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Montag, 6. Oktober 2014

Announcement from Allen Stanford

To the Stanford International Bank depositors, and clients of the global Stanford Financial Group

As this is the first statement from me since the February 17, 2009 destruction of the global Stanford companies, and my imprisonment for allegedly operating a fraud that has been referred to as a "Ponzi scheme", I want to be direct, clear and emphatic. The actions taken by the U.S. government against me and my companies and that resulted in such harm to so many of you, was baseless, opportunistically contrived and, most importantly, unlawful. To many of you, and especially those of you who believe in and trust the accuracy and veracity of the American media machine, for now I will simply advise you of the series of legal actions taken by me in recent months and ask that you look at them on line, read them carefully and then follow their progress through the American legal system. In the coming days and weeks, as these legal initiatives make their way through the courts I will be posting a daily message on this site to keep informed those of you who have been harmed.
Meanwhile, I want all of you to know, the many of you around the world who entrusted me and my companies with your investment monies, that it is my intent, and in fact my mission in this life, to restore my good reputation as an honest man, and to personally repay each and every one of you... in full ...each and every dollar that was so wrongfully taken from you by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The manner in which I intend to achieve this will be made clear in the coming weeks.

Thank you,

R. Allen Stanford

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Anuncio de Allen Stanford

A los depositantes de Stanford International Bank y clientes del global Stanford FinancialGroup
Como éste es la primera declaración de mí parte desde la destrucción de 17 de febrero de 2009 de las empresas mundiales de Stanford, y mi encarcelación por presuntamente operar un fraude que se ha referido como un "esquema Ponzi", quiero ser directo, claro y enfático. Las medidas adoptadas por el gobierno de Estados Unidos contra mí y mis empresas y que dio lugar a un daño para tantos de ustedes, fue infundada, oportunamente ideado y, lo más importante fue ilegal. A muchos de ustedes y especialmente aquellos de ustedes que creen en y confían en la exactitud y veracidad de la maquinaría de los medios estadounidenses, por ahora simplemente le aconsejaréque revisen una serie de acciones legales tomadas por mí en los últimos meses, y lean atentamente y luego sigan su progreso a través del sistema legal estadounidense. En los próximos días y semanas, a medida que estas iniciativas legales hacen su camino a través de los tribunales, voy a publicar un mensaje diario en este sitio para mantener informado a aquellos que han sido perjudicados.
Mientras tanto, quiero que sepan,a todos ustedesalrededordel mundo quienes confiaron en mí y mis empresas con sus fondos de inversión, que es mi intención y de hecho mi misión en esta vida, restaurar mi buena reputación como un hombre honrado y para personalmente pagar todos y cada uno de ustedes... en su totalidad.. .cada y todo dólar que tan injustamente le fue quitado por la Securities and Exchange Commission.
La manera en la cual tengo la intención de lograr este objetivo se realizará en las próximas semanas.
Gracias
R. Allen Stanford
 

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Sonntag, 28. September 2014

Una breve descripción de cada punto en la apelación de Stanford

I. si la Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) tenía jurisdicción y autoridad reguladora sobre Stanford International Bank Limited (SIB), o sus certificados de depósito (CD). Y si, después de la acción civil de la SEC, la acusación penal del Departamento de Justicia (DOJ) era defectuoso.

No creemos que el gobierno puso en evidencia o demostró que la SEC tenía autoridad para investigar Stanford International Bank, que era un banco offshore.

En primer lugar, la SEC no tiene la autoridad para investigar los bancos en general, mucho menos un banco offshore [extranjero]. Así que no tuvieron ninguna autoridad legal para exigir al Sr. Stanford para participar o colaborar con una investigación de su banco, para lo cual no tenían ninguna autoridad legal para investigar.

El 18 de julio de 2014, en la 'Securities and Exchange Commission v. Securities Investor ProtectionCorporation'. (SEC v. SIPC) (caso Nº 12-5286) el D.C. circuito determinó concluyentemente y ordenó concluyente, que los CDsofrecidos por el Banco extranjeroInternacional de Stanford fueron; (a) no "valores" como definición por, o regulación bajo las leyes federales de valores de Estados Unidos y en cambio eran; (b) “obligaciones de deuda"del banco, que eran; (c) no "vendido" a través de, o por Stanford Group Company y por lo tanto; (d) los compradores de esos CDs no fueron "clientes" del SGC y por lo tanto nunca estaban bajo la jurisdicción o sujetos a la autoridad reguladora de la U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

El 05 de septiembre de 2014 la Securities and Exchange Commission concedió a los hechos antes mencionados como lo decidió el Tribunal de circuito de D.C. y decidió que no apelaría dicha decisión.

Más allá de la cuestión de la extraterritorialidad - que es que Estados Unidos nunca tuvo jurisdicción ni autoridad reguladora sobre el Stanford International Bank - el Departamento de justicia amplió su nueva acusación reemplazando las fechas de las supuestas ofensas desde 1999-2009 (en su acusación del 18 de junio de 2009)(Doc. 1) hasta 1990-2010 (doc. 422). Este incremento (desde el año 1990hasta el año 2010) no sólo ocasiona que esta acusación sea "defectuosa", sino que también representa otro objetivo del DOJ que es el "fraude a la corte".

Para comenzar con - y más allá del hecho de que en febrero de 2010 el acusado Stanford había estado bajo custodia federal un total de ocho meses - en 1990 el estadounidense (Broker/Dealer) Stanford Group Company aun no existía.

Contrariamente a sus afirmaciones en la nueva acusación, AUSA Costa sabía que los CD emitidos por SIB no fueron "ofrecidos" por SIB ni "sugeridos" por SGC a ciudadanos estadounidenses o residentes hasta el año 1998 - un completo ocho años más allá del marco de tiempo alegado en la acusación.

En la elaboración de su nueva acusación, el Departamento de justicia se dio cuenta que una gran cantidad de riqueza del demandado Stanford fue creada a través de empresas de bienes raíces antes de 1998-el año de su presentación "Reglamento D" ante la SEC y mucho antes de que SIB comenzara a "ofrecer" y la SGC comenzaraa "sugerir" los CDs a los ciudadanos estadounidenses.

Al expandir el año del "esquema fraudulento" desde 1990, el Departamento de justicia entonces fue capaz de afirmar que esa riqueza pre-1998, "justifica" su liquidación ilegal por parte del receptor y evita que el acusado Stanford pueda acceder a cualquiera de esos activos para utilizarlos en su defensa. Y lo más importante, al expandirse el año del "esquema fraudulento" adelante a 2010, pudieron crear la apariencia que el acusado era culpable por las pérdidas que se produjeron un año después de la fecha de la TRO (Orden de restricción temporal) - un momento cuando el receptor designado por el Tribunal estaba en control, y cuando Stanford era incapaz (prohibido por el gobierno) de honrar las obligaciones de SIB.


