors he has engaged are consuming all the available funds they have collected.

Further, in the United States there has been no recognition that anyone but US voters and taxpayers have been harmed by this massive fraud, perpetrated by a US citizen, based in Texas, where officials of the US regulator preferred to spend their time at work watching porn instead of taking the enforcement actions they were charged with, against a business they knew to be a fraud.

The failure of the SEC in detecting the Madoff Ponzi scheme has been well reported and investigated, yet some of those SEC officials who missed Madoff knew as far back as 1997 that Stanford may be a fraud. The Stanford empire was investigated by the SEC on at least four occasions, first in 1997, and they concluded even back then it was likely a massive Ponzi scheme, yet no action was taken, as the SEC did not think there were any American investors, consequently they permitted the fraud to continue and grow exponentially for a further twelve years, abandoning 21,000 innocent investors to their fate, simply because they believed it did not concern US interests. How wrong could they be, and how prejudiced in their negligence and blatant disregard for their duties.

The SEC have been investigated for their failure to detect the Stanford fraud, and heavily criticized. Their own Inspector General has stated that the depth of their failure is unbelievable; and US congressmen have claimed that the debt they owe the Stanford victims is enormous, and demanded that they should act swiftly, so families whose retirement and savings were stolen as a result of greed and government failure can begin to rebuild their lives.

Following the investigation, earlier this year many hundreds of innocent Stanford victims worldwide filed protective claims against the SEC for negligence under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The SEC have had their allotted six months to respond, yet remain unconscionably silent, with no regard for the consequences of their complicity, or the demands of elected officials.

Now the SEC finds themselves and their appointed receiver once again under investigation, for the way they have conducted this receivership.

The Securities and Investors Protection Act was passed by congress to provide a fund to repay innocent victims of US securities fraud, irrespective of their nationality or place of abode. It gave the registered broker/dealers a veneer of respectability and investors the comfort of believing there was a safety net should the worst happen and any of the US financial advisors they trusted turn out to be liars, crooks, or thieves.

It has taken the SEC two years, under considerable political pressure, to instruct SIPC to do the right thing, yet we now learn the number of innocent victims who believed they were eligible for compensation may be limited further, and that SIPC themselves may raid the receivership estate, to recover their losses at the expense of the remaining victims.

Whenever innocent foreign victims of the Stanford fraud have asked for recognition in the United States, invariably they have been told that Stanford operated his fraud from the small Caribbean island of Antigua, and what rights have they to expect that US authorities and officials have any obligation or other moral duty to extend assistance. The tentacles of the Stanford empire stretched halfway around the globe and in each of its outposts was portrayed as a safe, stable, and conservative institution backed by a major Texas based group, regulated in the US, extending equivalent protection to investors worldwide to that benefiting US citizens. Further, R. Allen Stanford, the founder and sole shareholder was compared by Forbes to the likes of UBS and Wachovia, who accredited him as one of the United States 400 wealthiest individuals, with a portfolio of $51bn under management. After the president of the United States, George W Bush, and a raft of US senators and congressmen also lent Stanford their endorsement, how could his credibility possibly be questioned further?

At the request of dissatisfied victims of the Stanford fraud, the courts have recently appointed two very experienced directors of Grant Thornton as joint liquidators of Stanford International Bank, and charged them to recover and distribute, fairly and equally, and in the shortest possible time, the losses stemming from the Stanford Ponzi scheme. Grant Thornton have been recognized as the most proper person to recover losses stemming from the Stanford fraud, with the best chance of success by courts in every jurisdiction worldwide, except in the United States, where the receiver, Ralph Janvey, and his 'official' investors committee, comprising mainly self-interested attorneys, have contrived to establish a network of vested interests which serve primarily to benefit themselves, and through which they have reached an agreement whereby they may charge excessive fees which may run to hundreds of millions of dollars, all at the expense of all the innocent victims. Grant Thornton has strived to reach a workable protocol with Janvey for the benefit the innocent victims, yet the vested interests in the US continue to block any agreement from being reached.

There are frozen funds overseas, to the tune of $250m that Grant Thornton wish to recover and distribute equally, transparently, and quickly, to all the Stanford victims worldwide, yet they have been further blocked by the United States Department of Justice, who seek to 'repatriate' those funds to the US, to be distributed; how? These are funds that did not originate from the US yet the DOJ insists that US minority interests should once again be given preferential treatment.

