Stanford International Victims Group

Posts mit dem Label SIB werden angezeigt. Alle Posts anzeigen

Sonntag, 28. September 2014

Una breve descripción de cada punto en la apelación de Stanford

I. si la Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) tenía jurisdicción y autoridad reguladora sobre Stanford International Bank Limited (SIB), o sus certificados de depósito (CD). Y si, después de la acción civil de la SEC, la acusación penal del Departamento de Justicia (DOJ) era defectuoso.

No creemos que el gobierno puso en evidencia o demostró que la SEC tenía autoridad para investigar Stanford International Bank, que era un banco offshore.

En primer lugar, la SEC no tiene la autoridad para investigar los bancos en general, mucho menos un banco offshore [extranjero]. Así que no tuvieron ninguna autoridad legal para exigir al Sr. Stanford para participar o colaborar con una investigación de su banco, para lo cual no tenían ninguna autoridad legal para investigar.

El 18 de julio de 2014, en la 'Securities and Exchange Commission v. Securities Investor ProtectionCorporation'. (SEC v. SIPC) (caso Nº 12-5286) el D.C. circuito determinó concluyentemente y ordenó concluyente, que los CDsofrecidos por el Banco extranjeroInternacional de Stanford fueron; (a) no "valores" como definición por, o regulación bajo las leyes federales de valores de Estados Unidos y en cambio eran; (b) “obligaciones de deuda"del banco, que eran; (c) no "vendido" a través de, o por Stanford Group Company y por lo tanto; (d) los compradores de esos CDs no fueron "clientes" del SGC y por lo tanto nunca estaban bajo la jurisdicción o sujetos a la autoridad reguladora de la U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

El 05 de septiembre de 2014 la Securities and Exchange Commission concedió a los hechos antes mencionados como lo decidió el Tribunal de circuito de D.C. y decidió que no apelaría dicha decisión.

Más allá de la cuestión de la extraterritorialidad - que es que Estados Unidos nunca tuvo jurisdicción ni autoridad reguladora sobre el Stanford International Bank - el Departamento de justicia amplió su nueva acusación reemplazando las fechas de las supuestas ofensas desde 1999-2009 (en su acusación del 18 de junio de 2009)(Doc. 1) hasta 1990-2010 (doc. 422). Este incremento (desde el año 1990hasta el año 2010) no sólo ocasiona que esta acusación sea "defectuosa", sino que también representa otro objetivo del DOJ que es el "fraude a la corte".

Para comenzar con - y más allá del hecho de que en febrero de 2010 el acusado Stanford había estado bajo custodia federal un total de ocho meses - en 1990 el estadounidense (Broker/Dealer) Stanford Group Company aun no existía.

Contrariamente a sus afirmaciones en la nueva acusación, AUSA Costa sabía que los CD emitidos por SIB no fueron "ofrecidos" por SIB ni "sugeridos" por SGC a ciudadanos estadounidenses o residentes hasta el año 1998 - un completo ocho años más allá del marco de tiempo alegado en la acusación.

En la elaboración de su nueva acusación, el Departamento de justicia se dio cuenta que una gran cantidad de riqueza del demandado Stanford fue creada a través de empresas de bienes raíces antes de 1998-el año de su presentación "Reglamento D" ante la SEC y mucho antes de que SIB comenzara a "ofrecer" y la SGC comenzaraa "sugerir" los CDs a los ciudadanos estadounidenses.

Al expandir el año del "esquema fraudulento" desde 1990, el Departamento de justicia entonces fue capaz de afirmar que esa riqueza pre-1998, "justifica" su liquidación ilegal por parte del receptor y evita que el acusado Stanford pueda acceder a cualquiera de esos activos para utilizarlos en su defensa. Y lo más importante, al expandirse el año del "esquema fraudulento" adelante a 2010, pudieron crear la apariencia que el acusado era culpable por las pérdidas que se produjeron un año después de la fecha de la TRO (Orden de restricción temporal) - un momento cuando el receptor designado por el Tribunal estaba en control, y cuando Stanford era incapaz (prohibido por el gobierno) de honrar las obligaciones de SIB.

II. si los simultáneos juicios civiles y penales (y sanciones), basado en los mismos eventos subyacentes, eran violaciones de la cláusula de debido proceso de la Quinta y Octava enmiendas, y de la protección del acusado Stanford debido a doble juzgado.

El 16 de febrero de 2009 la Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) presentó una denuncia civil en el distrito norte de Texas (División de Dallas) y solicitó una orden de restricción temporal (TRO) para hacerse con el control de todos los activos globales del demandado Stanford, tanto personales como corporativos. La SEC solicitó el nombramiento de un síndico/receptor Ralph S. Janvey.

El receptor fue específicamente dirigido y autorizado para:

"Realizar todos los actos necesarios para conservar, mantener, administrar y preservar el valor del Banco, con el fin de evitar cualquier irreparable pérdida, daños o lesiones al Banco".

Antes de cualquier hallazgo de irregularidades, ya sea civil o criminal, en febrero 24 del 2010, el Tribunal Civil de Dallas había aprobado la venta de dos buques propiedad del acusadoStanford. En la aprobación de esta venta, juez Godbey ordenó al receptor "secuestrar” la mitad del producto de ambas ventas.

Esto y otras prematuras ventas y desembolsos de sus activos, fueron una presunción de culpabilidad, un verdadero hecho consumado inconstitucional.

"Este receptor y su equipo han pasado importantes cantidades de tiempo en estas actividades, las principales actividades han sido coordinación con la SEC, el FBI y el Departamento de justicia en la identificación y reuniendo grandes cantidades de documentos e información relevante para sus investigaciones en curso y responder a numerosas y extensas solicitudes de la SEC, el FBI y el Departamento de justicia para analizar y proporcionar información y documentos."

"Una parte importante del trabajo de FTI (Karyl Van Tassel) involucró la recopilación de información a petición de la SEC, el FBI y el Departamento de justicia en relación con sus investigaciones, utilizando numerosas bases de datos complejas, correos electrónicos, registros contables, documentos financieros y archivos encontrados".

De hecho, los informes de investigación generados por esta firma FTI, y financiado por la administración judicial de Stanford, fueron utilizados por el gobierno como la Fundación de todo su caso.

El acusado Stanford presentaría que esto es sin lugar a dudas "apoyo" de su argumento de que las investigaciones civiles y criminales fueron efectivamente una acción concertada y llevado a cabo como uno solo.