II. si los simultáneos juicios civiles y penales (y sanciones), basado en los mismos eventos subyacentes, eran violaciones de la cláusula de debido proceso de la Quinta y Octava enmiendas, y de la protección del acusado Stanford debido a doble juzgado.

El 16 de febrero de 2009 la Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) presentó una denuncia civil en el distrito norte de Texas (División de Dallas) y solicitó una orden de restricción temporal (TRO) para hacerse con el control de todos los activos globales del demandado Stanford, tanto personales como corporativos. La SEC solicitó el nombramiento de un síndico/receptor Ralph S. Janvey.

El receptor fue específicamente dirigido y autorizado para:
"Realizar todos los actos necesarios para conservar, mantener, administrar y preservar el valor del Banco, con el fin de evitar cualquier irreparable pérdida, daños o lesiones al Banco".

Antes de cualquier hallazgo de irregularidades, ya sea civil o criminal, en febrero 24 del 2010, el Tribunal Civil de Dallas había aprobado la venta de dos buques propiedad del acusadoStanford. En la aprobación de esta venta, juez Godbey ordenó al receptor "secuestrar” la mitad del producto de ambas ventas.

Esto y otras prematuras ventas y desembolsos de sus activos, fueron una presunción de culpabilidad, un verdadero hecho consumado inconstitucional.

"Este receptor y su equipo han pasado importantes cantidades de tiempo en estas actividades, las principales actividades han sido coordinación con la SEC, el FBI y el Departamento de justicia en la identificación y reuniendo grandes cantidades de documentos e información relevante para sus investigaciones en curso y responder a numerosas y extensas solicitudes de la SEC, el FBI y el Departamento de justicia para analizar y proporcionar información y documentos."

"Una parte importante del trabajo de FTI (Karyl Van Tassel) involucró la recopilación de información a petición de la SEC, el FBI y el Departamento de justicia en relación con sus investigaciones, utilizando numerosas bases de datos complejas, correos electrónicos, registros contables, documentos financieros y archivos encontrados".

De hecho, los informes de investigación generados por esta firma FTI, y financiado por la administración judicial de Stanford, fueron utilizados por el gobierno como la Fundación de todo su caso.

El acusado Stanford presentaría que esto es sin lugar a dudas "apoyo" de su argumento de que las investigaciones civiles y criminales fueron efectivamente una acción concertada y llevado a cabo como uno solo.

Janvey y FTI en realidad estaban realizando "una parte significativa" de lasinvestigaciones del SEC, el FBI y el Departamento de justicia.

En Estados Unidos v. Kordel, 397 US 1, 11 (1970), el Tribunal Supremo citó cinco situaciones en las que puede resultar una constatación de una violación del debido proceso. En el caso de Stanford encontramos tres de ellos:

1). Si el Gobierno realiza una acción civil únicamente para la obtención de pruebas para su enjuiciamiento penal.

2). Considerando que el acusado razonablemente teme perjuicio adverso de publicidad previa al juicio u otra lesión injusta.

3). Considerando que existe cualquier otra circunstancia especial que podría sugerir la inconstitucionalidad, o incluso la inconveniencia de un proceso penal.


III. si el Tribunal violó la Cuarta enmienda del demandado Stanford contra cateos ilegales y búsquedas al:

a)PERMITIENDO QUE LA ORDEN (CIVIL) DEL RECEPTOR FUERA UTILIZADO COMO UN "RECURSO DE ASISTENCIA"

El 17 de febrero de 2009, el receptor designado en materia civil, entró en las oficinas de Stanford FinancialGroup (en Houston y en otros lugares), con el propósito de agarrar el control de todoslos papeles y documentación electrónica indicados en la orden del receptor (vol. 6) (USCA5 1478-1488). Este receptor fue acompañado por U.S. Marshals, policías y agentes del FBI que, basado en la invitación aparente del receptor, eran libres para llevar a cabo un registro sin orden judicial e incautación de varios elementos en las instalaciones, de los cuales el Departamento de justicia utilizaría más adelante en la subsecuente investigación criminal y el enjuiciamiento.

El Tribunal (juez Hittner) - pero usted dice fue confiscado... se han incautado en una acción civil y el receptor en la acción civil entregó al gobierno.
Sr. Fazel - correcto. Pero estamos diciendo que la cuarta enmienda se aplica porque la acción del estado se produjo cuando los oficiales - oficiales de policía fueron interactuando con el receptor.
El Tribunal - cómo puedes volver y limpiarlo en una situación como ésta? Creo que es imposible, porque no tenían ninguna orden, eso es seguro.
Sr. Fazel - eso es seguro.

En violación de los derechos del acusado Stanford bajo la cuarta enmienda, la objeción del abogado fuéDENEGADA y la prueba 1500 (agenda de RAS con números telefónicos) - obtenida sin la orden de registro requerida - fue admitido como evidencia.

Más evidencia de que la orden de receptor fue utilizada como una orden general o "recurso de asistencia" puede encontrarse en el acceso y admisión de la prueba 616 del gobierno (2006 faxes y cartas entre Sr. King y Alvarado Re: proyecto de respuesta a ECCB).

"El baluarte de la protección de la cuarta enmienda" requiere que la "policía obtenga una orden de un magistrado neutral y desinteresado antes de embarcarse en una búsqueda" Franks v. 438 de Delaware, Estados Unidos 154 (1978). No importa si estos artículos fueron "puntualmente proporcionados" a las agencias gubernamentales o recogidos por ellos de manera independiente, ellos accedieron sin una orden judicial mediante la utilización de la orden del receptor como un "recurso de asistencia".

b)PERMITIENDO QUE EL RECEPTOR DESIGNADO ACTUARA FUERA DEL ALCANCE DE LA ORDEN DE RECEPTORIA.

El 06 de enero de 2012, el defensor Stanford presentó una "Moción para suprimir" y solicitar una audiencia probatoria. (vol. 5)(USCA5 1435-1474) Este movimiento también fue negado por el Tribunal (juez Hittner), y no se llevó a cabo ninguna audiencia probatoria.