The perpetrator of the fraud R. Allen Stanford still awaits trial in Texas. Unlike Madoff he has not confessed, but pleads the fifth amendment; has changed attorneys as frequently as changing his socks; claimed incompetence; drug addiction; and now memory loss; what next? His trial has been postponed twice, and is now due to be heard in January 2012, meanwhile many of the initial charges have been dropped, and there are some who believe he may soon be granted bail, and conveniently disappear.

In a recent twist many of the lawsuits that may eventually benefit the victims of this fraud, already delayed two years due to restrictions imposed by the judge appointed by the DoJ to hear the criminal case against Stanford; may now fail entirely, following a ruling by another judge; appointed by the SEC to preside over the civil case, all at the expense of the innocent victims.

Enough is enough. The United States authorities and institutions have failed us all, not just US citizens, and we all deserve to be treated equally. We have all seen our entire life savings stolen by a US citizen who was permitted to operate for years due to the negligence of the US regulator, and we now find US court appointed officers determined to line their pockets at the further expense of the innocent victims, and through political pressure, place US citizens in a preferential position, while the perpetrator of the fraud continues to mock us all.

It may not appear so to the US victims of this fraud but the world is watching just how self-interested and how little regard some officials and citizens of the US appear to have for anyone but themselves.

All 21,000 innocent Stanford victims lost their life savings in this massive fraud. All the foreign victims ask is to be treated with fairness, equality, and with due respect. No more humiliation and injustice. Is it too much to ask that the officials of the world's most powerful, wealthy, and technologically advanced nation show some integrity, accept responsibility for the consequences of their complicity in the Stanford fraud, and make due recompense without further delay to each and every victim regardless of class, creed or citizenship.

Source in English.

Source in Spanish.

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Investors in Allen Stanford's Ponzi scheme are now at the mercy of a floundering receivership

October 8, 2011 Ralph Janvey was dealt a tough hand. The 61-year-old Dallas attorney was appointed in February 2009 to extract assets from the wreckage of R. Allen Stanford's empire on behalf of harmed investors. The Texas Ponzi schemer's businesses included 145 separate entities and assets spread out across more than a dozen countries. However, critics contend that Janvey is making a mess of an already complicated proceeding. Two and a half years into his term as receiver, Janvey has spent a lot and produced little. Some investors are complaining that Janvey's strategy is flawed, and accuse him of mismanaging funds.

Investors state that Ralph Janvey has taken all US$120 million of the assets thus far collected by him and already existing in the estate.

The Securities and Exchange Commission, which picked Janvey for the job, criticized his tactics and his spending early on, but since then has been quiet; the agency is now under scrutiny for possible lapses in its oversight of its receiver. Tensions between investors, the receiver, and the SEC are reaching a boiling point.

Contrast Janvey's progress to that of Irving Picard, the Baker & Hostetler partner and appointed trustee in the Securities Investors Protection Corp (SIPC) - supervised liquidation of Bernard Madoff's businesses. Picard has recovered more than $10 billion of $70 billion lost and, as of February, had spent about $290 million - 0.3 percent of recovered assets - on legal and professional fees. Janvey, by contrast, had recovered $209 million as of July, including $63 million in cash balances already in Stanford accounts when he was appointed. Out of $7.2 billion in vanished CD investments, only about 3 cents had been recovered per dollar lost. And nearly half had already been spent: $49.2 million toward professional fees and $49.2 million in costs related to the winddown of Stanford operations.

And things are not looking promising moving forward. Even if every penny is recovered from the frozen Stanford accounts abroad and from the 1.000 - plus defendants in 54 clawback and fraudulent conveyance suits - and outcome that Janvey recently called very inlikely - Stanford's investors are still looking at getting back a maximum of just 14 cents per dollar.