Janvey y FTI en realidad estaban realizando "una parte significativa" de lasinvestigaciones del SEC, el FBI y el Departamento de justicia.

En Estados Unidos v. Kordel, 397 US 1, 11 (1970), el Tribunal Supremo citó cinco situaciones en las que puede resultar una constatación de una violación del debido proceso. En el caso de Stanford encontramos tres de ellos:

1). Si el Gobierno realiza una acción civil únicamente para la obtención de pruebas para su enjuiciamiento penal.

2). Considerando que el acusado razonablemente teme perjuicio adverso de publicidad previa al juicio u otra lesión injusta.

3). Considerando que existe cualquier otra circunstancia especial que podría sugerir la inconstitucionalidad, o incluso la inconveniencia de un proceso penal.

III. si el Tribunal violó la Cuarta enmienda del demandado Stanford contra cateos ilegales y búsquedas al:

a)PERMITIENDO QUE LA ORDEN (CIVIL) DEL RECEPTOR FUERA UTILIZADO COMO UN "RECURSO DE ASISTENCIA"

El 17 de febrero de 2009, el receptor designado en materia civil, entró en las oficinas de Stanford FinancialGroup (en Houston y en otros lugares), con el propósito de agarrar el control de todoslos papeles y documentación electrónica indicados en la orden del receptor (vol. 6) (USCA5 1478-1488). Este receptor fue acompañado por U.S. Marshals, policías y agentes del FBI que, basado en la invitación aparente del receptor, eran libres para llevar a cabo un registro sin orden judicial e incautación de varios elementos en las instalaciones, de los cuales el Departamento de justicia utilizaría más adelante en la subsecuente investigación criminal y el enjuiciamiento.

El Tribunal (juez Hittner) - pero usted dice fue confiscado... se han incautado en una acción civil y el receptor en la acción civil entregó al gobierno.

Sr. Fazel - correcto. Pero estamos diciendo que la cuarta enmienda se aplica porque la acción del estado se produjo cuando los oficiales - oficiales de policía fueron interactuando con el receptor.

El Tribunal - cómo puedes volver y limpiarlo en una situación como ésta? Creo que es imposible, porque no tenían ninguna orden, eso es seguro.

Sr. Fazel - eso es seguro.

En violación de los derechos del acusado Stanford bajo la cuarta enmienda, la objeción del abogado fuéDENEGADA y la prueba 1500 (agenda de RAS con números telefónicos) - obtenida sin la orden de registro requerida - fue admitido como evidencia.

Más evidencia de que la orden de receptor fue utilizada como una orden general o "recurso de asistencia" puede encontrarse en el acceso y admisión de la prueba 616 del gobierno (2006 faxes y cartas entre Sr. King y Alvarado Re: proyecto de respuesta a ECCB).

"El baluarte de la protección de la cuarta enmienda" requiere que la "policía obtenga una orden de un magistrado neutral y desinteresado antes de embarcarse en una búsqueda" Franks v. 438 de Delaware, Estados Unidos 154 (1978). No importa si estos artículos fueron "puntualmente proporcionados" a las agencias gubernamentales o recogidos por ellos de manera independiente, ellos accedieron sin una orden judicial mediante la utilización de la orden del receptor como un "recurso de asistencia".

b)PERMITIENDO QUE EL RECEPTOR DESIGNADO ACTUARA FUERA DEL ALCANCE DE LA ORDEN DE RECEPTORIA.

El 06 de enero de 2012, el defensor Stanford presentó una "Moción para suprimir" y solicitar una audiencia probatoria. (vol. 5)(USCA5 1435-1474) Este movimiento también fue negado por el Tribunal (juez Hittner), y no se llevó a cabo ninguna audiencia probatoria.

Específicamente, la cuestión en este asunto preocupa al receptor por acceso no autorizado y difusión de información completa de las cuentas del cliente de Stanford International Bank que estaban almacenadas en las bases de datos 'Datos Pro' y 'Temenos' ubicado en Antigua y protegido por las leyes de secreto y privacidad de banco de Antigua y Barbuda (Bus Intl. 244(1)) CorpAct. Lo que supera el alcance de la orden del receptor y por lo tanto su autoridad, este acceso ilegal y no autorizado de información sobre las cuentas del cliente del SIB fue alcanzado por una "carta de autorización" por Ralph S. Janvey (receptor) al Sr. Sohil Merchant, el empleado de Stanford que había diseñado las bases de datos y por lo tanto sabía eludir el sistema de seguridad de las computadoras del banco.

Cuando esta información inesperadamente falló en producir una sola "víctima" y en cambio sirvió para desmentir completamente estas acusaciones de esquema Ponzi y exonerar al demandado Stanford, la compañía de contabilidad forense (FTI) secuestró esas Temenos/DataPro bases de datos en un almacén controlado por FTI y lejos de la defensa de Stanford -inaccesibles en Washington, D.C.

El acceso (ilegal) fue completado y como admitió el Director Gerente de FTI (Karyl Van Tassel), estas dos DataPro y Temenos bases de datos habían sido trasladados desde Houston a Washington, D.C., fuera de capacidad en presupuesto restringido de la defensa para accederlas.

Karyl Van Tassel:Nosotros tenemos una base de datos con la información del CD de SIB, Temenos y DataPro.

Michael Stanley (abogado): está bien. ¿Dónde están localizados?

Karyl Van Tassel:Yo diría que el Temenos y DataPro están en la oficina de Washington...

Con respecto al caso de Stanford, el 26 de febrero de 2009, y previo a este acceso ilegal de información de privacidad protegida por ley, el Tribunal superior de Antigua y Barbuda emitió una orden (vol. 6) (USCA5 1727-1750) en la que explícitamente dice:

"(1) no divulgación de información específica del cliente está autorizada sin más, o de otro, orden de la corte; y (2) No divulgación de información está permitida bajo esta orden a cualquier gobierno extranjero o un organismo regulador a menos que dicha divulgación está sujeta a obligacionesde divulgación mutuas. Para los propósitos de esta orden, información específica del cliente significa información suficiente de detalle para permitir identificar el cliente en cuestión, la dirección del cliente o el monto de tales créditos saldos u otras inversiones de las cuentas." (vol. 6)((JSCA5 1729-1730)

El Departamento de justicia estadounidense reconoce que búsquedas hechas en otro país y llevadas a cabo por 'estatales' (americanos) (o Ralph Janvey, actuando como un "oficial" de la corte del juez Godbey) deben realizarse con el consentimiento de los locales del país y sus leyes.

