Allen Stanford filed on 24 April 2014 a Motion to Vacate

Motion to Vacate filed on 24 April 2014, based on:
1) SEC lack of jurisdictional or regulatory authority over SIB
2) Denial of Due Process, and improper venue for their complaint
3) Blatant violation of Stanford’s Fourth Amendment right to protection from illegal search and seizure
4) Fraud upon de Court in this matter

Janvey did not have warrants to seize all documents found in Stanford’s office.

Violation of the U.S. Computer and Wire Act. Janvey hired the FTI consulting, who got access illegally to the database located in Antigua. Once it was discovered, the access was shut off.

Stanford was denied to access some documents for his defense. In addition the denied access to the “select” material which was “mysteriously” relocated to a warehouse in Washington D.C. (there was enough room in Houston to store all the material, why did they move it to Washington?).

Stanford alleges that “select” material was the detailed customer account records of SIB obtained by Janvey illegally via “hacking”, and that the Government, through the Receiver, had very purposefully places well out of defense counsel’s reach.

Davis quickly pled to, for two reasons (a) he had embezzled vast amounts of money from the company, and (b) he was offered a deal that would allow him to avoid prosecution on the embezzling...

Reading the Motion to Vacate; the oral deposition of Karyl Van Tassel, who (unlicensed) firm (FTI) was being paid tens of millions of dollars to produce a certain result:

Attorney Matthew Nielson:
Q. Who prepared the Declaration?
A. (Van Tassel) The Declaration was prepared between FTI and Baker Botts.
Q. Okay. Who did the initial drafting?
A. Baker Botts did.
Q. The entire thing?
A. Yes.

Attorney Michael Stanley:
Q. you mentioned how a database had been compiled that had over 40 terabytes of information and 2.5 million documents.
A. (Van Tassel) Yes.
Q. Where do those documents come from?
A. Well, we talked about the Temenos database.
Q. It is fair to say that there have always been investments made with SIB money? I’ll make it a little more clear. When money came in from the depositors, this didn’t sit in a big burlap bag under Allen Stanford’s desk, did it?
A. No.
Q. Okay. It was actually put into banks and investments were made with that money, right?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Okay. Now, when the depositors wanted to redeem their CD’s, sometimes those redemptions would come from available cash, right?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Did it - it came from cash they had in the accounts that had not been invested in private equity, right?
A. Or otherwise disseminated throughout the organization, yes.

Stanley started asking about the accounts located in other banks and Van Tassel could not answer how many accounts are, how much money was deposited, how much money is currently available... 

Stanley also asked about how many companies received money from SIB (as investment from Stanford). Van Tassel could not exactly answer that question.

Stanley asked her why she said it was a Ponzi scheme from the beginning. Van Tassel said she got that information from Davis’s testimony. Van Tassel did not make any research or looked at the balance sheets to confirm whether SIB was solvent or not.

Attorney Mark Goranson to Van Tassel:
Q. I want to talk a little bit about, you had experience, excluding the Stanford matter, on two other matters that involved Ponzi schemes; is that correct?
A. (Van Tassel) Yes.
Q. Okay. And one involved, I think you said, a computer reseller; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And who were you retained by?
A. A law firm and I can’t recall the name.
Q. And did you issue a written report in that case?
A. No.
Q. And the second matter, I believe you said, was a real estate matter.
A. Yes.
Q. And the name of the lawsuit?
A. I don’t recall.
Q. And who retained you?
A. I don’t remember the name of the law firm


Jim Davis was an admitted “crook”, “coward”, “fraudster”, “liar” and “thief” who, to avoid 30 years of hard time would have said and admitted to anything asked of him - up to an including, if necessary, the Kennedy assassination. Though not yet faced with prison time, Karyl Van Tassel, Senior Managing Director of FTI Consulting, had an equally compelling reason to “find”, “declare” and provide “attestations” consistent with the predeterminations contained in the SEC’s complaint...

In other words, in all of her “Declarations” in the Stanford matter, Ms. Van Tassel, CPA, was attesting to work performed by a firm that had no license to perform such work - and nowhere in any of the required locations did she or her firm (FTI) indicate by way of disclaimer that “This firm is not a CPA firm”, and that the forensic accounting and investigatory work they were performing was being done with total disregard to the applicable laws in Texas.