In fairness, receivership experts say that Janvey, of four-lawyer Dallas litigation boutique Krage & Janvey, inherited a far different situation than Picard. The Madoff trustee has recovered billions of dollars in settlements with Madoff "feeder funds", while Janvey has no low-hanging fruit to go after. Stanford subsidiaries, not feeder funds, funneled new investors into the sham CDs issued by Stanford's Antiguan bank. Moreover, Stanford's companies never relied on the deep-pocketed audit firms, which have been the targets of other receivers. Janvey's efforts to find and recover Stanford assets, unlike Picard's, have been mired in cross-border jurisdictional disputes, with a parallel Antiguan liquidation proceeding successfully vying for control abroad. Janvey has been shut out of $335 million in known Stanford accounts in Canada and Europe, and has been barred from Antiguan warehouses holding Stanford records that may contain information about additional money.

But Janvey's troubles are also a product of the choices he's made. While Picard's team has even earned the praise of opposing counsel, Janvey's team has managed to alienate many investors and other would-be allies like the SEC. "You know everyone in the courtroom is angry with you", the judge overseeing the Stanford receivership, Dallas federal district court judge David Godbey, said in August 2009.

A first, major misstep was Janvey's decision to freeze investor accounts and sue individual investors for the return of their principal, not just their profits, in a wholesale attempt to redistribute losses evently across all past and current investors. That is almost never done, say veterans of other Ponzi-scheme receiverships. The move prompted the SEC in June 2009 to ask Judge Godbey to rein in the receiver.

In another questionable move, in February 2011 Janvey's team sent out a spray of small-potatoes fraudulent conveyance claims that engendered a lot of ill will. His targets included a couple of children's hospitals, a Washington think tank, and a religious charity, among others. "These type of cases are very winnable, but it's very tough call to make politically", says Barnes & Thornburg partner John Mills III, who has represented receivers and examiners in Ponzi schemes.

Around the same time, Janvey lodged a slew of eight-to-low-nine-figure fraudulent conveyance claims against the PGA Tour, the Golf Channel, the Memphis Grizzlies, the Houston Rockets, and individual pro athletes seeking the return of money Stanford paid for endorsement contracts. Counsel says that such claims are much more difficult to win, since the contracts were fulfilled, and defendants are fighting them aggressively. "Under his theory, if Stanford made payments to Con Edison to keep his electricity on, it could be a potential target too", observes Akerman Senterfitt's Micahel Goldberg, an expert on Ponzi schemes.

Janvey declined to comment on these claims, but his lead counsel, Baker Bott's Kevin Sadler, notes that Stanford used investor money to promote the Stanford name, and it was instrumental in perpetuating the Ponzi deal.

Meanwhile, investor frustration has been growing. In July a group of investors led by Gaytri Kachroo, the former McCarter & English lawyer who vaulted to prominence as counsel to Madoff whistle-blower Harry Markopolous, filed a motion to intervene. The group claims that the seven member committee Janvey installed as the only investor voice with legal standing – which includes five lawyers and two investors - doesn't adequately represent investors' interests. Kachroo's clients allege that the lawyers on the committee, who have taken over suits originally developed by Janvey's legal team, are "double-dipping" in the estate. Under agreements approved by the judge earlier this year, the firms are eligible for a quarter of any recoveries. Those contingency fees, Kachroo asserts, come on top of retainers each firm had already signed with individual investors. (Retainer contracts ranged from $500 to $20.000 per investor, according to copies provided to The American Lawyer). "The committee filed dozens of identical, boilerplate lawsuits based on the receiver's investigation, and will be rewarded generously for little or no work", Kachroo charges. Butzel Long partner Peter Morgenstern, a committee member representing roughly 1.000 investors, counters by saying that the retainer fees cover matters such as processing individual claims in both Stanford proceedings, regular communications with clients, and filing class actions on behalf of investors. The double-dipping notion "is a nonissue", he says. "We're all working awfully hard, and the finger-pointing and personal attacks are not constructive". At press time the judge had not yet ruled on the motion.

But all of the noise created by unhappy investors has finally caught the attention of the SEC. In July, David Kotz, the agency's inspector general, announced an investigation into the SEC's handling of the receivership. Though the scope of the investigation is still being determined, the office will be looking at potential misconduct or negligence by SEC staff, Kotz says. And in August, after facing intense pressure on Capitol Hill, the SEC declared that Stanford's victims are entitled to relief from SIPC, and has asked it to take over the liquidation of one of the 145 Stanford entities. Should that happen, it would flip the Stanford brokerage unit over to the control of bankruptcy court and a new SIPC -appointed trustee- leaving Janvey's future role in recovery efforts up in the air. A decision was expected in late September.