En este caso ninguno de estas instrucciones de la Corte Suprema o garantías relacionadas con los tratados o protocolos se adhirieron. Como es evidente, el receptor (Ralph Janvey) esgrimió la orden civil como un "recurso de asistencia" y superaba con creces su alcance. Además de su amplia investigación asistencia y coordinación con los investigadores (penales), mediante la emisión de esta "carta de autorización" para el acceso de datos, protegidos por la ley de privacidad, ubicados en Antigua, violó las leyes de la nación soberana de Antigua y Barbuda tanto las leyes del Tratado de los Estados Unidos.

Finalmente y lo más importante en estos procesos, como este ilegal acceso, (justificativo) Temenos y DataPro base de datos, se prestó al FBI y muy claramente y de forma selectiva fue utilizado por el gobierno en el juicio, bajo Brady v. Maryland Estados Unidos (1963) debería haber sido, pero nunca fue, proporcionado a la defensa.

Por lo tanto, en su semblante de este acto, seguido por el uso de esta información y fallapara ser proporcionada a la defensa, los fiscales de Estados Unidos violaron, de la manera más atroz, tanto la normativa de los descubrimientos y la cuarta enmienda del demandado Stanford al debido proceso y protección desde cateos ilegales y confiscaciones.

Leer mas: http://sivg.org/forum/view_topic.php?t=esp&id=99

Visit the Stanford International Victims Group - SIVG official forum http://sivg.org/forum/

Freitag, 12. September 2014

Appeal of Robert Allen Stanford - Sep. 10, 2014

Following part of the appeal of Stanford.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

I. Whether the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had jurisdiction and regulatory authority over Stanford International Bank Limited (SIB), or its Certificates of Deposit (CDs). And whether, following the SEC's civil action, the Department of Justice's (DOJ) criminal Indictment was defective.

II. Whether the simultaneous civil and criminal prosecutions (and sanctions imposed), based on the same underlying events, were violations of the DueProcess Clause of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments, and defendant Stanford's protection from Double Jeopardy.

III.Whether the Trial Court violated defendant Stanford's Fourth Amendment protection from illegal searches and seizures.

IV. Whether the District Court abused its discretion when it failed to hold a pre-trial Hearing to determine whether defendant Stanford had any "untainted" funds that could be used to pay for his defense.

V. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion by (a) disqualifying defendant Stanford's competent counsel of choice, and; (b) forcing ill-prepared appointed counsel to proceed to trial.

VI. Whether the Trial Court violated defendant Stanford's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial, by failing to provide appropriate responses to Jury Notes Two and Three.

VII. Whether defendant Stanford was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial, because pre-trial publicity precluded the assembly of an impartial jury.

VIII. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion by first deeming defendant Stanford competent, and then failing to grant him adequate time to prepare an effective defense, assist his counsel, or prepare to testify on his own behalf; in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial.

IX. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion by denying defendant Stanford adequate time to prepare an effective defense.

X. Whether the Trial Court violated defendant Stanford's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial by failing to provide the jury with a "unanimity of theory" instruction specific to which "misrepresentation" (element), on each of the mail fraud and/or wire fraud Counts constituted the overall "scheme to defraud."

XI. Whether the Trial Court violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, by proceeding with evidence which was insufficient to prove the essential elements of the mail fraud statute.

XII. Whether the Trial Court violated defendant Stanford's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial by issuing a modified "Allen charge" that was coercive.

XIII. Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion by enhancing defendant Stanford's sentence based on information not found in any Count of the Indictment, and that was neither entered into evidence, nor submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

XIV. Whether the Trial Court, through its rulings, demonstrated a partiality in favor of the Government that denied defendant Stanford an opportunity to present an adequate defense, in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to Due Process, and his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.

XV. Whether under the Cumulative Error Doctrine the issues presented here amount to a denial of defendant Stanford's Constitutional right to a fair trial, and thus undermined the reliability of the verdict.

STATEMENT I

Mr. McGuire: Specifically, as to Count 12, which is the Conspiracy to Obstruct the SEC Investigation; we don't believe the Government put on any evidence or showed that the SEC had authority to investigate Stafford International Bank, which was an offshore bank.

First of all, the SEC does not have the authority to investigate banks in general, much less an offshore [foreign] bank. So, they had no lawful authority to require Mr. Stanford to participate in or cooperate with an investigation of his bank, for which they had no lawful authority to investigate... (vol. 56)(USCA5 11534-11535)

For instance, at a pre-trial Hearing where the Government was requesting a Motion in Limine, barring any discussion about SIB's eligibility or ineligibility to access federal bailout money (TARP Funds), the prosecution pointed out the following:

AUSA Stellmach: There are two points, Judge; one, we just want to preclude any suggestion that the SIB was ever eligible. Foreign banks only received funds if they had U.S. subsidiaries, which Mr. Stanford's bank did not, because he didn't want to subject it to U.S. regulations. So it was never eligible for the TARP or any bailout funds. So it would be misleading to the jury to suggest otherwise... (vol. 36)(USCA5 15453)

Ultimately, the Trial Judge (Hittner) would grant this Motion in Limine (vol. 5)(USCA5 1381-1392)(Doc. 585) and, in the process, would further confirm the SEC's lack of jurisdiction over the bank by stating:

"[T]he allegation about TARP funds which foreign banks like SIB was not eligible to receive, is GRANTED at this time..." (vol. 36)(USCA5 15469)

AUSA Costa: [w]ho directly regulated Stanford International Bank throughout its histories?

Mr. Young: The FSRC.

AUSA Costa: Which is just in Antigua?

Mr. Young: Yes.

(vol. 50)(USCA5 7697-7698)

The most definitive proof of all, however, is found in the Superseding Indictment itself, under Section (5), which states: Although SIB marketed and sold its CDs within the United States, SIB was an Antiguan-based bank, and was not regulated by any United States banking authority. Instead, SIB was regulated by an agency of the Antiguan Government known as the Financial Services Regulatory Commission (the "Antiguan Regulatory Commission") which claimed to conduct inspections to determine the solvency of banks, to review the quality of bank's investments, and to confirm the accuracy of bank's reported returns. (Doc. 422)

In a related case, the Fifth Circuit has concluded that the Certificates of Deposit offered by SIB were not "covered securities" within the meaning of the preclusion provisions to the Securities Litigation Uniform Standard Act (SLUSA), specified in 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(F)(1)(A).

