Una breve descripción de cada punto en la apelación de Stanford

I. si la Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) tenía jurisdicción y autoridad reguladora sobre Stanford International Bank Limited (SIB), o sus certificados de depósito (CD). Y si, después de la acción civil de la SEC, la acusación penal del Departamento de Justicia (DOJ) era defectuoso.

No creemos que el gobierno puso en evidencia o demostró que la SEC tenía autoridad para investigar Stanford International Bank, que era un banco offshore.

En primer lugar, la SEC no tiene la autoridad para investigar los bancos en general, mucho menos un banco offshore [extranjero]. Así que no tuvieron ninguna autoridad legal para exigir al Sr. Stanford para participar o colaborar con una investigación de su banco, para lo cual no tenían ninguna autoridad legal para investigar.

El 18 de julio de 2014, en la 'Securities and Exchange Commission v. Securities Investor ProtectionCorporation'. (SEC v. SIPC) (caso Nº 12-5286) el D.C. circuito determinó concluyentemente y ordenó concluyente, que los CDsofrecidos por el Banco extranjeroInternacional de Stanford fueron; (a) no "valores" como definición por, o regulación bajo las leyes federales de valores de Estados Unidos y en cambio eran; (b) “obligaciones de deuda"del banco, que eran; (c) no "vendido" a través de, o por Stanford Group Company y por lo tanto; (d) los compradores de esos CDs no fueron "clientes" del SGC y por lo tanto nunca estaban bajo la jurisdicción o sujetos a la autoridad reguladora de la U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

El 05 de septiembre de 2014 la Securities and Exchange Commission concedió a los hechos antes mencionados como lo decidió el Tribunal de circuito de D.C. y decidió que no apelaría dicha decisión.

Más allá de la cuestión de la extraterritorialidad - que es que Estados Unidos nunca tuvo jurisdicción ni autoridad reguladora sobre el Stanford International Bank - el Departamento de justicia amplió su nueva acusación reemplazando las fechas de las supuestas ofensas desde 1999-2009 (en su acusación del 18 de junio de 2009)(Doc. 1) hasta 1990-2010 (doc. 422). Este incremento (desde el año 1990hasta el año 2010) no sólo ocasiona que esta acusación sea "defectuosa", sino que también representa otro objetivo del DOJ que es el "fraude a la corte".

Para comenzar con - y más allá del hecho de que en febrero de 2010 el acusado Stanford había estado bajo custodia federal un total de ocho meses - en 1990 el estadounidense (Broker/Dealer) Stanford Group Company aun no existía.

Contrariamente a sus afirmaciones en la nueva acusación, AUSA Costa sabía que los CD emitidos por SIB no fueron "ofrecidos" por SIB ni "sugeridos" por SGC a ciudadanos estadounidenses o residentes hasta el año 1998 - un completo ocho años más allá del marco de tiempo alegado en la acusación.

En la elaboración de su nueva acusación, el Departamento de justicia se dio cuenta que una gran cantidad de riqueza del demandado Stanford fue creada a través de empresas de bienes raíces antes de 1998-el año de su presentación "Reglamento D" ante la SEC y mucho antes de que SIB comenzara a "ofrecer" y la SGC comenzaraa "sugerir" los CDs a los ciudadanos estadounidenses.

Al expandir el año del "esquema fraudulento" desde 1990, el Departamento de justicia entonces fue capaz de afirmar que esa riqueza pre-1998, "justifica" su liquidación ilegal por parte del receptor y evita que el acusado Stanford pueda acceder a cualquiera de esos activos para utilizarlos en su defensa. Y lo más importante, al expandirse el año del "esquema fraudulento" adelante a 2010, pudieron crear la apariencia que el acusado era culpable por las pérdidas que se produjeron un año después de la fecha de la TRO (Orden de restricción temporal) - un momento cuando el receptor designado por el Tribunal estaba en control, y cuando Stanford era incapaz (prohibido por el gobierno) de honrar las obligaciones de SIB.

II. si los simultáneos juicios civiles y penales (y sanciones), basado en los mismos eventos subyacentes, eran violaciones de la cláusula de debido proceso de la Quinta y Octava enmiendas, y de la protección del acusado Stanford debido a doble juzgado.

El 16 de febrero de 2009 la Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) presentó una denuncia civil en el distrito norte de Texas (División de Dallas) y solicitó una orden de restricción temporal (TRO) para hacerse con el control de todos los activos globales del demandado Stanford, tanto personales como corporativos. La SEC solicitó el nombramiento de un síndico/receptor Ralph S. Janvey.

El receptor fue específicamente dirigido y autorizado para:

"Realizar todos los actos necesarios para conservar, mantener, administrar y preservar el valor del Banco, con el fin de evitar cualquier irreparable pérdida, daños o lesiones al Banco".

Antes de cualquier hallazgo de irregularidades, ya sea civil o criminal, en febrero 24 del 2010, el Tribunal Civil de Dallas había aprobado la venta de dos buques propiedad del acusadoStanford. En la aprobación de esta venta, juez Godbey ordenó al receptor "secuestrar” la mitad del producto de ambas ventas.

Esto y otras prematuras ventas y desembolsos de sus activos, fueron una presunción de culpabilidad, un verdadero hecho consumado inconstitucional.

"Este receptor y su equipo han pasado importantes cantidades de tiempo en estas actividades, las principales actividades han sido coordinación con la SEC, el FBI y el Departamento de justicia en la identificación y reuniendo grandes cantidades de documentos e información relevante para sus investigaciones en curso y responder a numerosas y extensas solicitudes de la SEC, el FBI y el Departamento de justicia para analizar y proporcionar información y documentos."

"Una parte importante del trabajo de FTI (Karyl Van Tassel) involucró la recopilación de información a petición de la SEC, el FBI y el Departamento de justicia en relación con sus investigaciones, utilizando numerosas bases de datos complejas, correos electrónicos, registros contables, documentos financieros y archivos encontrados".

De hecho, los informes de investigación generados por esta firma FTI, y financiado por la administración judicial de Stanford, fueron utilizados por el gobierno como la Fundación de todo su caso.

El acusado Stanford presentaría que esto es sin lugar a dudas "apoyo" de su argumento de que las investigaciones civiles y criminales fueron efectivamente una acción concertada y llevado a cabo como uno solo.

Janvey y FTI en realidad estaban realizando "una parte significativa" de lasinvestigaciones del SEC, el FBI y el Departamento de justicia.

En Estados Unidos v. Kordel, 397 US 1, 11 (1970), el Tribunal Supremo citó cinco situaciones en las que puede resultar una constatación de una violación del debido proceso. En el caso de Stanford encontramos tres de ellos:

1). Si el Gobierno realiza una acción civil únicamente para la obtención de pruebas para su enjuiciamiento penal.