"You know everybody in the court is angry with you", THE JUDGE OVERSEEING THE STANFORD RECEIVERSHIP SAID BACK IN 2009. It's still true.

Source.

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S.E.C. Files Were Illegally Destroyed, Lawyer Says

August 17, 2011
By EDWARD WYATT

An enforcement lawyer at the Securities and Exchange Commission says that the agency illegally destroyed files and documents related to thousands of early-stage investigations over the last 20 years, according to information released Wednesday by Congressional investigators.

The destroyed files comprise records of at least 9,000 preliminary inquiries into matters involving notorious individuals like Bernard L. Madoff, as well as several major Wall Street firms that later were the subject of scrutiny after the 2008 financial crisis, including Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Citigroup and Bank of America.

The S.E.C. is the very agency that is charged with making sure that Wall Street firms retain records of their own activities, and has brought numerous enforcement cases against firms for failing to do so.

The agency's records were routinely destroyed under an S.E.C. policy, since changed, that called for the disposal of records of a preliminary inquiry that was closed if it did not get upgraded to a formal investigation, according to Congressional records and people involved in inquiries into the matter. The agency believes that both the original policy and the new rules comply with federal document-retention laws.

John Nester, an S.E.C. spokesman, said that while the agency was not required to retain all documents, it changed its policy last year regarding destruction of files for "matters under investigation," the category of initial inquiry by the S.E.C.'s enforcement division that is the subject of the current scrutiny.

Changes were made to the S.E.C. policy after questions about the document destruction were raised in early 2010 by Darcy Flynn. Mr. Flynn, an employee of the S.E.C.'s enforcement division for 13 years, began a new job in January 2010 helping to manage the disposition of records for the division. Mr. Flynn, who continues to work at the S.E.C., has sought protection under federal whistle-blower laws.

The document disposal, which was first reported by Rolling Stone magazine on Wednesday, is the subject of inquiries by the Senate Judiciary Committee; the National Archives and Records Administration, which oversees laws governing federal agency records; and the inspector general of the S.E.C., according to the records and to people involved in the investigations.

In addition to whether the document disposal violated federal laws about government records, officials are concerned that the S.E.C. policy might have hindered later investigations into the same people or companies or covered up wrongdoing.

"These records may contain critical information that could be extremely useful in piecing together complex cases, even if not immediately pursued," Senator Charles E. Grassley, an Iowa Republican who is the ranking member on the Senate Judiciary Committee, wrote in a letter to the S.E.C. on Wednesday.

Mr. Nester declined to comment on Mr. Grassley's letter or on a letter to Mr. Grassley from a lawyer for Mr. Flynn that laid out the allegations in detail.

H. David Kotz, the S.E.C. inspector general, said that he was investigating the issue and hoped to complete a report by the end of September. A spokesman for the National Archives did not respond to requests for comment late Wednesday afternoon.

The National Archives wrote to the S.E.C. last year, saying that it "appears that there has been an unauthorized disposal of federal records," and asked for further information, according to Mr. Flynn's chronology.

Mr. Flynn said that S.E.C. officials discussed whether to lie about the document destruction because they might be open to criminal liability. Unlawful and willful destruction of federal records is punishable by up to three years in prison.

The S.E.C. replied to the National Archives in a letter, saying that it was "not aware of any specific instances of the destruction of records" that should have been retained. It added that it "cannot say with certainty that no such documents have been destroyed over the past seventeen years."

The letter from Mr. Flynn's lawyer said that the old document destruction policy gave S.E.C. officials assurance that if they closed an inquiry without upgrading it to a formal investigation, there would be no record of their actions.

It is common for S.E.C. employees to leave the agency for the private sector and then begin representing clients before the agency. Mr. Flynn contends that the practice increases the likelihood that S.E.C. investigators could do undetected favors for former colleagues and their clients by quashing investigations.

Whether that revolving door led to the closing of an investigation in 2001 involving Deutsche Bank and the destruction of the files is part of the investigation by the S.E.C.'s inspector general.

Source.

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