In yet another Stanford related case (Chadbourne& Parke, LLP v. Samuel Troice, et. al. 134 S.Ct. 1058 (2014) - recently before the Supreme Court), on theissue of "in connection with" and "covered securities", Justices Scalia, Kagan and Breyer noted the following:

JUSTICE SCALIA

"I had assumed that the purpose of the securities laws was to protect the purchasers and sellers of covered securities. There is no purchaser - or seller of a covered security involved here. It's.. .it's a purchaser of not-covered securities who is being defrauded, if anyone...why...why would the Federal Securities Laws protect that person?"

JUSTICE KAGAN

"In all our cases, there's been something to say when somebody asks the question: how has this affected a potential purchaser or seller in the market for the relevant securities?" "And here there's nothing to say."

On July 18, 2014, in 'Securities and Exchange Commission v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation'. (SEC v. SIPC) (case no. 12-5286) the D.C. Circuit conclusively determined, and conclusively ruled, that the CDs offered by the foreign-incorporated and foreign-domiciled Stanford International Bank were; (a) not "securities" as defined by, or regulated under, the federal securities laws of the United States, and instead were; (b) "debt obligations" of the Bank, which were; (c) not "sold" through, or by, Stanford Group Company, and thus; (d) the purchasers of those CDs were not "customers" of SGC, and were therefore never under the jurisdiction or subject to the regulatory authority of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

"The [District] Court reasoned that the investors obtained the Antiguan bank's CDs by depositing funds with the bank itself, not with SGC, and they thus cannot be considered customers of the latter.

We agree that the CD investors do not qualify as customers of SGC under the operative statutory definition."

On September 5, 2014 the Securities and Exchange Commission conceded to the aforementioned facts as found by the D.C. Circuit Court, and decided that they would not appeal the decision any further.

Beyond the extraterritoriality issue - which is that the United States never had jurisdiction nor regulatory authority over the foreign-incorporated and foreigndomiciled Stanford International Bank - in their new Superseding Indictment the DOJ broadened the dates of the alleged offenses from 1999-2009 (in their June 18, 2009 Indictment)(Doc. 1) to 1990-2010 (Doc. 422). This reach-back (to the year 1990) and forward (to the year 2010) not only renders the Indictment "defective", it is representative of another DOJ goal, and is a "fraud upon the Court".

To begin with - and beyond the fact that by February of 2010 defendant Stanford had been in federal custody a full eight months - in 1990 the U.S.-based (Broker/Dealer) Stanford Group Company did not yet exist.

Contrary to his assertions in the Superseding Indictment, AUSA Costa knew that the CDs issued by SIB were neither "offered" by SIB nor "suggested" by SGC to any American citizens or residents until the year 1998 - a full eight years beyond the time frame alleged in the Indictment.

In crafting their new Superseding Indictment, the DOJ realized that a vast amount of defendant Stanford's wealth was created through real estate ventures prior to 1998- the year of his "Regulation D" filing with the SEC, and long before SIB began "offering" and SGC began "suggesting" the CDs to U.S. citizens.

By their expanding the year of the "fraudulent scheme" back to 1990, the DOJ was then able to lay claim to that pre-1998 wealth, "justify" the Receiver's unlawful liquidations of pre-1998 assets, and thereby prevent defendant Stanford from accessing any of these assets to utilize in his defense. And more importantly, by expanding the year of the "fraudulent scheme" forward to 2010, they were able (as detailed in ISSUE XIII) to create the appearance that defendant Stanford was culpable for losses which occurred a full year beyond the date of the TRO - a time when the Court-appointed Receiver was in control, and when Stanford was incapable (prohibited by the Government) of honoring SIB 's obligations.

Visit the Stanford International Victims Group - SIVG official forum http://sivg.org/forum/

Donnerstag, 11. September 2014

Apelacion de Robert Allen Stanford - Sep. 10, 2014

A continuación parte de la apelación de Stanford.

DECLARACIÓN DE TEMAS

III. si el Tribunal violó la Cuarta enmienda del demandado Stanford contra cateos ilegales y búsquedas.

IV. si el Tribunal de distrito abusó de su discreción al no celebrar una audiencia previa al juicio para determinar si el acusado Stanford tenía fondos "no relacionados con el caso" que podrían utilizarse para pagar su defensa.

V. si el Tribunal abusó de su discreción por (a) descalificación del demandado Stanford para elegir a un Asesor competente, y; (b) obligando al nombrado abogado para preparar yproceder con el juicio.

VI. si el Tribunal violó el derecho de enmienda Sexta del acusado Stanford a un juicio justo, por no dar respuestas apropiadas a jurado notas 2 y 3.

VII. si demandado Stanford fue privado de su derecho a la Sexta enmienda a un juicio justo, porque la publicidad previa al juicio imposibilitó el montaje de un jurado imparcial.

VIII. si el Tribunal abusó de su discreción por primero atribuiral demandado Stanford competente y luego al no concederle el tiempo adecuado para preparar una defensa eficaz, ayudar a su abogado, o preparar a testificar en su propia defensa; en violación de la cláusula de debido proceso de la Decimocuarta Enmienda, así como sus Quinta y Sexta enmienda de los derechos a un juicio justo.

IX. si el Tribunal abusó de su discreción al negar al demandado Stanfordun tiempo adecuado para preparar una defensa efectiva.

X. si el Tribunal violó el derecho de enmienda Sexta del acusado Stanford a un juicio justo por no proporcionar al jurado con una instrucción de "unanimidad de teoría" específica para la "tergiversación" (elemento), en cada uno delos fraude que constituyeron en general el "esquema para defraudar".

XI. si el Tribunal violó la cláusula de debido proceso de la Decimocuarta Enmienda, procediendo con la evidencia que era insuficiente para probar los elementos esenciales de la ley de fraude de correo.

XII. si el Tribunal violó el derecho de enmienda Sexta del acusado Stanford a un juicio justo mediante la emisión de una modificada"acusaciónpara Allen" que fue coercitivo.

XIII. si el Tribunal abusó de su discreción mejorando la frase del acusado Stanford en base a información no encontrada en ningún cargo de la acusación, y que ni siquiera entró en evidencia, ni fue presentada al jurado y probado más allá de una duda razonable.