2). Considerando que el acusado razonablemente teme perjuicio adverso de publicidad previa al juicio u otra lesión injusta.

3). Considerando que existe cualquier otra circunstancia especial que podría sugerir la inconstitucionalidad, o incluso la inconveniencia de un proceso penal.

III. si el Tribunal violó la Cuarta enmienda del demandado Stanford contra cateos ilegales y búsquedas al:

a)PERMITIENDO QUE LA ORDEN (CIVIL) DEL RECEPTOR FUERA UTILIZADO COMO UN "RECURSO DE ASISTENCIA"

El 17 de febrero de 2009, el receptor designado en materia civil, entró en las oficinas de Stanford FinancialGroup (en Houston y en otros lugares), con el propósito de agarrar el control de todoslos papeles y documentación electrónica indicados en la orden del receptor (vol. 6) (USCA5 1478-1488). Este receptor fue acompañado por U.S. Marshals, policías y agentes del FBI que, basado en la invitación aparente del receptor, eran libres para llevar a cabo un registro sin orden judicial e incautación de varios elementos en las instalaciones, de los cuales el Departamento de justicia utilizaría más adelante en la subsecuente investigación criminal y el enjuiciamiento.

El Tribunal (juez Hittner) - pero usted dice fue confiscado... se han incautado en una acción civil y el receptor en la acción civil entregó al gobierno.

Sr. Fazel - correcto. Pero estamos diciendo que la cuarta enmienda se aplica porque la acción del estado se produjo cuando los oficiales - oficiales de policía fueron interactuando con el receptor.

El Tribunal - cómo puedes volver y limpiarlo en una situación como ésta? Creo que es imposible, porque no tenían ninguna orden, eso es seguro.

Sr. Fazel - eso es seguro.

En violación de los derechos del acusado Stanford bajo la cuarta enmienda, la objeción del abogado fuéDENEGADA y la prueba 1500 (agenda de RAS con números telefónicos) - obtenida sin la orden de registro requerida - fue admitido como evidencia.

Más evidencia de que la orden de receptor fue utilizada como una orden general o "recurso de asistencia" puede encontrarse en el acceso y admisión de la prueba 616 del gobierno (2006 faxes y cartas entre Sr. King y Alvarado Re: proyecto de respuesta a ECCB).

"El baluarte de la protección de la cuarta enmienda" requiere que la "policía obtenga una orden de un magistrado neutral y desinteresado antes de embarcarse en una búsqueda" Franks v. 438 de Delaware, Estados Unidos 154 (1978). No importa si estos artículos fueron "puntualmente proporcionados" a las agencias gubernamentales o recogidos por ellos de manera independiente, ellos accedieron sin una orden judicial mediante la utilización de la orden del receptor como un "recurso de asistencia".

b)PERMITIENDO QUE EL RECEPTOR DESIGNADO ACTUARA FUERA DEL ALCANCE DE LA ORDEN DE RECEPTORIA.

El 06 de enero de 2012, el defensor Stanford presentó una "Moción para suprimir" y solicitar una audiencia probatoria. (vol. 5)(USCA5 1435-1474) Este movimiento también fue negado por el Tribunal (juez Hittner), y no se llevó a cabo ninguna audiencia probatoria.

Específicamente, la cuestión en este asunto preocupa al receptor por acceso no autorizado y difusión de información completa de las cuentas del cliente de Stanford International Bank que estaban almacenadas en las bases de datos 'Datos Pro' y 'Temenos' ubicado en Antigua y protegido por las leyes de secreto y privacidad de banco de Antigua y Barbuda (Bus Intl. 244(1)) CorpAct. Lo que supera el alcance de la orden del receptor y por lo tanto su autoridad, este acceso ilegal y no autorizado de información sobre las cuentas del cliente del SIB fue alcanzado por una "carta de autorización" por Ralph S. Janvey (receptor) al Sr. Sohil Merchant, el empleado de Stanford que había diseñado las bases de datos y por lo tanto sabía eludir el sistema de seguridad de las computadoras del banco.

Cuando esta información inesperadamente falló en producir una sola "víctima" y en cambio sirvió para desmentir completamente estas acusaciones de esquema Ponzi y exonerar al demandado Stanford, la compañía de contabilidad forense (FTI) secuestró esas Temenos/DataPro bases de datos en un almacén controlado por FTI y lejos de la defensa de Stanford -inaccesibles en Washington, D.C.

El acceso (ilegal) fue completado y como admitió el Director Gerente de FTI (Karyl Van Tassel), estas dos DataPro y Temenos bases de datos habían sido trasladados desde Houston a Washington, D.C., fuera de capacidad en presupuesto restringido de la defensa para accederlas.

Karyl Van Tassel:Nosotros tenemos una base de datos con la información del CD de SIB, Temenos y DataPro.

Michael Stanley (abogado): está bien. ¿Dónde están localizados?

Karyl Van Tassel:Yo diría que el Temenos y DataPro están en la oficina de Washington...

Con respecto al caso de Stanford, el 26 de febrero de 2009, y previo a este acceso ilegal de información de privacidad protegida por ley, el Tribunal superior de Antigua y Barbuda emitió una orden (vol. 6) (USCA5 1727-1750) en la que explícitamente dice:

"(1) no divulgación de información específica del cliente está autorizada sin más, o de otro, orden de la corte; y (2) No divulgación de información está permitida bajo esta orden a cualquier gobierno extranjero o un organismo regulador a menos que dicha divulgación está sujeta a obligacionesde divulgación mutuas. Para los propósitos de esta orden, información específica del cliente significa información suficiente de detalle para permitir identificar el cliente en cuestión, la dirección del cliente o el monto de tales créditos saldos u otras inversiones de las cuentas." (vol. 6)((JSCA5 1729-1730)

El Departamento de justicia estadounidense reconoce que búsquedas hechas en otro país y llevadas a cabo por 'estatales' (americanos) (o Ralph Janvey, actuando como un "oficial" de la corte del juez Godbey) deben realizarse con el consentimiento de los locales del país y sus leyes.

En este caso ninguno de estas instrucciones de la Corte Suprema o garantías relacionadas con los tratados o protocolos se adhirieron. Como es evidente, el receptor (Ralph Janvey) esgrimió la orden civil como un "recurso de asistencia" y superaba con creces su alcance. Además de su amplia investigación asistencia y coordinación con los investigadores (penales), mediante la emisión de esta "carta de autorización" para el acceso de datos, protegidos por la ley de privacidad, ubicados en Antigua, violó las leyes de la nación soberana de Antigua y Barbuda tanto las leyes del Tratado de los Estados Unidos.

Finalmente y lo más importante en estos procesos, como este ilegal acceso, (justificativo) Temenos y DataPro base de datos, se prestó al FBI y muy claramente y de forma selectiva fue utilizado por el gobierno en el juicio, bajo Brady v. Maryland Estados Unidos (1963) debería haber sido, pero nunca fue, proporcionado a la defensa.