Específicamente, la cuestión en este asunto preocupa al receptor por acceso no autorizado y difusión de información completa de las cuentas del cliente de Stanford International Bank que estaban almacenadas en las bases de datos 'Datos Pro' y 'Temenos' ubicado en Antigua y protegido por las leyes de secreto y privacidad de banco de Antigua y Barbuda (Bus Intl. 244(1)) CorpAct. Lo que supera el alcance de la orden del receptor y por lo tanto su autoridad, este acceso ilegal y no autorizado de información sobre las cuentas del cliente del SIB fue alcanzado por una "carta de autorización" por Ralph S. Janvey (receptor) al Sr. Sohil Merchant, el empleado de Stanford que había diseñado las bases de datos y por lo tanto sabía eludir el sistema de seguridad de las computadoras del banco.

Cuando esta información inesperadamente falló en producir una sola "víctima" y en cambio sirvió para desmentir completamente estas acusaciones de esquema Ponzi y exonerar al demandado Stanford, la compañía de contabilidad forense (FTI) secuestró esas Temenos/DataPro bases de datos en un almacén controlado por FTI y lejos de la defensa de Stanford -inaccesibles en Washington, D.C.

El acceso (ilegal) fue completado y como admitió el Director Gerente de FTI (Karyl Van Tassel), estas dos DataPro y Temenos bases de datos habían sido trasladados desde Houston a Washington, D.C., fuera de capacidad en presupuesto restringido de la defensa para accederlas.

Karyl Van Tassel:Nosotros tenemos una base de datos con la información del CD de SIB, Temenos y DataPro.
Michael Stanley (abogado): está bien. ¿Dónde están localizados?
Karyl Van Tassel:Yo diría que el Temenos y DataPro están en la oficina de Washington...
Con respecto al caso de Stanford, el 26 de febrero de 2009, y previo a este acceso ilegal de información de privacidad protegida por ley, el Tribunal superior de Antigua y Barbuda emitió una orden (vol. 6) (USCA5 1727-1750) en la que explícitamente dice:

"(1) no divulgación de información específica del cliente está autorizada sin más, o de otro, orden de la corte; y (2) No divulgación de información está permitida bajo esta orden a cualquier gobierno extranjero o un organismo regulador a menos que dicha divulgación está sujeta a obligacionesde divulgación mutuas. Para los propósitos de esta orden, información específica del cliente significa información suficiente de detalle para permitir identificar el cliente en cuestión, la dirección del cliente o el monto de tales créditos saldos u otras inversiones de las cuentas." (vol. 6)((JSCA5 1729-1730)

El Departamento de justicia estadounidense reconoce que búsquedas hechas en otro país y llevadas a cabo por 'estatales' (americanos) (o Ralph Janvey, actuando como un "oficial" de la corte del juez Godbey) deben realizarse con el consentimiento de los locales del país y sus leyes.

En este caso ninguno de estas instrucciones de la Corte Suprema o garantías relacionadas con los tratados o protocolos se adhirieron. Como es evidente, el receptor (Ralph Janvey) esgrimió la orden civil como un "recurso de asistencia" y superaba con creces su alcance. Además de su amplia investigación asistencia y coordinación con los investigadores (penales), mediante la emisión de esta "carta de autorización" para el acceso de datos, protegidos por la ley de privacidad, ubicados en Antigua, violó las leyes de la nación soberana de Antigua y Barbuda tanto las leyes del Tratado de los Estados Unidos.

Finalmente y lo más importante en estos procesos, como este ilegal acceso, (justificativo) Temenos y DataPro base de datos, se prestó al FBI y muy claramente y de forma selectiva fue utilizado por el gobierno en el juicio, bajo Brady v. Maryland Estados Unidos (1963) debería haber sido, pero nunca fue, proporcionado a la defensa.


Por lo tanto, en su semblante de este acto, seguido por el uso de esta información y fallapara ser proporcionada a la defensa, los fiscales de Estados Unidos violaron, de la manera más atroz, tanto la normativa de los descubrimientos y la cuarta enmienda del demandado Stanford al debido proceso y protección desde cateos ilegales y confiscaciones.


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Freitag, 12. September 2014

Appeal of Robert Allen Stanford - Sep. 10, 2014

Following part of the appeal of Stanford.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

I. Whether the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had jurisdiction and regulatory authority over Stanford International Bank Limited (SIB), or its Certificates of Deposit (CDs). And whether, following the SEC's civil action, the Department of Justice's (DOJ) criminal Indictment was defective.

II. Whether the simultaneous civil and criminal prosecutions (and sanctions imposed), based on the same underlying events, were violations of the DueProcess Clause of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments, and defendant Stanford's protection from Double Jeopardy.

III.Whether the Trial Court violated defendant Stanford's Fourth Amendment protection from illegal searches and seizures.

IV. Whether the District Court abused its discretion when it failed to hold a pre-trial Hearing to determine whether defendant Stanford had any "untainted" funds that could be used to pay for his defense.

V. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion by (a) disqualifying defendant Stanford's competent counsel of choice, and; (b) forcing ill-prepared appointed counsel to proceed to trial.

VI. Whether the Trial Court violated defendant Stanford's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial, by failing to provide appropriate responses to Jury Notes Two and Three.

VII. Whether defendant Stanford was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial, because pre-trial publicity precluded the assembly of an impartial jury.

VIII. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion by first deeming defendant Stanford competent, and then failing to grant him adequate time to prepare an effective defense, assist his counsel, or prepare to testify on his own behalf; in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial.

IX. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion by denying defendant Stanford adequate time to prepare an effective defense.

X. Whether the Trial Court violated defendant Stanford's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial by failing to provide the jury with a "unanimity of theory" instruction specific to which "misrepresentation" (element), on each of the mail fraud and/or wire fraud Counts constituted the overall "scheme to defraud."

XI. Whether the Trial Court violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, by proceeding with evidence which was insufficient to prove the essential elements of the mail fraud statute.

XII. Whether the Trial Court violated defendant Stanford's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial by issuing a modified "Allen charge" that was coercive.

XIII. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion by enhancing defendant Stanford's sentence based on information not found in any Count of the Indictment, and that was neither entered into evidence, nor submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

XIV. Whether the Trial Court, through its rulings, demonstrated a partiality in favor of the Government that denied defendant Stanford an opportunity to present an adequate defense, in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to Due Process, and his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.

XV. Whether under the Cumulative Error Doctrine the issues presented here amount to a denial of defendant Stanford's Constitutional right to a fair trial, and thus undermined the reliability of the verdict.