XIV. si el Tribunal, a través de sus resoluciones, demostró una parcialidad a favor del gobierno que negó al acusado Stanford una oportunidad para presentar una defensa adecuada, en violación de su Quinta Enmiendade derecho al debido proceso y su Sexta enmienda de derecho a un juicio justo.

XV. ya sea bajo la doctrina de Error acumulado sobre los temas presentados aquí,entre otros a una negación del derecho constitucional del acusado Stanford a un juicio justo, y de esta manera minó la fiabilidad del veredicto.

Leer mas: http://sivg.org/forum/view_topic.php?t=esp&id=99

Visit the Stanford International Victims Group - SIVG official forum http://sivg.org/forum/

Freitag, 25. April 2014

Allen Stanford filed on 24 April 2014 a Motion to Vacate

Motion to Vacate filed on 24 April 2014, based on:
1) SEC lack of jurisdictional or regulatory authority over SIB
2) Denial of Due Process, and improper venue for their complaint
3) Blatant violation of Stanford’s Fourth Amendment right to protection from illegal search and seizure
4) Fraud upon de Court in this matter

Janvey did not have warrants to seize all documents found in Stanford’s office.

Violation of the U.S. Computer and Wire Act. Janvey hired the FTI consulting, who got access illegally to the database located in Antigua. Once it was discovered, the access was shut off.

Stanford was denied to access some documents for his defense. In addition the denied access to the “select” material which was “mysteriously” relocated to a warehouse in Washington D.C. (there was enough room in Houston to store all the material, why did they move it to Washington?).

Stanford alleges that “select” material was the detailed customer account records of SIB obtained by Janvey illegally via “hacking”, and that the Government, through the Receiver, had very purposefully places well out of defense counsel’s reach.

Davis quickly pled to, for two reasons (a) he had embezzled vast amounts of money from the company, and (b) he was offered a deal that would allow him to avoid prosecution on the embezzling...

Reading the Motion to Vacate; the oral deposition of Karyl Van Tassel, who (unlicensed) firm (FTI) was being paid tens of millions of dollars to produce a certain result:

Attorney Matthew Nielson:
Q. Who prepared the Declaration?
A. (Van Tassel) The Declaration was prepared between FTI and Baker Botts.
Q. Okay. Who did the initial drafting?
A. Baker Botts did.
Q. The entire thing?
A. Yes.

Attorney Michael Stanley:
Q. you mentioned how a database had been compiled that had over 40 terabytes of information and 2.5 million documents.
A. (Van Tassel) Yes.
Q. Where do those documents come from?
A. Well, we talked about the Temenos database.
Q. It is fair to say that there have always been investments made with SIB money? I’ll make it a little more clear. When money came in from the depositors, this didn’t sit in a big burlap bag under Allen Stanford’s desk, did it?
A. No.
Q. Okay. It was actually put into banks and investments were made with that money, right?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Okay. Now, when the depositors wanted to redeem their CD’s, sometimes those redemptions would come from available cash, right?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Did it - it came from cash they had in the accounts that had not been invested in private equity, right?
A. Or otherwise disseminated throughout the organization, yes.

Stanley started asking about the accounts located in other banks and Van Tassel could not answer how many accounts are, how much money was deposited, how much money is currently available...

Stanley also asked about how many companies received money from SIB (as investment from Stanford). Van Tassel could not exactly answer that question.

Stanley asked her why she said it was a Ponzi scheme from the beginning. Van Tassel said she got that information from Davis’s testimony. Van Tassel did not make any research or looked at the balance sheets to confirm whether SIB was solvent or not.

Attorney Mark Goranson to Van Tassel:
Q. I want to talk a little bit about, you had experience, excluding the Stanford matter, on two other matters that involved Ponzi schemes; is that correct?
A. (Van Tassel) Yes.
Q. Okay. And one involved, I think you said, a computer reseller; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And who were you retained by?
A. A law firm and I can’t recall the name.
Q. And did you issue a written report in that case?
A. No.
Q. And the second matter, I believe you said, was a real estate matter.
A. Yes.
Q. And the name of the lawsuit?
A. I don’t recall.
Q. And who retained you?
A. I don’t remember the name of the law firm

Jim Davis was an admitted “crook”, “coward”, “fraudster”, “liar” and “thief” who, to avoid 30 years of hard time would have said and admitted to anything asked of him - up to an including, if necessary, the Kennedy assassination. Though not yet faced with prison time, Karyl Van Tassel, Senior Managing Director of FTI Consulting, had an equally compelling reason to “find”, “declare” and provide “attestations” consistent with the predeterminations contained in the SEC’s complaint...

In other words, in all of her “Declarations” in the Stanford matter, Ms. Van Tassel, CPA, was attesting to work performed by a firm that had no license to perform such work - and nowhere in any of the required locations did she or her firm (FTI) indicate by way of disclaimer that “This firm is not a CPA firm”, and that the forensic accounting and investigatory work they were performing was being done with total disregard to the applicable laws in Texas.

FTI aided and abetted the SEC and DOJ in their fraudulent pursuit of SIB, the concealment of an international crime, and ultimately, the purposeful denial of information that would have proven the solvency of SIB; and thus the innocence of RAS. Additional evidentiary support for this conclusion is found in the Receiver’s decision to employ both the unlicensed FTI, and the more widely known and reputable (and appropriately licensed) accounting firm Ernst & Young. As there can be no other reason for retaining both of these firms, and it is thus abundantly clear that the more accommodating and less reputable FTI was needed here to attest to the financial manipulations necessary to corroborate the SEC’s allegation of a Ponzi scheme.

Attorney Dick DeGuerin asked FTI’s lead forensic auditor, Jeffrey Ferguson the following question:
Q. This isn’t a Ponzi scheme, is it?
A. (Mr Ferguson FTI) I haven’t formulated an opinion on that.
(Mr. DeGuerin to the Court): “This is a gentleman who’s a certified fraud examiner, whose firm has [already] been paid $6 million dollars to look at records, and he cannot say under oath that this is a Ponzi scheme.

And then, 3 years later, after the thousands of media slanderings and the total destruction of his global company, his life and an untold number of other lives, based on Karyl Van Tassel’s findings of a “Ponzi scheme”...

BUT Van Tassel said she got that information (that it was a Ponzi scheme) from Davis’s testimony. Van Tassel did not make any research or looked at the balance sheets to confirm whether SIB was solvent or not.