Por lo tanto, en su semblante de este acto, seguido por el uso de esta información y fallapara ser proporcionada a la defensa, los fiscales de Estados Unidos violaron, de la manera más atroz, tanto la normativa de los descubrimientos y la cuarta enmienda del demandado Stanford al debido proceso y protección desde cateos ilegales y confiscaciones.

Leer mas: http://sivg.org/forum/view_topic.php?t=esp&id=99

Visit the Stanford International Victims Group - SIVG official forum http://sivg.org/forum/

Appeal of Robert Allen Stanford - Sep. 10, 2014

Following part of the appeal of Stanford.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

I. Whether the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had jurisdiction and regulatory authority over Stanford International Bank Limited (SIB), or its Certificates of Deposit (CDs). And whether, following the SEC's civil action, the Department of Justice's (DOJ) criminal Indictment was defective.

II. Whether the simultaneous civil and criminal prosecutions (and sanctions imposed), based on the same underlying events, were violations of the DueProcess Clause of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments, and defendant Stanford's protection from Double Jeopardy.

III.Whether the Trial Court violated defendant Stanford's Fourth Amendment protection from illegal searches and seizures.

IV. Whether the District Court abused its discretion when it failed to hold a pre-trial Hearing to determine whether defendant Stanford had any "untainted" funds that could be used to pay for his defense.

V. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion by (a) disqualifying defendant Stanford's competent counsel of choice, and; (b) forcing ill-prepared appointed counsel to proceed to trial.

VI. Whether the Trial Court violated defendant Stanford's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial, by failing to provide appropriate responses to Jury Notes Two and Three.

VII. Whether defendant Stanford was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial, because pre-trial publicity precluded the assembly of an impartial jury.

VIII. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion by first deeming defendant Stanford competent, and then failing to grant him adequate time to prepare an effective defense, assist his counsel, or prepare to testify on his own behalf; in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial.

IX. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion by denying defendant Stanford adequate time to prepare an effective defense.

X. Whether the Trial Court violated defendant Stanford's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial by failing to provide the jury with a "unanimity of theory" instruction specific to which "misrepresentation" (element), on each of the mail fraud and/or wire fraud Counts constituted the overall "scheme to defraud."

XI. Whether the Trial Court violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, by proceeding with evidence which was insufficient to prove the essential elements of the mail fraud statute.

XII. Whether the Trial Court violated defendant Stanford's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial by issuing a modified "Allen charge" that was coercive.

XIII. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion by enhancing defendant Stanford's sentence based on information not found in any Count of the Indictment, and that was neither entered into evidence, nor submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

XIV. Whether the Trial Court, through its rulings, demonstrated a partiality in favor of the Government that denied defendant Stanford an opportunity to present an adequate defense, in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to Due Process, and his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.

XV. Whether under the Cumulative Error Doctrine the issues presented here amount to a denial of defendant Stanford's Constitutional right to a fair trial, and thus undermined the reliability of the verdict.

STATEMENT I

Mr. McGuire: Specifically, as to Count 12, which is the Conspiracy to Obstruct the SEC Investigation; we don't believe the Government put on any evidence or showed that the SEC had authority to investigate Stafford International Bank, which was an offshore bank.

First of all, the SEC does not have the authority to investigate banks in general, much less an offshore [foreign] bank. So, they had no lawful authority to require Mr. Stanford to participate in or cooperate with an investigation of his bank, for which they had no lawful authority to investigate... (vol. 56)(USCA5 11534-11535)

For instance, at a pre-trial Hearing where the Government was requesting a Motion in Limine, barring any discussion about SIB's eligibility or ineligibility to access federal bailout money (TARP Funds), the prosecution pointed out the following:

AUSA Stellmach: There are two points, Judge; one, we just want to preclude any suggestion that the SIB was ever eligible. Foreign banks only received funds if they had U.S. subsidiaries, which Mr. Stanford's bank did not, because he didn't want to subject it to U.S. regulations. So it was never eligible for the TARP or any bailout funds. So it would be misleading to the jury to suggest otherwise... (vol. 36)(USCA5 15453)

Ultimately, the Trial Judge (Hittner) would grant this Motion in Limine (vol. 5)(USCA5 1381-1392)(Doc. 585) and, in the process, would further confirm the SEC's lack of jurisdiction over the bank by stating:

"[T]he allegation about TARP funds which foreign banks like SIB was not eligible to receive, is GRANTED at this time..." (vol. 36)(USCA5 15469)

AUSA Costa: [w]ho directly regulated Stanford International Bank throughout its histories?

Mr. Young: The FSRC.

AUSA Costa: Which is just in Antigua?

Mr. Young: Yes.

(vol. 50)(USCA5 7697-7698)

The most definitive proof of all, however, is found in the Superseding Indictment itself, under Section (5), which states: Although SIB marketed and sold its CDs within the United States, SIB was an Antiguan-based bank, and was not regulated by any United States banking authority. Instead, SIB was regulated by an agency of the Antiguan Government known as the Financial Services Regulatory Commission (the "Antiguan Regulatory Commission") which claimed to conduct inspections to determine the solvency of banks, to review the quality of bank's investments, and to confirm the accuracy of bank's reported returns. (Doc. 422)

In a related case, the Fifth Circuit has concluded that the Certificates of Deposit offered by SIB were not "covered securities" within the meaning of the preclusion provisions to the Securities Litigation Uniform Standard Act (SLUSA), specified in 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(F)(1)(A).

In yet another Stanford related case (Chadbourne& Parke, LLP v. Samuel Troice, et. al. 134 S.Ct. 1058 (2014) - recently before the Supreme Court), on theissue of "in connection with" and "covered securities", Justices Scalia, Kagan and Breyer noted the following:

JUSTICE SCALIA

"I had assumed that the purpose of the securities laws was to protect the purchasers and sellers of covered securities. There is no purchaser - or seller of a covered security involved here. It's.. .it's a purchaser of not-covered securities who is being defrauded, if anyone...why...why would the Federal Securities Laws protect that person?"

JUSTICE KAGAN

"In all our cases, there's been something to say when somebody asks the question: how has this affected a potential purchaser or seller in the market for the relevant securities?" "And here there's nothing to say."

On July 18, 2014, in 'Securities and Exchange Commission v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation'. (SEC v. SIPC) (case no. 12-5286) the D.C. Circuit conclusively determined, and conclusively ruled, that the CDs offered by the foreign-incorporated and foreign-domiciled Stanford International Bank were; (a) not "securities" as defined by, or regulated under, the federal securities laws of the United States, and instead were; (b) "debt obligations" of the Bank, which were; (c) not "sold" through, or by, Stanford Group Company, and thus; (d) the purchasers of those CDs were not "customers" of SGC, and were therefore never under the jurisdiction or subject to the regulatory authority of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

"The [District] Court reasoned that the investors obtained the Antiguan bank's CDs by depositing funds with the bank itself, not with SGC, and they thus cannot be considered customers of the latter.