STATEMENT I

Mr. McGuire: Specifically, as to Count 12, which is the Conspiracy to Obstruct the SEC Investigation; we don't believe the Government put on any evidence or showed that the SEC had authority to investigate Stafford International Bank, which was an offshore bank.
First of all, the SEC does not have the authority to investigate banks in general, much less an offshore [foreign] bank. So, they had no lawful authority to require Mr. Stanford to participate in or cooperate with an investigation of his bank, for which they had no lawful authority to investigate... (vol. 56)(USCA5 11534-11535)

For instance, at a pre-trial Hearing where the Government was requesting a Motion in Limine, barring any discussion about SIB's eligibility or ineligibility to access federal bailout money (TARP Funds), the prosecution pointed out the following:

AUSA Stellmach: There are two points, Judge; one, we just want to preclude any suggestion that the SIB was ever eligible. Foreign banks only received funds if they had U.S. subsidiaries, which Mr. Stanford's bank did not, because he didn't want to subject it to U.S. regulations. So it was never eligible for the TARP or any bailout funds. So it would be misleading to the jury to suggest otherwise... (vol. 36)(USCA5 15453)

Ultimately, the Trial Judge (Hittner) would grant this Motion in Limine (vol. 5)(USCA5 1381-1392)(Doc. 585) and, in the process, would further confirm the SEC's lack of jurisdiction over the bank by stating:
"[T]he allegation about TARP funds which foreign banks like SIB was not eligible to receive, is GRANTED at this time..." (vol. 36)(USCA5 15469)

AUSA Costa: [w]ho directly regulated Stanford International Bank throughout its histories?
Mr. Young: The FSRC.
AUSA Costa: Which is just in Antigua?
Mr. Young: Yes.
(vol. 50)(USCA5 7697-7698)

The most definitive proof of all, however, is found in the Superseding Indictment itself, under Section (5), which states: Although SIB marketed and sold its CDs within the United States, SIB was an Antiguan-based bank, and was not regulated by any United States banking authority. Instead, SIB was regulated by an agency of the Antiguan Government known as the Financial Services Regulatory Commission (the "Antiguan Regulatory Commission") which claimed to conduct inspections to determine the solvency of banks, to review the quality of bank's investments, and to confirm the accuracy of bank's reported returns. (Doc. 422)

In a related case, the Fifth Circuit has concluded that the Certificates of Deposit offered by SIB were not "covered securities" within the meaning of the preclusion provisions to the Securities Litigation Uniform Standard Act (SLUSA), specified in 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(F)(1)(A).

In yet another Stanford related case (Chadbourne& Parke, LLP v. Samuel Troice, et. al. 134 S.Ct. 1058 (2014) - recently before the Supreme Court), on theissue of "in connection with" and "covered securities", Justices Scalia, Kagan and Breyer noted the following:

JUSTICE SCALIA
"I had assumed that the purpose of the securities laws was to protect the purchasers and sellers of covered securities. There is no purchaser - or seller of a covered security involved here. It's.. .it's a purchaser of not-covered securities who is being defrauded, if anyone...why...why would the Federal Securities Laws protect that person?"

JUSTICE KAGAN
"In all our cases, there's been something to say when somebody asks the question: how has this affected a potential purchaser or seller in the market for the relevant securities?" "And here there's nothing to say."

On July 18, 2014, in 'Securities and Exchange Commission v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation'. (SEC v. SIPC) (case no. 12-5286) the D.C. Circuit conclusively determined, and conclusively ruled, that the CDs offered by the foreign-incorporated and foreign-domiciled Stanford International Bank were; (a) not "securities" as defined by, or regulated under, the federal securities laws of the United States, and instead were; (b) "debt obligations" of the Bank, which were; (c) not "sold" through, or by, Stanford Group Company, and thus; (d) the purchasers of those CDs were not "customers" of SGC, and were therefore never under the jurisdiction or subject to the regulatory authority of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

"The [District] Court reasoned that the investors obtained the Antiguan bank's CDs by depositing funds with the bank itself, not with SGC, and they thus cannot be considered customers of the latter.
We agree that the CD investors do not qualify as customers of SGC under the operative statutory definition."

On September 5, 2014 the Securities and Exchange Commission conceded to the aforementioned facts as found by the D.C. Circuit Court, and decided that they would not appeal the decision any further.

Beyond the extraterritoriality issue - which is that the United States never had jurisdiction nor regulatory authority over the foreign-incorporated and foreigndomiciled Stanford International Bank - in their new Superseding Indictment the DOJ broadened the dates of the alleged offenses from 1999-2009 (in their June 18, 2009 Indictment)(Doc. 1) to 1990-2010 (Doc. 422). This reach-back (to the year 1990) and forward (to the year 2010) not only renders the Indictment "defective", it is representative of another DOJ goal, and is a "fraud upon the Court".

To begin with - and beyond the fact that by February of 2010 defendant Stanford had been in federal custody a full eight months - in 1990 the U.S.-based (Broker/Dealer) Stanford Group Company did not yet exist.

Contrary to his assertions in the Superseding Indictment, AUSA Costa knew that the CDs issued by SIB were neither "offered" by SIB nor "suggested" by SGC to any American citizens or residents until the year 1998 - a full eight years beyond the time frame alleged in the Indictment.
In crafting their new Superseding Indictment, the DOJ realized that a vast amount of defendant Stanford's wealth was created through real estate ventures prior to 1998- the year of his "Regulation D" filing with the SEC, and long before SIB began "offering" and SGC began "suggesting" the CDs to U.S. citizens.


By their expanding the year of the "fraudulent scheme" back to 1990, the DOJ was then able to lay claim to that pre-1998 wealth, "justify" the Receiver's unlawful liquidations of pre-1998 assets, and thereby prevent defendant Stanford from accessing any of these assets to utilize in his defense. And more importantly, by expanding the year of the "fraudulent scheme" forward to 2010, they were able (as detailed in ISSUE XIII) to create the appearance that defendant Stanford was culpable for losses which occurred a full year beyond the date of the TRO - a time when the Court-appointed Receiver was in control, and when Stanford was incapable (prohibited by the Government) of honoring SIB 's obligations.

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Donnerstag, 11. September 2014

Apelacion de Robert Allen Stanford - Sep. 10, 2014

A continuación parte de la apelación de Stanford.

DECLARACIÓN DE TEMAS

I. si la Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) tenía jurisdicción y autoridad reguladora sobre Stanford International Bank Limited (SIB), o sus certificados de depósito (CD). Y si, después de la acción civil de la SEC, la acusación penal del Departamento de Justicia (DOJ) era defectuoso.

II. si los simultáneos juicios civiles y penales (y sanciones), basado en los mismos eventos subyacentes, eran violaciones de la cláusula de debido proceso de la Quinta y Octava enmiendas, y de la protección del acusado Stanford debido a doble juzgado.