FTI aided and abetted the SEC and DOJ in their fraudulent pursuit of SIB, the concealment of an international crime, and ultimately, the purposeful denial of information that would have proven the solvency of SIB; and thus the innocence of RAS. Additional evidentiary support for this conclusion is found in the Receiver’s decision to employ both the unlicensed FTI, and the more widely known and reputable (and appropriately licensed) accounting firm Ernst & Young. As there can be no other reason for retaining both of these firms, and it is thus abundantly clear that the more accommodating and less reputable FTI was needed here to attest to the financial manipulations necessary to corroborate the SEC’s allegation of a Ponzi scheme.

Attorney Dick DeGuerin asked FTI’s lead forensic auditor, Jeffrey Ferguson the following question:
Q. This isn’t a Ponzi scheme, is it?
A. (Mr Ferguson FTI) I haven’t formulated an opinion on that.
(Mr. DeGuerin to the Court): “This is a gentleman who’s a certified fraud examiner, whose firm has [already] been paid $6 million dollars to look at records, and he cannot say under oath that this is a Ponzi scheme.

And then, 3 years later, after the thousands of media slanderings and the total destruction of his global company, his life and an untold number of other lives, based on Karyl Van Tassel’s findings of a “Ponzi scheme”...

BUT Van Tassel said she got that information (that it was a Ponzi scheme) from Davis’s testimony. Van Tassel did not make any research or looked at the balance sheets to confirm whether SIB was solvent or not.

Read more: http://sivg.org/forum/view_topic.php?t=eng&id=255

Visit the Stanford International Victims Group - SIVG official forum http://sivg.org/forum/

Stanford Victims might get SIPC

April 27, 2011

The Securities Investor Protection Corp. (SIPC) - touted as a backstop against brokerage losses - can not longer refuse to cover losses by investors in financier Allen Stanford's alleged $7 billion fraud.

People believe their money is protected by SIPC - and they are right!

SIPC is a non-profit corporation funded by its members -- securities broker-dealers -- whose clients get some insurance against loss. SIPC makes good when a brokerage fails.

Literature for the Antigua-based Stanford International Bank, through which Stanford is accused of selling billions of dollars worth of bogus, high-yielding certificates of deposit, bore the SIPC logo, generally regarded as a seal of approval for financial institutions.

Under U.S. law, SIPC repays up to $500,000 in custodial losses to investors whose securities are missing from accounts at member firms. The protection doesn’t extend to investors who’ve got their certificates, even if the securities have been rendered worthless by fraudulent conduct. However the declaration of the forensic accountant Karyl Van Tassel, found that money that was supposed to buy certificates of deposit at Stanford's Antiguan bank was diverted for other purposes.

The 50+ members of Congress who signed the letter to the SEC

We are aware of several issues the SEC staff has raised with respect to whether Stanford Victims qualify for SIPC coverage. It is our understanding that SEC counsel has informally stated that SGC customers are not eligible for SIPC coverage at this time because (1) SGC was merely an introducing broker-dealer, and (2) SIPC is not meant to compensate customers of worthless securities. Before making a formal decision, we request the SEC consider the facts set forth in the Declaration of Karyl Van Tassel (attached hereto as "Exhibit A"), which illustrates how the funds for SGC were generally routed to continue Stanford’s fraudulent business practices, rather then purchasing securities. Read the complete letter here!

Mary L. Schapiro’s response

I assure you that the SEC is taking the situation of the Stanford Victims Coalition ("SVC") members, and all other Stanford victims, very seriously, and is investigating closely their status under SIPA. Commission staff, which has already devoted substantial time and effort on this issue, is striving to complete, as soon as possible, its investigation and review of the relevant facts relating to the Stanford case with a view to determining whether a legal basis exists for a SIPA liquidation of SGC. Read the complete letter here!

Missing or Worthless

Some investors’ lawyers complain SIPC is splitting hairs by limiting coverage to securities that are "missing" instead of rendered worthless by fraud.

"The Madoff clients’ securities were never there, so SIPC covers that loss and has been paying like slot machines," Stanley, who represents Stanford investors, said in an interview. Based on the declaration of the forensic accountant Karyl Van Tassel, Stanford investors should also be covered by SIPC.

Both Ways

"The SEC can’t have it both ways," Malouf said (who represents mostly Latin American investors). "They’re taking my clients’ money and using it to pay non-bank debts. If it is all one company, then there couldn’t have been any CDs purchased from a separate independent bank."

If the SEC believes that "all the Stanford universe is one consolidated entity," Malouf said, then Stanford’s Antiguan certificates of deposit "are exactly what SIPC covers, fraud." In previous similar cases, non-member affiliate companies were also granted with SIPC cover.