We agree that the CD investors do not qualify as customers of SGC under the operative statutory definition."

On September 5, 2014 the Securities and Exchange Commission conceded to the aforementioned facts as found by the D.C. Circuit Court, and decided that they would not appeal the decision any further.

Beyond the extraterritoriality issue - which is that the United States never had jurisdiction nor regulatory authority over the foreign-incorporated and foreigndomiciled Stanford International Bank - in their new Superseding Indictment the DOJ broadened the dates of the alleged offenses from 1999-2009 (in their June 18, 2009 Indictment)(Doc. 1) to 1990-2010 (Doc. 422). This reach-back (to the year 1990) and forward (to the year 2010) not only renders the Indictment "defective", it is representative of another DOJ goal, and is a "fraud upon the Court".

To begin with - and beyond the fact that by February of 2010 defendant Stanford had been in federal custody a full eight months - in 1990 the U.S.-based (Broker/Dealer) Stanford Group Company did not yet exist.

Contrary to his assertions in the Superseding Indictment, AUSA Costa knew that the CDs issued by SIB were neither "offered" by SIB nor "suggested" by SGC to any American citizens or residents until the year 1998 - a full eight years beyond the time frame alleged in the Indictment.

In crafting their new Superseding Indictment, the DOJ realized that a vast amount of defendant Stanford's wealth was created through real estate ventures prior to 1998- the year of his "Regulation D" filing with the SEC, and long before SIB began "offering" and SGC began "suggesting" the CDs to U.S. citizens.

By their expanding the year of the "fraudulent scheme" back to 1990, the DOJ was then able to lay claim to that pre-1998 wealth, "justify" the Receiver's unlawful liquidations of pre-1998 assets, and thereby prevent defendant Stanford from accessing any of these assets to utilize in his defense. And more importantly, by expanding the year of the "fraudulent scheme" forward to 2010, they were able (as detailed in ISSUE XIII) to create the appearance that defendant Stanford was culpable for losses which occurred a full year beyond the date of the TRO - a time when the Court-appointed Receiver was in control, and when Stanford was incapable (prohibited by the Government) of honoring SIB 's obligations.

Read more: http://sivg.org/forum/view_topic.php?t=eng&id=264

Visit the Stanford International Victims Group - SIVG official forum http://sivg.org/forum/

Apelacion de Robert Allen Stanford - Sep. 10, 2014

A continuación parte de la apelación de Stanford.

DECLARACIÓN DE TEMAS

I. si la Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) tenía jurisdicción y autoridad reguladora sobre Stanford International Bank Limited (SIB), o sus certificados de depósito (CD). Y si, después de la acción civil de la SEC, la acusación penal del Departamento de Justicia (DOJ) era defectuoso.

II. si los simultáneos juicios civiles y penales (y sanciones), basado en los mismos eventos subyacentes, eran violaciones de la cláusula de debido proceso de la Quinta y Octava enmiendas, y de la protección del acusado Stanford debido a doble juzgado.

III. si el Tribunal violó la Cuarta enmienda del demandado Stanford contra cateos ilegales y búsquedas.

IV. si el Tribunal de distrito abusó de su discreción al no celebrar una audiencia previa al juicio para determinar si el acusado Stanford tenía fondos "no relacionados con el caso" que podrían utilizarse para pagar su defensa.

V. si el Tribunal abusó de su discreción por (a) descalificación del demandado Stanford para elegir a un Asesor competente, y; (b) obligando al nombrado abogado para preparar yproceder con el juicio.

VI. si el Tribunal violó el derecho de enmienda Sexta del acusado Stanford a un juicio justo, por no dar respuestas apropiadas a jurado notas 2 y 3.

VII. si demandado Stanford fue privado de su derecho a la Sexta enmienda a un juicio justo, porque la publicidad previa al juicio imposibilitó el montaje de un jurado imparcial.

VIII. si el Tribunal abusó de su discreción por primero atribuiral demandado Stanford competente y luego al no concederle el tiempo adecuado para preparar una defensa eficaz, ayudar a su abogado, o preparar a testificar en su propia defensa; en violación de la cláusula de debido proceso de la Decimocuarta Enmienda, así como sus Quinta y Sexta enmienda de los derechos a un juicio justo.

IX. si el Tribunal abusó de su discreción al negar al demandado Stanfordun tiempo adecuado para preparar una defensa efectiva.

X. si el Tribunal violó el derecho de enmienda Sexta del acusado Stanford a un juicio justo por no proporcionar al jurado con una instrucción de "unanimidad de teoría" específica para la "tergiversación" (elemento), en cada uno delos fraude que constituyeron en general el "esquema para defraudar".

XI. si el Tribunal violó la cláusula de debido proceso de la Decimocuarta Enmienda, procediendo con la evidencia que era insuficiente para probar los elementos esenciales de la ley de fraude de correo.

XII. si el Tribunal violó el derecho de enmienda Sexta del acusado Stanford a un juicio justo mediante la emisión de una modificada"acusaciónpara Allen" que fue coercitivo.

XIII. si el Tribunal abusó de su discreción mejorando la frase del acusado Stanford en base a información no encontrada en ningún cargo de la acusación, y que ni siquiera entró en evidencia, ni fue presentada al jurado y probado más allá de una duda razonable.

XIV. si el Tribunal, a través de sus resoluciones, demostró una parcialidad a favor del gobierno que negó al acusado Stanford una oportunidad para presentar una defensa adecuada, en violación de su Quinta Enmiendade derecho al debido proceso y su Sexta enmienda de derecho a un juicio justo.

XV. ya sea bajo la doctrina de Error acumulado sobre los temas presentados aquí,entre otros a una negación del derecho constitucional del acusado Stanford a un juicio justo, y de esta manera minó la fiabilidad del veredicto.

Leer mas: http://sivg.org/forum/view_topic.php?t=esp&id=99

Visit the Stanford International Victims Group - SIVG official forum http://sivg.org/forum/

The "Conclusion", "Requested Relief" and the "Restitution" (part of the appeal)

The appeal will be filed in a matter of just a few days. All of us involved in its development agree that all of the victims should see the "Conclusion", "Requested Relief" and the "Restitution" part of the appeal before it's printed and presented in court.