III. si el Tribunal violó la Cuarta enmienda del demandado Stanford contra cateos ilegales y búsquedas.

IV. si el Tribunal de distrito abusó de su discreción al no celebrar una audiencia previa al juicio para determinar si el acusado Stanford tenía fondos "no relacionados con el caso" que podrían utilizarse para pagar su defensa.

V. si el Tribunal abusó de su discreción por (a) descalificación del demandado Stanford para elegir a un Asesor competente, y; (b) obligando al nombrado abogado para preparar yproceder con el juicio.

VI. si el Tribunal violó el derecho de enmienda Sexta del acusado Stanford a un juicio justo, por no dar respuestas apropiadas a jurado notas 2 y 3.

VII. si demandado Stanford fue privado de su derecho a la Sexta enmienda a un juicio justo, porque la publicidad previa al juicio imposibilitó el montaje de un jurado imparcial.

VIII. si el Tribunal abusó de su discreción por primero atribuiral demandado Stanford competente y luego al no concederle el tiempo adecuado para preparar una defensa eficaz, ayudar a su abogado, o preparar a testificar en su propia defensa; en violación de la cláusula de debido proceso de la Decimocuarta Enmienda, así como sus Quinta y Sexta enmienda de los derechos a un juicio justo.

IX. si el Tribunal abusó de su discreción al negar al demandado Stanfordun tiempo adecuado para preparar una defensa efectiva.

X. si el Tribunal violó el derecho de enmienda Sexta del acusado Stanford a un juicio justo por no proporcionar al jurado con una instrucción de "unanimidad de teoría" específica para la "tergiversación" (elemento), en cada uno delos fraude que constituyeron en general el "esquema para defraudar".

XI. si el Tribunal violó la cláusula de debido proceso de la Decimocuarta Enmienda, procediendo con la evidencia que era insuficiente para probar los elementos esenciales de la ley de fraude de correo.

XII. si el Tribunal violó el derecho de enmienda Sexta del acusado Stanford a un juicio justo mediante la emisión de una modificada"acusaciónpara Allen" que fue coercitivo.

XIII. si el Tribunal abusó de su discreción mejorando la frase del acusado Stanford en base a información no encontrada en ningún cargo de la acusación, y que ni siquiera entró en evidencia, ni fue presentada al jurado y probado más allá de una duda razonable.

XIV. si el Tribunal, a través de sus resoluciones, demostró una parcialidad a favor del gobierno que negó al acusado Stanford una oportunidad para presentar una defensa adecuada, en violación de su Quinta Enmiendade derecho al debido proceso y su Sexta enmienda de derecho a un juicio justo.

XV. ya sea bajo la doctrina de Error acumulado sobre los temas presentados aquí,entre otros a una negación del derecho constitucional del acusado Stanford a un juicio justo, y de esta manera minó la fiabilidad del veredicto.

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Freitag, 31. Mai 2013

Stanford Judge Approves Interim Distribution to Victims

By Tom Korosec & Andrew Harris
A plan by a court-appointed receiver to distribute assets recovered from R. Allen Stanford's Ponzi scheme to investors was approved by a federal judge in Dallas.

U.S. District Judge David C. Godbey accepted the plan by Ralph Janvey, the receiver appointed in 2009 to marshal and liquidate Stanford's personal and business assets, to make a $55 million interim distribution to about 17,000 claimants, or about 1 cent for each of the $5.1 billion lost in the fraud scheme.

"We will follow it up in a subsequent distribution as the money comes in," Janvey's attorney, Kevin Sadler of Baker Botts LLP, told Godbey at a court hearing in April.

Ponzi scheme victims of Bernard L. Madoff, who was arrested in December 2008, recovered more than $5.4 billion. Clients of the MF Global Inc. brokerage were paid about $4.9 billion after its parent, MF Global Holdings Ltd., failed in October 2011. Victims of a scheme by Peregrine Financial Group Inc. founder Russell Wasendorf, who prosecutors last year said stole $215 million, received an interim distribution of $123 million.

A federal jury in Houston last year found Stanford, 63, guilty of lying to investors about the nature and oversight of certificates of deposit issued by his Antigua-based bank. The jurors decided he must forfeit $330 million in accounts seized by the U.S. government.

The SEC case is Securities and Exchange Commission v. Stanford International Bank, 09-cv-00298, U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas (Dallas). The criminal case is U.S. v. Stanford, 09-cr-00342, U.S. District Court, Southern District of Texas (Houston).

To contact the reporter on this story: Andrew Harris in the Chicago federal courthouse at aharris16@bloomberg.net
To contact the editor responsible for this story: Michael Hytha at mhytha@bloomberg.net
 


STANFORD RECEIVERSHIP CERTIFICATION NOTICE

Before making distribution payments under the Interim Plan, the Receiver is required to send a Certification Notice to the Investor CD Claimants. This Certification Notice must ask each Investor CD Claimant for certification regarding whether they have applied for or received compensation for their claimed losses from sources other than the Receivership and, if so, the amount of such compensation. Investor CD Claimants must timely respond to this Certification Notice as a condition of receiving payment under the Interim Plan.
EXHIBIT B: CERTIFICATION NOTICE

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Dienstag, 7. Mai 2013

Canadian lawyer sues U.S. government over Allen Stanford ponzi scheme

Todd Weiler May 7, 2013
By Drew Hasselback

Investors lost billions in the ponzi scheme orchestrated by Texas tycoon Allen Stanford, and now a Canadian lawyer believes he has an innovative legal strategy to recover funds for victims of the fraud who reside outside the United States.

Todd Weiler, who specializes in international law, believes that "unconscionable negligence and/or manifest incompetence" on the part of U.S. regulators may have breached the foreign investor protection provisions of several international trade treaties signed by the U.S. government.
Todd Weiler claims the U.S. government breached international trade treaties by failing to protect foreign investors from Allen Stanford's $7-billion ponzi scheme. Peter J. Thompson/National Post
If this had happened to Americans in Mexico, there'd be no doubt that those Americans would be bringing a NAFTA claim against Mexico

A request for arbitration and statement of claim the London, Ont. lawyer has delivered to the U.S. Department of State alleges that the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission was aware of problems at the Stanford Group of Companies (SGC) and at Stanford Financial Group (SFG) as early as 1997. Yet in a "shocking and egregious failure," SEC officials failed to shut Stanford down until 2009, the claim alleges.