Read more: http://sivg.org/forum/view_topic.php?t=eng&id=255

Visit the Stanford International Victims Group - SIVG official forum http://sivg.org/forum/

Donnerstag, 25. April 2013

SEC Order Against Stanford

April 25, 2013
By U.S. District Judge David C. Godbey

Securities and Exchange Commission, Plaintiff, vs. Stanford International Bank LTD., et al. Defendants. Civil Action No. 3:09-CV-0298-N

This Order addresses Plaintiff Security and Exchange Commission's ("SEC") motion for partial summary judgment [1779]. The Court grants the motion. The Court also denies Defendant R. Allen Stanford's motion for extension of time [1807].

The Court grants the SEC's motion for summary judgment. The Court enjoins Stanford from violating the Exchange Act § 10(b), Rule 10b-5, the Securities Act § 17(a), and the Advisers Act § 206(1) and (2), enjoins Davis violating the Exchange Act § 10(b), Rule 10b-5, the Securities Act § 17(a), and enjoins SGC and SIB from violating the Exchange Act § 10(b), Rule 10b-5, the Securities Act § 17(a), the Advisers Act § 206(1) and (2), and the Investment Company Act § 7(d). The Court finds Stanford, Davis, SGC, and SIB jointly and severally liable to disgorge the $5.9 billion fraudulently acquired by Stanford's scheme. The Court adds $861,189,969.06 of prejudgment interest to this total, for a total disgorgement liability of $6,761,189,969.06. Finally, the Court imposes a civil penalty of $5.9 billion on Stanford and $5 million on Davis.

Read the complete Order of U.S. District Judge David C. Godbey.

Visit the Stanford International Victims Group - SIVG official forum http://sivg.org/forum/

Dienstag, 12. März 2013

Stanford investors' lawsuit heads to federal court

March 12, 2013
By Bill Lodge

Eighty-nine investors defrauded by now-imprisoned Houston financier Robert Allen Stanford want $115 million from seven insurance companies in addition to claims that could total as much as $1 billion against the Louisiana Office of Financial Institutions and SEI Investments Co.

But six of the insurers responded Monday by transferring the investors' 4-year-old state court suit to Baton Rouge federal court, action the investors have fought hard in the past.

"We feel confident that this case should not be removed to federal court, because the state court has already ruled on it" and granted the investors class-action status, said Phillip W. Preis, Baton Rouge attorney for the investors.

Telephone and email requests for comment from three New Orleans attorneys for the insurance companies were not returned.

The investors sued OFI and Pennsylvania-based SEI in 19th Judicial District Court in Baton Rouge in 2009. That was soon after the Securities and Exchange Commission shut down Stanford's worldwide operations and alleged his investment program was nothing more than a fraudulent scheme.

But a federal judge in Dallas, where the SEC had filed its complaint, yanked the Louisiana investors' suit into his Texas court and then dismissed the case.

The Dallas judge ruled in 2011 that the Baton Rouge investors suit violated a Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act prohibition against state court litigation that could negatively affect the nation's financial markets.

Last year, however, a three-judge panel of the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals overruled the Dallas judge and concluded that investors could pursue recovery of their losses in Baton Rouge state court.

That returned the investor claims to state District Judge Michael Caldwell, who held hearings on disputed allegations that OFI knew of Stanford's misdeeds and should have warned investors, as well as a complaint that SEI ignored a duty to tell investors that Stanford's assets were grossly overvalued. SEI's services were contracted by Stanford.

Caldwell issued a judgment last year that certified the investors' suit as a class action, meaning that all people who lost investments at Stanford Trust Co.'s Baton Rouge office could join the suit as plaintiffs against SEI, OFI and now SEI's seven insurers.

Caldwell has not yet scheduled a trial for the case.

The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to hear arguments on appeals of related Stanford investor cases in October.

In Baton Rouge, attorneys for both SEI and OFI repeatedly have denied all allegations that their clients failed any responsibility to alert investors about Stanford's frauds.

"The role of the OFI is to regulate, not to ensure that those who invest in companies subject to OFI regulation will never lose money as a result of criminal behavior," OFI attorney David Latham told Caldwell in one court filing.

"SEI did not make any false statements" to Stanford investors, SEI attorney J. Gordon Cooney Jr. told Caldwell in September. Cooney later added: "SEI has not violated Louisiana securities law."

Court records show the investors added SEI's insurers to its list of defendants in an amended complaint that was filed Feb. 13 under seal.

Preis said Monday the amended complaint was filed under a nonpublic seal because it contains information related to OFI's exam reports on Stanford Trust, which Caldwell ruled earlier must remain confidential.

The six insurers that transferred the dispute Monday to U.S. District Judge James J. Brady are Allied World Assurance Co. (U.S.) Inc., Continental Casualty Co., Arch Insurance Co., Indian Harbor Insurance Co., Nutmeg Insurance Co. and certain underwriters at Lloyd's of London.

Those insurers told Brady a seventh firm — Endurance Specialty Insurance Ltd., of Bermuda — did not join their motion because Endurance officials had not yet been served with a copy of the investors' suit.

Stanford has been in federal custody since June 2009, when he was indicted by a federal grand jury in Houston for worldwide frauds alleged to exceed $7 billion. He was convicted on fraud charges last year and sentenced to a prison term of 115 years.

Source.

Visit the Stanford International Victims Group - SIVG official forum http://sivg.org/forum/

Montag, 18. Februar 2013

Stanford Investors Sue Antigua, Caribbean Central Bank

February 18, 2013
By Laurel Brubaker Calkins

R. Allen Stanford's receiver and investors' committee sued Antigua, the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank and 23 former Stanford Financial Group Co. executives over allegations they aided the financier's $7 billion fraud.

The Official Stanford Investors Committee seeks repayment of at least $90 million in documented loans Stanford made to the dual-island nation of Antigua and Barbuda and accuses its elected officials of having been "Stanford's partners in crime." The nation's leaders shielded Stanford's scheme and traded choice real estate for as much as $230 million in loans that haven't been repaid, according to the lawsuit.

"Antigua knowingly provided necessary assistance to Stanford's $7 billion Ponzi scheme and, in exchange, received millions of dollars in loans whose repayment terms Stanford did not enforce," the committee said in a complaint filed in Dallas federal court on Feb. 15. "For well over a decade, Antigua was a prime participant in, and beneficiary of, the Stanford Ponzi scheme, and actively protected and shielded Stanford's criminal enterprise from real regulatory scrutiny."