CONCLUSION

"When the law has exceeded its proper functions, it has not done so merely in some inconsequential and debatable matters. The law has gone further than this; it has acted in direct opposition to its own purpose. The law has beenused to destroy its own objective; it has been applied to annihilating the justicethat it was supposed to maintain; to limiting and destroying rights which its real purpose was to respect. The law has placed the collective force at the disposal of the unscrupulous who wish, without risk, to exploit the person, liberty, and property of others. It has converted plunder into a right, in order to protect plunder. And it has converted lawful defense into a crime, in order to punish lawful defense."
- Frederic Bastiat,1850
As if this French philosopher was prophesying 164 years into the future, this is precisely what was done in and through the collective and unscrupulous actions against Robert Allen Stanford and his companies. In short, in the annals of American jurisprudence, it is doubtful that any individual has suffered (and lived to talk about) a greater injustice than this appellant.
At the Stanford trial, when faced with a ruling on just one of the irrefutable violations of this appellant's rights under the U.S. Constitution, the Trial Judge (David Hittner) posed the question:

-How can you go back and clean it up in a situation like this?
(vol.46.)(USCA5 6865-6866)

The answer to that question, which has been passed on to this Honorable Court, is as clear now as it was at the time of the Stanford trial.

REQUESTED RELIEF

Based on the lawless and life-ruining actions of both the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice, followed by the foregoing violations to this appellant's rights under the U.S. Constitution, Robert Allen Stanford prays that this Court will acquit him of all charges in this matter, and vacate his March 6, 2012 conviction in its entirety.

RESTITUTION

Further, and in addition to a total acquittal and vacating his March 6, 2012 conviction in its entirety, Robert Allen Stanford prays that this Honorable Court will send a message to the "collective force" (the Securities and Exchange Commission and Department of Justice) and hold them publicly accountable, and monetarily liable, for their lawless and life-ruining actions. Collectively, these actions have resulted in the total destruction of the global group of Stanford companies, ruined both the personal and professional reputation of Robert Allen Stanford, and brought unimaginable and unquantifiable grief and hardship to his family. And not to mention, caused this appellant to be unjustly charged, convicted, and sentenced to an unprecedented 110 years in a maximum security federal penitentiary.
Additionally, these lawless and unscrupulous actions on the part of this "collective force" caused unquantifiable losses and (continue to cause) untold hardship to the thousands of dedicated Stanford employees throughout the United States and around the world.
And, lastly, and most importantly for this Honorable Court to never forget, as Mr. Stanford himself never has, is the fact that the "collective force" of these two agencies of the United States Government have caused the many thousands of depositors in Stanford International Bank, in the United States and around the world, to lose virtually every dollar entrusted to it, and to its owner, this appellant, Robert Allen Stanford.

More precisely, appellant Robert Allen Stanford now prays that this Honorable Court will Order the full monetary restoration of every asset which was caused to be lost or destroyed by this "collective force", a restitution he very conservatively calculates at $15 billion.
Following his acquittal, and immediate release from prison, Stanford prays that this Honorable Court will begin this restoration process by Ordering the rightful return of the Stanford International Bank's 'Temenos and DataPro' customer account information (which was illegally accessed by the Receiver and is now being used in his insidious "clawback" actions), which precisely identifies each depositor and the amount currently owed to them - as it is this appellant's desire, and full intent, to quickly return to Stanford International Bank in Antigua with this information and personally present a check in the full amount owed to each and every of these depositors, with 5% interest calculated from February 17,2009.

Respectfully submitted,
Robert Allen Stanford


Read more: http://sivg.org/forum/view_topic.php?t=eng&id=262

Visit the Stanford International Victims Group - SIVG official forum http://sivg.org/forum/

SEC Escapes Stanford Victims' Suit Over $7B Ponzi Scheme

By Law360, New York

A Louisiana judge Friday threw out a putative class action alleging the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission facilitated Robert Allen Stanford's $7 billion Ponzi scheme, finding the agency was shielded by a law barring suits over federal officials' discretionary choices.

U.S. District Shelly D. Dick said the discretionary function exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act applied to the case brought by victims of Stanford in part because the alleged refusal of former official Spencer Barasch in the SEC's Fort Worth, Texas, office to investigate the Ponzi scheme was a matter of choice.

"While the Court sympathizes with the losses suffered by the plaintiffs in this matter, plaintiffs have failed to identify any mandatory obligations violated by SEC employees in the performance of their discretionary duties," Judge Dick concluded in granting the government's motion to dismiss.

"Plaintiff[s] have also failed to allege facts demonstrating that the challenged actions are not grounded in public policy considerations," she said.

The plaintiffs argued that Barasch's alleged conduct did not fall under the discretionary function exception because the SEC has a policy of making enforcement referrals to the National Association of Securities Dealers and the Texas State Securities Board. Therefore, if a decision was made to refer Stanford, and then not followed, that decision falls outside the discretionary function exception.

But Judge Dick rejected that argument, saying that while "the alleged conduct of Barasch is disturbing... the FTCA clearly states that the discretionary function exception applies 'whether or not the discretion involved be abused.'"

The suit, which was filed in July under the FTCA, alleged that SEC employees in Fort Worth knew as early as 1997 - only two years after Stanford Group Co. registered with the agency - that the company was likely operating a Ponzi scheme and did nothing about it.

Former SEC regional enforcement director Barasch, now an attorney with Andrews Kurth LLP, was singled out in the complaint for failing in his duties.

"In 1998 [to NASD] and again in 2002 [to TSSB] the SEC - through enforcement director Barasch and others - reached the conclusion that referrals should be made. Barasch himself was designated to perform these tasks," the complaint said. "But, in fact, these referrals were not made, with the effect that Stanford escaped scrutiny by other agencies for years, thus facilitating Stanford's scheme to defraud."

In dismissing the case, Judge Dick cited a similar decision by a Texas federal judge in another case brought against the SEC over Stanford's scheme. The plaintiffs in Dartez v. U.S. had argued that Barasch's decisions and the negligent supervision of his superiors were not protected policy considerations.

"While the [Dartez] decision is not binding on this Court, the Court can find no flaw in [its] reasoning," Judge Dick said.

The plaintiffs are represented by C. Frank Holthaus, Scott H. Fruge, Michael C. Palmintier and John W. DeGravelles of DeGravelles Palmintier Holthaus & Fruge and Edward J. Gonzales III.

The case is Anderson et al. v. United States of America, number 3:12-cv-00398, in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana.

Read more: http://sivg.org/article/2013_SEC_Escapes_Stanford_Victims_Suit_Over_7B_Ponzi_Scheme.html

Visit the Stanford International Victims Group - SIVG official forum http://sivg.org/forum/

Stanford Judge Approves Interim Distribution to Victims

By Tom Korosec & Andrew Harris

A plan by a court-appointed receiver to distribute assets recovered from R. Allen Stanford's Ponzi scheme to investors was approved by a federal judge in Dallas.