Mr. Weiler alleges that the U.S. refused to take steps to shut Stanford down earlier because U.S. officials believed the majority of Stanford's victims were not U.S. nationals. The Canadian lawyer argues that international trade treaties, among them the North American Free Trade Agreement, require that the U.S. government treat investors from all signatory countries equally, regardless of their residency.

"If this had happened to Americans in Mexico, there'd be no doubt that those Americans would be bringing a NAFTA claim against Mexico, and that they would deserve to win," Mr. Weiler said in an interview. "The Americans have for 100 years used these agreements and other policies to bring other governments to heel and make sure they get this kind of protection and legal security."

The U.S. State Department web site shows that it has received notice of legal actions Mr. Weiler has filed on behalf of Stanford victims from Guatemala, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Chile and Peru, and which are brought under various trade agreements the U.S. has signed with those countries. However, the U.S. government has not yet acknowledged on the web site that it has received the NAFTA claim that Mr. Weiler has filed on behalf of Mexican and Canadian residents. All the claims contain allegations that have yet to be proven at a hearing.

A high-flying Texas businessman who built a series of financial institutions in the United States and the Caribbean, Stanford was eventually arrested and charged with fraud in 2009. He had been known as "Sir Allen Stanford" in recognition of his services to the government of Antigua and Barbuda. He was tried in U.S. federal court and sentenced to 110 years in prison upon his conviction for fraud in 2012. His knighthood was revoked in 2010.

Investors who placed funds with Stanford International Bank received "certificates of deposit" or CDs that were supposed to be low risk investments that offered generous returns. The scheme took in more than US$7-billion. Some 21,000 investors from around the world were taken in.

SEC officials, who are responsible for protecting the investments of investors, acted with unconscionable negligence
Stanford trial Stanford's activities caught the attention of U.S. regulators as early as 1997, a mere two years after the Stanford Group of Companies registered with the SEC in 1995, according to a report completed in 2010 by David Kotz, who was at the time the SEC's inspector general. The NAFTA claim filed by Mr. Weiler relies on that report, which concluded that the SEC could have sought legal action to shut down Stanford years earlier than it did.
A high-flying Texas businessman who built a series of financial institutions in the United States and the Caribbean, Stanford was eventually arrested and charged with fraud in 2009. Aaron M. Sprecher/Bloomberg
"SEC officials, who are responsible for protecting the investments of investors such as the claimants against criminal enterprises such as SFG, acted with unconscionable negligence and or manifest incompetence, causing millions of dollars of losses to the claimants as a result," the claim states.

Because Mr. Weiler's claim is structured as a proposed international arbitration, the legal action is open only to non-U.S. residents from countries with which the U.S. has signed trade agreements. Mr. Weiler says the action, which he is bringing in conjunction with several other lawyers from the United States, could include "several thousand" clients.

Other third parties have been targeted for their connection to Stanford. Liquidators of Stanford International Bank have sued Toronto-Dominion bank in Quebec and other jurisdictions on the theory that, as Stanford's banker, TD should have known the Texan businessman was up to no good. TD denies the allegation.

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Donnerstag, 28. Februar 2013

KRCL Stanford Ponzi Scheme Litigation Update

By David M. Clem
It has been more than four years since the District Court for the Northern District of Texas appointed Ralph Janvey as Receiver for the Stanford Entities-shutting down what the SEC alleged to be a $7 billion Ponzi scheme. In that time, R. Allen Stanford and some of his associates have been tried and convicted in criminal courts, while hundreds of civil lawsuits continue to creep forward. Most of the civil suits are consolidated for pretrial purposes into MDL 2099, in the Northern District of Texas. This litigation alert will briefly address the criminal convictions, followed by an update on the SLUSA appeal that KRCL wrote about in April.[1] Lastly, this alert will report on some of the new complaints filed by the Receiver and the Official Stanford Investors Committee in February.

The Criminal Trials

On June 14, 2012, Judge Hittner of the Southern District of Texas sentenced R. Allen Stanford to 110 years in federal prison for various counts of fraud, conspiracy, and obstruction. The court also imposed a $5.9 billion judgment against Stanford individually. Stanford has appealed the conviction to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Stanford's conviction and judgment followed a six-week trial at which his former chief financial officer, James Davis, testified against Stanford as part of a plea agreement. The court sentenced James Davis to five years in prison and imposed a $1 billion money judgment.

Laura Pendergest-Holt, Stanford's former chief investment officer, plead guilty to obstruction and received a sentence of 36 months in prison and no monetary judgment.

On February 14, 2013, the court sentenced Gilbert Lopez, Stanford's former chief accounting officer, and Mark Kuhrt, the former controller, to 20 years in prison. These defendants have signaled their intentions to appeal.

The Lopez and Kuhrt sentences bring an end to the criminal trial proceedings, other than those related to Leroy King, an Antiguan banking regulator whom prosecutors are attempting to extradite to the United States for trial.

The SLUSA Appeal

As we have previously written, the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 ("SLUSA") prohibits state-based securities class actions if the claims allege "a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase of a covered security." Judge Godbey in the Northern District of Texas previously ruled that the plaintiffs' claims, which related to CDs issued by Stanford International Bank, were sufficiently related to "covered securities" to warrant SLUSA preemption.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that SLUSA preemption does not apply and breathing life back into the plaintiffs' claims.

Last month, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the SLUSA issue.[2] The Supreme Court granted certiorari in spite of opposition from the Solicitor General, who wrote in an amicus brief that the facts presented are too peculiar to provide any assistance to lower courts that may later face SLUSA preemption issues.

The Supreme Court will hear oral argument in the October 2013 Term. If the high court reverses the Fifth Circuit, the plaintiffs' claims that are based on state law securities violations will be dismissed, significantly diminishing the plaintiffs' ability to recover against financial services defendants.

The February 15 Lawsuits

The Official Stanford Investors Committee is a court-appointed group consisting of seven members that purportedly represent a "cross-section of the Stanford victims' community." The Receiver assigned certain of its claims to the Committee, which has brought suits in its own name and has also intervened in some lawsuits.

Despite the uncertainty created by the pending SLUSA appeal, the Committee has recently increased its litigation activity. On February 15, 2013, the Committee filed three complaints with the MDL Court-a complaint in intervention and two original complaints.

The Committee filed the complaint in intervention in Rotstain v. Trustmark National Bank, HSBC Bank PLC, The Toronto-Dominion Bank, and Bank of Houston, No. 3:09-cv-2384. Rotstain is a purported class action brought by victims of Stanford's purported Ponzi scheme. The Receiver and the Committee had previously intervened, but had not alleged claims directly against the defendant banks until this filing. The Committee alleges various claims related to fraudulent transfers, conversion, and conspiracy. The Committee also seeks punitive damages for the banks' alleged participation or abetting of Stanford's fraudulent scheme.