Stanford, 62, was convicted in March of masterminding a Ponzi scheme that defrauded investors through the sale of bogus certificates of deposit at his Antigua-based Stanford International Bank Ltd. He is serving a 110-year sentence in a Florida federal prison as he appeals his verdict and sentence.

Falsified Audits
Evidence at Stanford's trial showed he bribed Antiguan banking regulator Leroy King to falsify audits certifying the bank's investment returns and mislead U.S. securities regulators investigating the former Texas billionaire's operations. Stanford was also allowed to underwrite and participate in banking reform legislation that Antigua claimed had cleaned up its corrupt offshore banking industry, according to trial evidence. Antigua has so far failed to extradite King to face criminal charges in the U.S.

The investors on Feb. 15 separately sued the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, which nationalized Stanford's other island financial institution, the Bank of Antigua, after the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission seized Stanford's enterprise on suspicion of fraud in February 2009.

The ECCB in turn parceled out ownership in the bank to the government of Antigua and to other Caribbean banks in what the investors called "a second act of brazen thievery." The head of ECCB's monetary council at the time was Antiguan Minister of Finance Errol Cort, who was both King's supervisor and one of Stanford's personal attorneys, according to court papers.

Rightful Owners
"The considerable value of the Bank of Antigua, believed to be in the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars, should be distributed as compensation to its rightful owners, Stanford's victims and creditors," the committee said in court papers.

Recent comments by Antiguan elected officials indicate the country intends to repay the bank instead of the defrauded investors, Peter D. Morgenstern, a lawyer for the investors' committee, wrote, meaning that "in essence, Antigua intends to use CD investors' money to pay itself."

Tom Bayko, Antigua's attorney, didn't immediately respond to voice or e-mail messages seeking comment on the lawsuit. In an earlier suit, Bayko said Antigua was protected from such litigation by foreign sovereign immunity.

Officials at the ECCB didn't immediately return telephone or e-mail messages seeking comment on the lawsuit.

Ralph Janvey, Stanford's court-appointed receiver, filed another lawsuit on Feb. 15 claiming breach of fiduciary duty lawsuit by 23 former directors and officers of Stanford's operations, including three executives convicted of furthering the fraud scheme. The suit seeks return of all compensation from these individuals, some of whom have been previously sued by the receiver on similar claims.

"Many directors and officers simply looked the other way, while others actively assisted Stanford in defrauding thousands of people out of billions of dollars," Kevin Sadler, Janvey's lead lawyer, said in the filing in Dallas federal court. They "put their continued employment and substantial compensation ahead of the best interests of the entities they were hired to serve," he said.

The cases are The Official Stanford Investors Committee v. Antigua and Barbuda, 3:13-cv-0760; The Official Stanford Investors Committee v. Bank of Antigua, 3:13-cv-0762; Janvey v. Alvarado, 3:13-cv-0775. All are in U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas (Dallas).

The main criminal case is U.S. v. Stanford, 09-cr-342, U.S. District Court, Southern District of Texas (Houston).

Source.

Visit the Stanford International Victims Group - SIVG official forum http://sivg.org/forum/

Dienstag, 22. Januar 2013

Ex-Stanford executive gets 5 years in $7B swindle

January 22, 2013
By JUAN A. LOZANO

The star prosecution witness in the trial of convicted Texas financier R. Allen Stanford was sentenced Tuesday to five years in prison for helping to bilk investors out of more than $7 billion in one of the biggest Ponzi schemes in U.S. history.

James M. Davis had faced up to 30 years in prison after pleading guilty in 2009 to three fraud and conspiracy charges as part of an agreement with prosecutors.

"I am ashamed and I'm embarrassed," Davis said at the sentencing hearing at Houston federal court. "I've perverted what was right and I hurt thousands of investors. I betrayed their trust and also associates and neighbors and friends and my family."

Prosecutors say Stanford persuaded investors to buy certificates of deposit from his Caribbean bank, then used that money to bankroll a string of failed businesses and his own lavish lifestyle, including a fleet of private jets and yachts.

At Stanford's trial last year, Davis - the former chief financial officer of Stanford's companies - portrayed his ex-boss as the leader of the fraud who burned through billions of CD deposits. He testified that he and Stanford faked the bank's profits and fabricated documents to hide the fraud.

Stanford, a one-time billionaire, was convicted in March on 13 of 14 fraud-related counts. He was sentenced to 110 years in prison and is serving his sentence in a Central Florida prison.

Many of the dramatic details at Stanford's fraud trial - including testimony about bribes and blood oaths - came from Davis.

Stanford's defense attorneys accused Davis of being behind the fraud and tried to discredit him by calling him a liar and tax cheat. Davis, who was Stanford's roommate at Baylor University for a semester in 1973, said he realized he was party to fraud when he was asked to lie to a potential investor to say the bank had insurance.

Davis said he was "one of those liars" who faked the bank's numbers but that Stanford was "the chief faker."

Another top executive in Stanford's now-defunct empire - former chief investment officer Laura Pendergest-Holt - was sentenced to three years in prison in September after pleading guilty to one count of obstruction of a U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission proceeding.

Two other ex-executives - Gilbert Lopez, the ex-chief accounting officer, and Mark Kuhrt, the ex-global controller - were convicted in November of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and nine counts of wire fraud. They are set to be sentenced Feb. 14.

A former Antiguan financial regulator was also indicted and awaits extradition to the U.S.

Source.

Visit the Stanford International Victims Group - SIVG official forum http://sivg.org/forum/

Montag, 30. Juli 2012

Order re. Chapter 15 / COMI

July 30, 2012
By U.S. District Judge David C. Godbey

The Court grants the Joint Liquidators' motion for substitution as Plaintiff nunc pro tunc to June 8, 2010 and grants in part and denies in part their request that the Court take judicial notice. The Court overrules the parties' objections to each others' evidence. Finally, because the Stanford Entities' COMI is in the United States and they have an establishment in Antigua, the Court grants the Antiguan Proceeding foreign nonmain recognition, granting in part and denying in part the Joint Liquidators' petition for recognition. The Court grants the Joint Liquidators limited, conditional relief under Chapter 15.

In accordance with this Order, the Court orders the Clerk of the Court to terminate Peter Wastell and Nigel Hamilton-Smith as Plaintiffs and add Marcus Wide and Hugh Dickson as Plaintiffs.