U.S. District Judge David C. Godbey accepted the plan by Ralph Janvey, the receiver appointed in 2009 to marshal and liquidate Stanford's personal and business assets, to make a $55 million interim distribution to about 17,000 claimants, or about 1 cent for each of the $5.1 billion lost in the fraud scheme.

"We will follow it up in a subsequent distribution as the money comes in," Janvey's attorney, Kevin Sadler of Baker Botts LLP, told Godbey at a court hearing in April.

Ponzi scheme victims of Bernard L. Madoff, who was arrested in December 2008, recovered more than $5.4 billion. Clients of the MF Global Inc. brokerage were paid about $4.9 billion after its parent, MF Global Holdings Ltd., failed in October 2011. Victims of a scheme by Peregrine Financial Group Inc. founder Russell Wasendorf, who prosecutors last year said stole $215 million, received an interim distribution of $123 million.

A federal jury in Houston last year found Stanford, 63, guilty of lying to investors about the nature and oversight of certificates of deposit issued by his Antigua-based bank. The jurors decided he must forfeit $330 million in accounts seized by the U.S. government.

The SEC case is Securities and Exchange Commission v. Stanford International Bank, 09-cv-00298, U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas (Dallas). The criminal case is U.S. v. Stanford, 09-cr-00342, U.S. District Court, Southern District of Texas (Houston).

To contact the reporter on this story: Andrew Harris in the Chicago federal courthouse at aharris16@bloomberg.net
To contact the editor responsible for this story: Michael Hytha at mhytha@bloomberg.net

Source.

 

Read the ORDER APPROVING RECEIVER'S INTERIM DISTRIBUTION PLAN.

STANFORD RECEIVERSHIP CERTIFICATION NOTICE

Before making distribution payments under the Interim Plan, the Receiver is required to send a Certification Notice to the Investor CD Claimants. This Certification Notice must ask each Investor CD Claimant for certification regarding whether they have applied for or received compensation for their claimed losses from sources other than the Receivership and, if so, the amount of such compensation. Investor CD Claimants must timely respond to this Certification Notice as a condition of receiving payment under the Interim Plan.
EXHIBIT B: CERTIFICATION NOTICE

Read more: http://sivg.org/article/2013_Stanford_Judge_Approves_Interim_Distribution_to_Victims.html

Visit the Stanford International Victims Group - SIVG official forum http://sivg.org/forum/

INITIAL REPLY BRIEF OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, APPELLANT

By Michael L. Post

In its opening brief, the Securities and Exchange Commission established that the district court erred both in incorrectly applying a preponderance standard of proof in this preliminary, summary proceeding and in applying an unduly narrow construction of the statutory term "customer" to preclude the possibility of coverage under the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 ("SIPA" or the "Act") for investors in the Stanford Ponzi scheme. The arguments made by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation ("SIPC") in response are based on an incorrect view of the nature of this proceeding and a misreading of the relevant statutory scheme, applicable case law, and underlying facts.

Contrary to SIPC's contention, this proceeding will not lead to a final determination of the key question at issue-whether any of the Stanford victims qualify as "customers" under SIPA. Nor did Congress confer greater discretion on SIPC than on the Commission to make the determination whether to seek to initiate a SIPA liquidation proceeding. Given the preliminary nature of the proceeding here, and the statutory relationship between the parties, a probable cause standard of proof is appropriate. Moreover, SIPC's formalistic construction of the term "customer" to preclude the potential for SIPA coverage here erroneously gives effect to both the fraudulent corporate boundaries designed by Allen Stanford to USCA Case #12-5286 Document #1437933 Filed: 05/24/2013 Page 9 of 40 facilitate his scheme and the illegitimate securities sent to investors in furtherance of that scheme.

Nor will the Commission's interpretation of the statutory definition of a "customer" undermine the statutory scheme as SIPC and its amici contend. The Commission is not advocating that every customer of every Stanford entity would have customer status under SIPA. See Brief of the SEC at 49 ("SEC __"). Rather, its position is that in the rare circumstances presented here-where the Stanford entities (including Stanford International Bank, Ltd. ("SIBL") and Stanford Group Company ("SGC")) were operated as a single fraudulent enterprise ignoring corporate boundaries, SGC accountholders who purchased SIBL CDs were solicited by SGC and dealt substantially with SGC employees, and the purported securities issued by SIBL were in reality interests in a Ponzi scheme-SGC accountholders who purchased SIBL CDs through SGC should be deemed to have deposited funds with SGC. This interpretation is the correct one; and it is at least a reasonable one that is entitled to deference.

Even apart from the lack of separateness of SGC and SIBL, the Commission's application should be granted under the Old Naples and Primeline cases.

The Commission's position here is also supported by two court of appeals cases expressly holding that customer status under SIPA "does not … depend simply on to whom the claimant handed her cash or made her check payable, or even where the funds were initially deposited." Old Naples, 223 F.3d at 1302; see Primeline, 295 F.3d at 1107. Relying on a different opinion's erroneous description of those cases, SIPC argues that the customers in those case provided money "to an ostensible agent of a broker-debtor." Br. 50 (quoting In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Secs., LLC, 708 F.3d 422, 428 (2d Cir. 2013)). In fact, the claimants in Old Naples provided money to a "separate company" that was owned by the same person who owned the SIPC-member introducing broker. 223 F.3d at 1299-1300. And in Primeline, at least some of the claimants provided money directly to companies separately owned by a sales representative of the broker-dealer. See 295 F.3d at 1104.

SIPC also argues that Old Naples and Primeline are distinguishable because they involved a broker that failed to clear a transaction with its clearing broker. Br. 50. But this is a distinction without a difference. As the Commission concluded, what matters is that depositing money with SIBL was "in reality no different than depositing it with SGC." Analysis at 8-9; see SEC 51-54.

Similarly unpersuasive is SIPC's attempt to distinguish Old Naples and Primeline on the ground that the investors there "never received the securities they intended to purchase." Br. 50. The court in Primeline expressly noted that some investors "received fraudulent 'Debenture Certificates'" "[i]n exchange for their cash." 295 F.3d at 1109. Moreover, the physical CDs should be disregarded here. See SEC 54.

Finally, SIPC urges this Court to reject Old Naples and Primeline as being against the supposed "weight of authority." Br. 51. But those cases involved facts most similar to those presented in this case, and SIPC points to no contrary authority in analogous circumstances. For example, in Aozora Bank Ltd., 480 B.R. 117 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff'd, 708 F.3. 422 (2d Cir. 2013), cited by SIPC, the investors at issue did not have accounts with the broker-dealer, and did not intend to open accounts with the broker-dealer. See 480 B.R. at 123-24, 128. Rather, their dealings were with independent entities which were not under common ownership and control with the broker-dealer. See id. at 121; see also SEC v. Kenneth Bove & Co., Inc., 378 F. Supp. 697, 698-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (claimants, allegedly at debtor's direction, sent shares of stock to an independent, third-party broker). The Ninth Circuit's decision in Brentwood Securities-which both Old Naples (223 F.3d at 1300) and Primeline (295 F.3d at 1106) cited-is similarly far afield. Unlike here, the investor funds in Brentwood Securities did not get funneled back to the broker-dealer and "[n]othing in the record establishe[d]" that the broker-dealer "had any role at all" in the transactions at issue. 925 F.2d at 328.