On the same day, the Committee filed an original complaint styled The Official Stanford Investors Committee v. Bank of Antigua, et al., No. 3:13-cv-0762. In this action, the Committee seeks recovery from eight foreign banks for claims similar to those alleged in the Rotstain matter. The Committee alleges that the Antiguan government and its monetary regulator, the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, were complicit in and integral to Stanford's fraud. According to the complaint, the Antiguan government's seizure of the Bank of Antigua (a Stanford-controlled entity) resulted in the dissemination of Stanford assets to various Caribbean-based banks. The Committee seeks to recover these assets, alleged to be in the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars, under theories of fraudulent transfer and conversion.

In addition, the Committee filed suit directly against the nation of Antigua and Barbuda, in a case styled The Official Stanford Investors Committee v. Antigua and Barbuda, No. 3:13-cv-0760. In this Complaint, the Committee levies its most serious accusations against the Antiguan government, alleging that the country "became a 'blood brother' to Stanford" and that key government officials "were literally Stanford's partners in crime." By this action, the Committee seeks to recover almost one hundred million dollars in unpaid loans made by Stanford to the government of Antigua and Barbuda.

The Receiver also filed a new lawsuit on February 15, 2013. In Janvey v. Pablo M. Alvarado, et al., No. 3:13-cv-0775, the Receiver seeks to recover from 23 former directors and officers of various Stanford entities for breach of fiduciary duty. The suit essentially alleges that the directors and officers either knew of the fraud or facilitated the fraud by ignoring numerous "red flags." Laura Pendergest-Holt, Mark Kuhrt, and Gilberto Lopez are among the defendants.

KRCL will continue to monitor the Stanford litigation closely.

[1] The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Revives Securities Fraud Claims in Stanford Entities Securities Litigation
[2]The consolidated cases are Chadbourne & Park LLP v. Troice, No. 12-79; Willis of Colorado, Inc. v. Troice, No. 12-86; and Proskauer Rose LLP v. Troice, No. 12-88.

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Donnerstag, 14. Februar 2013

Ex-Stanford Executives Get 20-Year Sentences

February 14, 2013
By DEBBIE CAI
Two former Stanford Financial Group executives were each sentenced to 20 years in prison for aiding convicted financier Robert Allen Stanford in perpetuating a massive Ponzi scheme, the Department of Justice said.

Gilbert T. Lopez Jr., former chief accounting officer of Stanford Financial Group Co., and Mark J. Kuhrt, former global controller of Stanford Financial Group Global Management, were convicted by a Houston federal jury in November of last year.

The men, both from Houston, were convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and nine counts of wire fraud, the DOJ said.

Judge David Hittner of the Southern District of Texas, who presided over the trial, sentenced Mr. Lopez and Mr. Kuhrt to serve three years of supervised release and ordered Mr. Lopez to pay a $25,000 fine, along with the prison terms. He also found that both men committed perjury at trial.

Evidence presented at the trial showed that Mr. Lopez and Mr. Kuhrt were aware of and tracked Stanford's misuse of Stanford International Bank's assets, kept the misuse hidden from the public and from almost all of Stanford's other employees, and worked behind the scenes to prevent the misuse from being discovered, the DOJ said.

Jack Zimmermann, lead counsel for Mr. Lopez, told Dow Jones Newswires that he is "very disappointed." The sentence was expected to be closer to that of James Davis, former finance chief of Stanford Financial who last month was given five years in jail for his role in the scheme. Mr. Zimmermann described Mr. Davis as the architect of the fraud. He plans to appeal the conviction.

Lawyers for Mr. Kuhrt weren't immediately available for comment.

Former Texas businessman Mr. Stanford is serving a 110-year sentence for stealing billions of dollars in investors' money and investing much of it in unprofitable private businesses he controlled. Laura Pendergest-Holt, Stanford's former chief investment officer, is serving a three-year sentence.

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Donnerstag, 7. Februar 2013

RECEIVER'S FIFTH INTERIM REPORT REGARDING STATUS OF RECEIVERSHIP, ASSET COLLECTION, AND ONGOING ACTIVITIES

February 7, 2013
By Kevin M. Sadler
The Receiver hereby submits for the Court's consideration the following information regarding the status of the Receivership, asset collection efforts, and other ongoing activities. Unless otherwise stated herein, the information in this report is current as of January 31, 2013. The Receiver will supplement this report as circumstances develop or if the information herein materially changes.

I. CASH INFLOWS &MAJOR RECEIVERSHIP ASSETS
The total amount of cash collected by the Receiver - including, but not limited to, remaining operating income streams, asset liquidation, and recovery of assets and funds from third parties - was approximately $230.2 million as of January 31, 2013. The total of all cash on hand was $111 million, which is net of the cash outflows discussed in more detail below in Section II of this report. Of this amount, $8 million was restricted and $103 million was unrestricted.

Cash Balances & Trailing Revenue: The cash balances recovered by the Receiver shortly following his appointment on February 17, 2009 totaled approximately $63.1 million. In addition, the Receivership has collected roughly $5.3 million in cash associated with income earned prior to the inception of the Receivership.

Private Equity: The Receiver has recovered approximately $37.5 million in net cash proceeds from the liquidation of private equity investments and expects to receive approximately $300,000 more from closed or pending private equity liquidations. In addition, the Receiver's financial advisor is continuing to market the remaining investments in Stanford's private equity portfolio, which has an estimated value of up to $6.7 million.

Real Estate: The Receiver has recovered approximately $18.7 million in net cash proceeds from the liquidation of real estate, including the recent Holly Springs sale [see Doc.1695]. Although the Receiver's real estate brokers are continuing to market other properties in Stanford's real estate portfolio, the Receiver is unable to estimate the potential recovery from the liquidation of those properties at this time.

Watercraft and Airplanes: The Receiver has recovered approximately $8.0 million from the disposition of airplanes owned or leased by Stanford and from the sales of the Sea Eagle yacht, the Little Eagle yacht, and the Robust Eagle tugboat.

Latin American Assets: The Receiver has been able to liquidate assets in Panama, Ecuador, and Peru, resulting in a recovery of approximately $12.9 million. Moreover, the Receiver is pursuing the recovery of up to $10.2 million in additional Latin American assets.

Miscellaneous Asset Sales: The Receiver has recovered approximately $2.2 million from the sale of miscellaneous assets - including, but not limited to, furniture, coins, vehicles, and assorted equipment.