SEC spokesman Kevin Callahan declined to comment when asked to clarify the agency’s position on whether Stanford’s businesses should be treated as a consolidated entity. 

Source: http://sivg.org/article/stanford_investors_SIPC.html

Visit the Stanford International Victims Group - SIVG official forum http://sivg.org/forum/

Forensic accountant gives Stanford investors a little hope

By LOREN STEFFY
HOUSTON CHRONICLE
February 15, 2011

For two years, Stanford Financial Group's victims have struggled with the grim reality of their situation. Not only is their money gone, but every safety net has failed them. Now, they're hoping a new finding by a forensic accountant will give them a better chance at getting some of their money back.

Last week, investors circulated a declaration by FTI Consulting, an accounting firm hired by receiver Ralph Janvey to determine whether Stanford investors should be covered by the Securities Investor Protection Corp - SIPC.

The ruling found that money that was supposed to buy certificates of deposit at Stanford's Antiguan bank was diverted for other purposes.

The finding "100 percent supports the legal argument we've made" to get investors covered by SIPC, Angela Shaw, the head of the Stanford Victims Coalition, said in an e-mail sent to other investors.

After all, SIPC is covering some of the losses for Bernie Madoff's victims because he never bought the stocks he told clients he'd bought for them.

While the two cases may seem similar, they aren't. Nothing about the accountant's findings in the Stanford case changes SIPC's determination that investors aren't covered, said Stephen Harbeck, SIPC's chief executive. "We don't see a customer that we can protect," he said.

SIPC doesn't cover lost investment value, even if there may be fraud involved. Stanford investors' money may have been diverted, but the CDs did exist and the bank still had records of investors owning them, the accountant's report found. What was falsified, according to the Securities and Exchange Commission, was the assets that backed up those CDs.

Hoping SEC will step in

Stanford investors, though, hope the FTI report will encourage the SEC, which missed so many warnings about Stanford for so long, to ask SIPC to extend the coverage. So far, it hasn't. The SEC could even sue SIPC to compel it to cover Stanford's victims, but that's never happened.

"In this instance, both parties agree that there's no cause to initiate coverage," Harbeck said. "We were not designed to replace the initial purchase price when a security goes down in value."

That, of course, is not what Stanford victims want to hear. And who can blame them? After all, they weren't chasing exorbitant returns on risky investments. They thought they were buying a safe haven low-risk CDs - in a time of market turmoil. In many cases, they were following the advice of their trusted brokers.

Confusing to investors

SIPC is a narrowly defined insurance fund. The arcane details of its limitations have confused investors for years - at least the few who were even aware it existed.

In creating SIPC, Congress was careful to insure against broker misconduct, but not to shield investors from risk that, recent Wall Street bailouts aside, is supposed to be a part of investing.

The Stanford case, though, raises the question of whether that law needs amending. After all, the SEC claims Stanford brokers peddled the bogus CDs, collecting commissions for selling them to clients of the company's brokerage operation, which was a SIPC member.

In other words, SIPC coverage enhanced the veneer of credibility that Stanford used to sell itself to investors, and the FTI report describes a SIPC member firm that was diverting funds from customer purchases without the customers' knowledge. The fact that the alleged fraud wasn't quite as blatant as Madoff's - an obfuscation instead of an outright lie - is a hairline distinction with multibillion-dollar consequences.

Improvements ahead?

Given all the damage from Stanford's collapse, perhaps some good can yet come from the ashes. Perhaps Congress can review the law and build better protections for future investors.

SIPC touts itself as investors' first line of defense. For Stanford investors, it may be their last hope. The forensic accounting declaration makes it very clear that any funds that were intended to buy securities did not in fact reach its purpose; no securities were ever purchased and in fact it was only “fictitious securities.” Fictitious securities have been covered by SIPC in previous cases.

SIPC was denied until now with the excuse that investors got securities, but they are worthless because the Bank got broke and SIPC doesn’t insure worthless securities. But now with this declaration of Karyl Van Tassel, all the victims will get SIPC cover based on previous similar cases.

Nonmember affiliate company were also granted with SIPC cover

SIPC member
Old Naples Securities
First Interregional Equity Corporation
Churchill Securities
New Times Securities Services (New Times)

Nonmember affiliate(s)
Old Naples Financial Services
First Interregional Advisors Corporation
CD Investment Group Churchill Mortgage Investment Corporation
New Age Securities (New Age)

Source: http://sivg.org/article/SGC_Forensic_Accounting_Van_Tassel.html

Visit the Stanford International Victims Group - SIVG official forum http://sivg.org/forum/