SIPC and its amici argue that ruling in the Commission's favor would "transform SIPC into an insurer against every fraudulent scheme implicating a broker-dealer." Br. 47; see SIFMA Br. 20-21; Law Professors Br. 19-20. But the Commission's position depends on the rare factual situation where, among other circumstances, there is a sufficient basis both (1) to disregard the corporate form of the broker-dealer and (2) to disregard the issuance of the purported security to the investor. Moreover, this scenario is substantially similar to recognized "customer" situations, such as where a broker-dealer misappropriates cash deposited with the broker-dealer or takes a deposit of cash but does not purchase any securities for the depositor. See, e.g., In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Secs. LLC, 654 F.3d 229, 236 (2d Cir. 2011). Amicus Financial Services Institute ("FSI") contends that covering "all" of the SIBL CD investors' losses would exhaust SIPC's reserve fund (FSI Br. 5), but FSI fails to take account of the facts that (1) many investors did not buy SIBL CDs through SGC and (2) the statute caps at $500,000 each customer's potential SIPC advancement (see 15 U.S.C. 78fff-3(a)).

Read the complete SEC Reply to SIPC in SEC vs SIPC.

Related article (Nonmember affiliate company were also granted with SIPC cover): Forensic accountant gives Stanford investors a little hope

Read more: http://sivg.org/article/2013_SEC_Reply_to_SIPC_in_SEC_vs_SIPC.html

Visit the Stanford International Victims Group - SIVG official forum http://sivg.org/forum/

Canadian lawyer sues U.S. government over Allen Stanford ponzi scheme

	May 7, 2013 By Drew Hasselback Investors lost billions in the ponzi scheme orchestrated by Texas tycoon Allen Stanford, and now a Canadian lawyer believes he has an innovative legal strategy to recover funds for victims of the fraud who reside outside the United States. Todd Weiler, who specializes in international law, believes that "unconscionable negligence and/or manifest incompetence" on the part of U.S. regulators may have breached the foreign investor protection provisions of several international trade treaties signed by the U.S. government.
Todd Weiler claims the U.S. government breached international trade treaties by failing to protect foreign investors from Allen Stanford's $7-billion ponzi scheme. Peter J. Thompson/National Post
If this had happened to Americans in Mexico, there'd be no doubt that those Americans would be bringing a NAFTA claim against Mexico A request for arbitration and statement of claim the London, Ont. lawyer has delivered to the U.S. Department of State alleges that the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission was aware of problems at the Stanford Group of Companies (SGC) and at Stanford Financial Group (SFG) as early as 1997. Yet in a "shocking and egregious failure," SEC officials failed to shut Stanford down until 2009, the claim alleges. Mr. Weiler alleges that the U.S. refused to take steps to shut Stanford down earlier because U.S. officials believed the majority of Stanford's victims were not U.S. nationals. The Canadian lawyer argues that international trade treaties, among them the North American Free Trade Agreement, require that the U.S. government treat investors from all signatory countries equally, regardless of their residency. "If this had happened to Americans in Mexico, there'd be no doubt that those Americans would be bringing a NAFTA claim against Mexico, and that they would deserve to win," Mr. Weiler said in an interview. "The Americans have for 100 years used these agreements and other policies to bring other governments to heel and make sure they get this kind of protection and legal security." The U.S. State Department web site shows that it has received notice of legal actions Mr. Weiler has filed on behalf of Stanford victims from Guatemala, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Chile and Peru, and which are brought under various trade agreements the U.S. has signed with those countries. However, the U.S. government has not yet acknowledged on the web site that it has received the NAFTA claim that Mr. Weiler has filed on behalf of Mexican and Canadian residents. All the claims contain allegations that have yet to be proven at a hearing. A high-flying Texas businessman who built a series of financial institutions in the United States and the Caribbean, Stanford was eventually arrested and charged with fraud in 2009. He had been known as "Sir Allen Stanford" in recognition of his services to the government of Antigua and Barbuda. He was tried in U.S. federal court and sentenced to 110 years in prison upon his conviction for fraud in 2012. His knighthood was revoked in 2010. Investors who placed funds with Stanford International Bank received "certificates of deposit" or CDs that were supposed to be low risk investments that offered generous returns. The scheme took in more than US$7-billion. Some 21,000 investors from around the world were taken in. SEC officials, who are responsible for protecting the investments of investors, acted with unconscionable negligence
	Stanford's activities caught the attention of U.S. regulators as early as 1997, a mere two years after the Stanford Group of Companies registered with the SEC in 1995, according to a report completed in 2010 by David Kotz, who was at the time the SEC's inspector general. The NAFTA claim filed by Mr. Weiler relies on that report, which concluded that the SEC could have sought legal action to shut down Stanford years earlier than it did.
A high-flying Texas businessman who built a series of financial institutions in the United States and the Caribbean, Stanford was eventually arrested and charged with fraud in 2009. Aaron M. Sprecher/Bloomberg
"SEC officials, who are responsible for protecting the investments of investors such as the claimants against criminal enterprises such as SFG, acted with unconscionable negligence and or manifest incompetence, causing millions of dollars of losses to the claimants as a result," the claim states. Because Mr. Weiler's claim is structured as a proposed international arbitration, the legal action is open only to non-U.S. residents from countries with which the U.S. has signed trade agreements. Mr. Weiler says the action, which he is bringing in conjunction with several other lawyers from the United States, could include "several thousand" clients. Other third parties have been targeted for their connection to Stanford. Liquidators of Stanford International Bank have sued Toronto-Dominion bank in Quebec and other jurisdictions on the theory that, as Stanford's banker, TD should have known the Texan businessman was up to no good. TD denies the allegation.

Source.

Read more: http://sivg.org/article/2013_Canadian_lawyer_sues_US_government_Stanford.html

Visit the Stanford International Victims Group - SIVG official forum http://sivg.org/forum/

Louisiana officials want release of SEC report in Stanford case

April 22, 2013
By BILL LODGE

A Louisiana senator told officials of the Securities and Exchange Commission Friday that he wants immediate release of a year-old report by the commission's inspector general on efforts to recover money for victims of a multibillion-dollar fraud.

U.S. Sen. David Vitter, R-La., described as incompetent efforts by a court-appointed receiver to find and distribute assets of convicted con man Robert Allen Stanford.