Litigation: The Receiver has fraudulent-transfer, unjust-enrichment, and other claims pending against numerous defendants, through which the Receiver seeks the recovery of approximately $700 million. The Receiver has identified at least an additional $1.1 million in international litigation claims. Asset recovery litigation is difficult, protracted, and expensive.

Nevertheless, such claims are the single largest potential source of funds which may be recovered for the benefit of Stanford's victims. Although the Receiver has thus far received approximately $15.5 million from settlements and other litigation efforts (including over $2.2 million received from the political committee defendants in Case No. 3:10-CV-0346-N) and has secured an injunction to hold another approximately $25 million, the amount that the Receiver ultimately is able to collect from defendants is uncertain and may be less than the amounts claimed. The Receiver will continue to work towards appropriate and reasonable settlements, where possible, in order to maximize the net recovery to the Receivership Estate. A detailed report regarding the status of the Receiver's many litigation claims is found in the Third Joint Report of the Receiver, the Examiner and the Investors Committee Concerning Pending Litigation (For the Quarter Ending September 30, 2012) [see Doc. 1716], and related litigation issues are discussed in the Report of the Examiner and Receiver Addressing Matters Assigned to Magistrate Judge Frost [see Doc. 1720].

Return of Political Contributions: The Receiver has identified approximately $1.9 million in political contributions made by Allen Stanford and related entities. The Receiver has requested the return of these contributions from over 90 politicians, political action committees, and congressional committees. Through January 31, 2013, $1,770,380 has been returned (including the principal amount of the contributions that were part of the over $2.2 million received from the political committee defendants discussed above).

Coins and Bullion Inventory: The Receiver has approximately $200,000 in remaining coins and bullion inventory relating to the coins and bullion operations.

Overseas Cash: The Receiver has identified approximately $310 million in cash, assets, and other investments in foreign accounts, including accounts in Canada, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland. The Receiver cannot ascertain the exact current value of these assets, which are subject to forfeiture proceedings, because those funds are not currently subject to the Receiver's control or direct monitoring. The Receiver is working with the Department of Justice and the Joint Liquidators in Antigua in an effort to reach agreement concerning the release and distribution of these assets.

Other Inflows & Assets: The Receivership has collected approximately $66.8 million through the liquidation of other investment accounts held on behalf of Stanford, including approximately $5.0 million held on behalf of Stanford Trust Company; $1.0 million from the liquidation of Bank of Antigua accounts; $46.7 million through the liquidation of Stanford accounts at Pershing and of various investment funds held on Stanford's behalf; $8.4 million through the recovery of additional cash balances; and $5.7 million received via other inflows, including, but not limited to, rental and interest income, cash flows from other liquidated bank accounts, and restricted funds and interest thereon. The Receiver estimates that he may recover up to $2.5 million in additional assets held in U.S. banks and brokerages.

II. CASH OUTFLOWS
From February 17, 2009 through January 31, 2013, the total amount of Receivership cash outflows - comprising professional fees and expenses, as well as other types of expenses - was approximately $119.2 million.

Expenses Other than Professional Fees: The total amount of all payments made by the Receiver for expenses other than professional fees was approximately $53.3 million. This figure comprises the following approximate amounts: $26.7 million in personnel expenses and other employee expenses; $3.8 million in insurance expenses; $3.5 million in taxes; $1.6 million in general and administrative expenses; $2.4 million in telecommunications expenses; $5.2 million in occupancy expenses; $2.5 million in settled claims; and $7.7 million in other expenses. As previously explained in the Fourth Interim Report [see Doc. 1630 at 5-7], these expenses have decreased dramatically as the Receivership has progressed.

Professional Fees and Expenses: As of January 31, 2013, the professional fees and expenses paid to the Receiver and his professionals total approximately $63.3 million.

Approximately half of this amount was paid in the first year of the Receivership ($30.9 million from the first quarter of 2009 through the first quarter of 2010) to wind down operations and institute necessary legal actions to protect and benefit the Estate.

Furthermore, the Receivership Estate has paid (per Court approval) the Examiner's expenses and legal fees totaling approximately $1.9 million through January 31, 2013. Also per Court direction, the Receivership Estate has paid a total of approximately $600,000 in attorneys' fees, expert fees, and expenses incurred by the Official Stanford Investors Committee (the "OSIC") through January 31, 2013.

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Dienstag, 22. Januar 2013

Ex-Stanford executive gets 5 years in $7B swindle

January 22, 2013
By JUAN A. LOZANO
The star prosecution witness in the trial of convicted Texas financier R. Allen Stanford was sentenced Tuesday to five years in prison for helping to bilk investors out of more than $7 billion in one of the biggest Ponzi schemes in U.S. history.

James M. Davis had faced up to 30 years in prison after pleading guilty in 2009 to three fraud and conspiracy charges as part of an agreement with prosecutors.

"I am ashamed and I'm embarrassed," Davis said at the sentencing hearing at Houston federal court. "I've perverted what was right and I hurt thousands of investors. I betrayed their trust and also associates and neighbors and friends and my family."

Prosecutors say Stanford persuaded investors to buy certificates of deposit from his Caribbean bank, then used that money to bankroll a string of failed businesses and his own lavish lifestyle, including a fleet of private jets and yachts.

At Stanford's trial last year, Davis - the former chief financial officer of Stanford's companies - portrayed his ex-boss as the leader of the fraud who burned through billions of CD deposits. He testified that he and Stanford faked the bank's profits and fabricated documents to hide the fraud.

Stanford, a one-time billionaire, was convicted in March on 13 of 14 fraud-related counts. He was sentenced to 110 years in prison and is serving his sentence in a Central Florida prison.

Many of the dramatic details at Stanford's fraud trial - including testimony about bribes and blood oaths - came from Davis.

Stanford's defense attorneys accused Davis of being behind the fraud and tried to discredit him by calling him a liar and tax cheat. Davis, who was Stanford's roommate at Baylor University for a semester in 1973, said he realized he was party to fraud when he was asked to lie to a potential investor to say the bank had insurance.

Davis said he was "one of those liars" who faked the bank's numbers but that Stanford was "the chief faker."

Another top executive in Stanford's now-defunct empire - former chief investment officer Laura Pendergest-Holt - was sentenced to three years in prison in September after pleading guilty to one count of obstruction of a U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission proceeding.

Two other ex-executives - Gilbert Lopez, the ex-chief accounting officer, and Mark Kuhrt, the ex-global controller - were convicted in November of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and nine counts of wire fraud. They are set to be sentenced Feb. 14.

A former Antiguan financial regulator was also indicted and awaits extradition to the U.S.

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