Order re. Chapter 15 / COMI.

Visit the Stanford International Victims Group - SIVG official forum http://sivg.org/forum/

Dienstag, 24. Juli 2012

Motion To Intervene and To Suspend the Memorandum Opinion and Order of July, 3, 2012

July 24, 2012
By Richard R. Cheatham

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 Richard R. Cheatham moves to intervene in this action in order to protect his interest in the subject of the action and pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 to suspend the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order of July, 3, 2012 pending reconsideration in light of the facts presented in connection Intervener's Motion to Intervene.

In support of this motion, Richard R. Cheatham relies on the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order of July, 3, 2012 and his Memorandum In Support of Motion To Intervene and To Suspend Memorandum Opinion and Order of July, 3, 2012.

Motion To Intervene and To Suspend the Memorandum Opinion and Order.

SENATE and HOUSE letter to Schapiro

July 2012 Senate Letter to Schapiro.

July 2012 House Letter to Schapiro.

SIPC OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO INTERVENE

On July 24, 2012, Richard Cheatham filed a motion to intervene and to "suspend" the Court's July 3 Opinion—three weeks after the fact. Although he provides no documentary evidence in support of his assertions, Cheatham contends that brokers from the Stanford Group Company ("SGC") purchased Stanford International Bank, Ltd. ("SIBL") CDs for him without his knowledge, and that the SEC failed to consider the "atypical" nature of these CD purchases in pursuing its case. The Court should reject Cheatham's thirteenth-hour motion for three separate and independent reasons...

Read the complete SIPC OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO INTERVENE.

Visit the Stanford International Victims Group - SIVG official forum http://sivg.org/forum/

Freitag, 6. April 2012

Opposition to the USA's motion to dismiss the complaint

April 6, 2012
By Dr. Gaytri D. Kachroo

Plaintiffs hereby oppose the United States of America's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (the "Motion"). This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action because the government fails to demonstrate that the discretionary function exception shields from liability the Securities and Exchange Commission's ("SEC") negligent failure to follow statutorily prescribed courses of action in the wake of its discovery of Robert Allen Stanford's Ponzi scheme.

The government's strategy on this Motion is to paint with a very broad brush. Thus, the government argues that "the manner in which the SEC chooses to regulate the securities industry" is discretionary conduct protected by the discretionary function exception in the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). Generalized this way, the government's argument obviously cannot be contested. But framing the issue this way only creates a paper tiger. The conduct challenged in this case is not the SEC's regulation of the industry writ large, but rather its failure to comply with two specific, non-discretionary mandates. The government's over-generalization of the issue is an effort to move the battle to safer ground. This misdirection does not survive scrutiny.

Moreover, such a macro approach to the discretionary function exception results in the reverse of what Congress intended, which was to construe the remedial provisions of the FTCA liberally and the exceptions narrowly. If every claim against the SEC were to be construed as an attack on "the manner in which the SEC chooses to regulate the securities industry," then this narrow exception would swallow the general waiver and afford the SEC virtual immunity, contrary to Congress' intent. Indeed, as the government itself points out, Congress considered exempting the SEC from the FTCA entirely, but ultimately, did not do so.

Thus, the crucial first step in determining whether the exception applies is to isolate the specific conduct actually being challenged. Here, the Complaint does not make a broad attack on the manner in which the SEC regulates the securities industry, but rather, challenges two specific instances of SEC inaction: (1) a failure to notify the Securities Investor Protection Corporation ("SIPC") that U.S. registered broker-dealer Stanford Group Company "SGC") was in financial difficulty, after concluding that it was; and (2) a failure to deny continued registration to SGC as an investment advisor in light of the SEC's determination that SGC failed to satisfy registration requirements.

These negligent omissions violated statutorily mandated duties to take prescribed courses of action and thus, were not and could not have been permissible policy choices. As the Supreme Court has explained and courts have consistently held, where there exists a mandatory responsibility, there is no room for a policy choice. Moreover, even if the government could show that the SEC's negligent omissions involved the exercise of judgment, the government also fails to demonstrate, as it must, that such judgment was grounded in considerations of public policy.

Source: PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT

Donnerstag, 5. April 2012

Stanford Judge Lets Receiver Raise Fee, Retains 20% Discount

April 5, 2012
By Andrew Harris and Edvard Pettersson

The court-appointed receiver for R. Allen Stanford can bill his time starting this year at 2012 rates with a 20 per cent discount in spite of objections by Stanford investors who haven't received any money so far.

U.S. District Judge David C. Godbey in Dallas, in an order yesterday, imposed a 10 per cent "holdback" on out-of-pocket expenses. In a separate order today, Godbey approved the payment of $1.6 million in fees and expenses that the receiver, Dallas lawyer Ralph Janvey, had requested and said he could apply later for the held-back amount of $382,253.

Janvey's outside counsel, Kevin Sadler, argued at a hearing yesterday that the receiver's team has been working at the same pay rates since 2009. Sadler said that Janvey, who regularly charges his clients $500 an hour, has been billing $340 an hour on the Stanford case and then discounting that by 20 per cent.

A federal jury in Houston last month found Stanford, 62, guilty of fraud in what prosecutors said was a $7 billion scheme involving bogus certificates of deposit at his Antigua-based bank. He's scheduled to be sentenced on June 14. Janvey, whom Godbey appointed in February 2009 -- four months before Stanford was indicted -- and his outside professionals, including Baker Botts LLP (1143L), have been paid more than $52 million. That sum doesn't include a court-imposed $16 million hold-back.

RESPONSE OF THE OFFICIAL STANFORD INVESTORS COMMITTEE

The Official Stanford Investors Committee (the "Committee"), respectfully submits this Response to the Receiver's Motion for Approval of Request to Amend Fee Structure and Holdback [Doc. No. 1543].

The Committee, which speaks for the more than 20,000 investor victims of Allen Stanford's Ponzi scheme, opposes the relief requested by the Receiver and his team of professionals. The Receiver's professionals have been well compensated in the 3 years of this Receivership, having collected well in excess of $52 million in fees (with an additional almost $16 million in reserve via the holdback). During this same time period the investor victims have not recovered a single penny as there have been no distributions. Given the current state of this receivership, the Committee cannot agree to giving the Receiver's professionals what is widely perceived within the investor community as a "raise".

Therefore the Committee opposes the relief requested.

Response of the official Stanford investors committee to Receiver's motion to amend fee structure and Holdback.