Stanford, 63, of Houston, is serving a 110-year prison sentence for a fraud conviction that followed estimated worldwide losses of approximately $7 billion. About $1 billion of those losses were from about 1,000 investors in the Baton Rouge, Lafayette and Covington areas, according to estimates by state Sen. Bodi White, R-Central, and Baton Rouge attorney Phillip W. Preis.

"The fraud caused an absolute tragedy for many Louisiana families who invested their hard-earned retirement savings in good faith that it would be there for them when they retired," Vitter said Friday in a letter to Mary Jo White, who chairs the SEC.

Vitter said the receiver in the case, Dallas attorney Ralph Janvey, spent $100 million to collect $55 million for Stanford's victims.

"In the best light, Janvey's actions can only be seen as incompetent," Vitter told White in that letter. He urged White to release the SEC inspector general's report on Janvey, noting that it was completed in March 2012.

There are more than 20,000 Stanford victims across more than 100 countries.

A retired Zachary couple, Louis and Kathy Mier, saw $240,000 of their savings stolen by Stanford's fraudulent scheme.

"Whatever any of our congressmen do to shed light on the truth of what happened, and whatever they can do to help us get our money back and be whole again, would make Louis and me very, very happy," Kathy Mier said Friday.

John J. Nester, a spokesman for the SEC, said in an email Friday that neither he nor other SEC officials would comment on Vitter's request before White issues a response to the senator's letter.

U.S. Sen. Mary Landrieu, D-La., released a statement through her staff: "The Stanford victims deserve answers, and the immediate release of the IG's report is the very least the SEC can do."

U.S. Rep. Bill Cassidy, R.-Baton Rouge, said through his staff: "I strongly urge the SEC … to release the full results of the inspector general's report. The victims of this crime were hard working Louisiana families, and they are entitled to see the details of the report."

Vitter noted that Janvey, against the SEC's wishes, unsuccessfully sued some Stanford victims in an effort to seize money those victims retrieved before Stanford's operations were shut down in February 2009.

"Given the demonstrated incompetence of the court-appointed receiver, it makes you wonder how bad this (inspector general's) report gets," Vitter added. "The Stanford victims deserve to see."

Source.

Read more: http://sivg.org/article/2013_Louisiana_want_release_SEC_report_Stanford_case.html

Visit the Stanford International Victims Group - SIVG official forum http://sivg.org/forum/

SEC Can't Force Help For Stanford Victims, DC Circ. Told

April 12, 2013
By Counsel for Appellee SIPC

The Securities Investor Protection Corp. asked the D.C. Circuit on Monday to affirm a landmark district court ruling declaring it doesn't owe compensation to victims of Robert Allen Stanford's $7 billion Ponzi scheme, suggesting the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission succumbed to political pressure in bringing the suit.

The SIPC asked the appeals court to affirm U.S. District Judge Robert L. Wilkins' decision dismissing the agency's application to compel the SIPC to pay the fraud victims' claims through a liquidation proceeding.

A top agency official had originally agreed that the SIPC did not owe funds under the Securities Investor Protection Act, SIPC claims, but that changed after U.S. Senator David Vitter, R-La., threatened to block the nominations of two SEC officials in June 2011, the SIPC said.

"The record shows that the SEC's general counsel agreed that SIPA did not apply to the Stanford case," the SIPC said. "It was only two years later that the SEC sought to force SIPC's hand, apparently bowing to pressure from a U.S. senator," referencing a June 14, 2011, press release from Vitter.

The corporation, funded by the brokerage industry to cover investors who lose money in failing firms, also claims the SEC didn't seek a liquidation until two years after its 2009 case against Stanford.

"If the SEC had thought the Stanford fraud was within the scope of what SIPA protects, it was under a legal obligation to notify SIPC immediately," the SIPC said. "The SEC did not do so, even though it filed an enforcement action against Stanford and secured the appointment of a receiver over U.S. Stanford assets in February 2009."

On July 3, Judge Wilkins ruled that Stanford's U.S.-based Stanford Group Co. was a member of the SIPC, but that the Antigua-based Stanford International Bank was not. Stanford International Bank Ltd. was an offshore bank, not a registered broker-dealer, which is what the SIPC oversees, Judge Wilkins said.

Judge Wilkins' decision was a major blow to victims of the Ponzi scheme, who together lost upwards of $7 billion in certificates of deposit administered by Stanford International Bank. It also carried broader legal significance, marking the first time since the enactment of SIPA 42 years ago that a federal court had ruled on how much power the SEC has to command a SIPC liquidation.

The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that brokerage customers cannot force such proceedings, but that the SEC has the authority to do so.

Because of its precedential nature, a key issue in the Stanford dispute was the standard of proof required of the SEC. The agency argued for a more lenient standard than the SIPC did, describing its burden as merely probable cause supported by hearsay. Judge Wilkins ultimately chose the higher standard requested by the SIPC: a preponderance of the evidence. In an SIPC liquidation, an investor must meet a preponderance standard to prove the validity of his or her claim.

In its appellate brief filed in January, the SEC said Judge Wilkins had taken a too-narrow view of the term "customer." The agency argued that transactions with both Stanford entities should be treated the same way under SIPA because the company operated "as a single fraudulent enterprise that ignored corporate boundaries."

"This interpretation of the statute to allow for flexibility in certain circumstances is the correct one, and it is at least a reasonable one that was entitled to deference by the district court," the SEC said.

The SEC added that it was not seeking customer status for all Stanford investors, but only for those who held accounts with Stanford Group Co., purchased fraudulent certificates of deposit through SGC and deposited funds with Stanford International Bank Ltd.

But SIPC said Monday that the terms of its mission were clear: to protect investors when a member brokerage fails, adding that Judge Wilkins' purportedly narrow view of the term 'customer' was appropriate.

"By its terms, the statute does not insure against fraud or investment losses, instead protecting only the 'customer' property that an SIPC-'member' brokerage firm holds in custody when the brokerage fails," the corporation added.

The corporation also said the SEC's case was unprecedented because it has not made similar requests in proceedings related to the downfall of a major financial institution.

"In 40 years and over 300 liquidation proceedings — including the recent liquidations ofLehman Brothers Inc., Madoff Investment Securities LLC, and MF Global Inc. — this is the first the the SEC had ever tried to compel a liquidation."

Stanford was sentenced in June to 110 years in prison for his role in the fraud.

SIPC is represented by Edwin John U, Eugene F. Assaf Jr., John C. O'Quinn, Michael W. McConnell and Elizabeth M. Locke of Kirkland & Ellis LLP.

The case is U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., case number 12-5286, in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

SIPC Response to SEC Appeal Brief.

Read more: http://sivg.org/article/2013_SEC_Cant_Force_Help_For_Stanford_Victims.html

Visit the Stanford International Victims Group - SIVG official forum http://sivg.org/forum/